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ABSTRACT
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1926-1935
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The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Neal Pease

Following its reemergence on the map of Europe in 1919, the Second Polish
Republic found itself wedged between a revisionist German state and a world revolutionseeking communist Russia. Although it procured alliances with France and Romania,
territorial issues spoiled relations with neighboring states and revisions to the post-World
War I order began to raise serious concerns over the Republic’s security in East Central
Europe. Seven years later and after the May coup by Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the Sanacja
regime emerged as the Republic’s caretaker and instituted an exotic foreign policy that
saw Poland become self-dependent and adopt the sub-policy of equilibrium or
“równowaga.” This thesis focuses on the formation of Sanacja’s foreign policy during a
nine-year period from 1926 to 1935, through the examination of relations between Poland
and its allies, perceived enemies, neighbors, and the overall changing political
atmosphere in Europe.
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INTRODUCTION
From 1926 to 1935 the Second Polish Republic was ruled by the Sanacja regime
under the tutelage of Marshal Józef Piłsudski.1 Its political ideology was derived from the
term’s meaning, aiming to morally purify a Polish state whose political arena had spiraled
out of control in recent years. Although domestic instability was the primary motive for
Pilsudski’s seizure of power in May 1926, once in control the Marshal had devoted most
of his time in shaping Polish foreign policy.
Poland’s place in Europe’s interwar period was nothing new when compared to its
past, as the reborn Republic found itself yet again wedged in between two large and
aggressive neighbors in Germany and Russia. Only this time, the Polish nation did not
find itself imprisoned by the great 19th century empires of Europe under a Kaiser or a
Tsar. Germany was left with overwhelming feelings of bitterness due to the unfavorable
terms that the Treaty of Versailles forced upon it. Russia saw two revolutions replace its
autocracy with a communist party whose goal was to spread the proletariat revolution
abroad. But regardless of their new postwar forms, both states shared a common interest
in that they could not reconcile the very thought of an independent Polish state.
The longevity of the Republic’s independence and cultural life relied on
preventing the past from repeating. Namely, that Germany and Russia’s collaboration
could only serve to bring about the end of the Polish state. Thus it was imperative for
Polish foreign policy to prevent such a possibility by continuously working to protect

1

Some historians classify the regime as encompassing the additional four years between the Marshal’s
death in 1935, and the capitulation of the Republic at the onset of World War II in 1939. However I classify
the period from 1935-1939 not under the Sanacja regime, but under the Colonels regime, one that was
without the Marshal’s direction but composed of many former military colleagues of his who lacked his
foresight in policy-making.
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Poland’s interests and find guarantees for its security. Though the Paris Peace Conference
had established a postwar system to promote and maintain peace, gradual changes over
the following years began to undermine that structure and threaten to swing the pendulum
away from Poland’s favorable position.
Sanacja’s foreign policy did not seek to undo what the regime’s predecessors had
done. The main issues that made this nine-year period of Polish foreign policy stand out
were the dangerous circumstances that the Republic had found itself in by the time
Piłsudski seized power. Domestic instability, continuous cabinet changes, and
subsequently, the lack of consistent policies caused the failure in the Republic’s search
and adaptation of a uniform foreign policy. Whereas the Locarno Agreements created a
dangerous precedent for territorial revisionism to strike at the Republic’s borders, the
Treaty of Rapallo revived the late 18th century idea of German-Russian collaboration that
could only end disastrously for Poland. Perhaps a greater problem lay in the fact that
Poland’s allies, France and Romania, had drifted away from full cooperation within a
defensive system created to guarantee each other’s security. The Sanacja regime inherited
the reins of a state that had been geopolitically isolated and whose security was left
exposed.
My choice in time frame is based on the following observation: the large majority
of scholarship has tended to focus on Polish foreign policy during the whole interwar
period, from 1919-1939. While there does exist a smaller collection of scholarship that
groups Sanacja with its successors, the Colonels regime, I find merit in separating the two
and devoting greater attention to the former.2 The focus of my thesis is to examine how
2

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the differences between the Sanacja regime and the
Colonels regime, even if only centered on foreign policy. Although the latter inherited the Marshal’s
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the Sanacja regime under its chief architect, Marshal Piłsudski, attempted to bring Poland
out of its geopolitical isolation and secure its position in East Central Europe, using
methods that differed from the regime’s predecessors. The basic phenomenon that its
foreign policy presents us with is that it made Poland increasingly self-reliant in its search
for security over the nine-year period, rather than place its independence in the hands of
institutions such as the League of Nations, which tended to disregard its interests over the
years. In order to display this, particular attention is paid to Poland’s neighbors
(Germany, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union) and allies (France
and Romania), and what changes it made to conducting diplomatic relations with these
states. Though I spend more time examining Poland’s position vis-à-vis them,
background information on their position in Interwar Europe has been provided as well. I
then place these interactions within the European political scene in order to test their
reactions to the changes taking place, such as the introduction of international concepts
like the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or regional schemes such as the Eastern Pact.
For purposes of clarity, the thesis is composed of five chapters that divide up the
nine-year period in to blocks of years. Chapter one introduces us to the rebirth of and the
first seven years of the Second Polish Republic. It provides a background on the state’s
social, economic, political, and foreign policy makeup, culminating in Piłsudski’s coup
and subsequent consolidation of Sanacja’s rule over Poland. Chapter two introduces us to
the origins of Sanacja’s foreign policy, where its blueprint is presented and initial
interactions with Poland’s neighbors and allies take place. Following drastic changes in
the European political scene within the first three years, Chapter Three presents the
policies, it failed to maintain them or make the necessary adjustments to avoid Nazi and Soviet aggression
in the fall of 1939.
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radical shift in foreign policy to accommodate them. Poland continues to grow
independent of the influence of its allies and the League of Nations, and exhibits
aggressive tactics in order to counter foreign actions that are deemed detrimental to its
interests. Poland’s position vis-à-vis the rise of Nazi Germany and Europe’s answer in
appeasing and or neutralizing it are examined in Chapter Four. And finally, the last five
months of Sanacja’s foreign policy under the tutelage of Marshal Piłsudski, as well as a
brief overview of the Republic’s last four years of independence, are laid out in Chapter
Five.
When originally planning this thesis, my goal was to identify something new or
original about the topic. But there was little feasibility in attempting such a venture.
Under the guidance of my adviser and thesis committee, I reworked the goal of this
project into something that could perhaps be more contributing to the existing
scholarship. From the view of Sanacja Poland, my thesis attempts to reconstruct the
events occurring in Interwar Europe from 1926-1935, recounting the decay in the
postwar-Versailles system and Sanacja’s subsequent response to it. My intention is not to
absolve the Republic of its shortcomings or to glorify any of its achievements, but to
argue that its security was the safest in the hands of this particular regime. Poland and
Europe may have fallen victim to Nazi and Soviet aggression in 1939, but this thesis will
show that there were attempts made by the former to avoid the road less traveled, the
road to another world war and deprivation of independence.
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I. THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC
From Independence to Sanacja
Absent for over 123 years, Poland returned to the map of Europe following the
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires at the end of
World War I. The Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination became a guideline for the
Polish representation at the Paris Peace Conference, to help the young Polish state ease
back into its form as an independent state in Europe. Although diplomats from the
victorious Allied side crafted the peace to “never again” bring about such a devastating
war and reconstruct a Europe with independent states primarily in East Central Europe,
the bayonets of the Polish army also played a large part in forging the borders of the
Second Polish Republic.
The Republic’s borders stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Danubian basin,
situated yet again between two large neighbors in Germany and Russia, and bordering
also newly established states such as Czechoslovakia and Lithuania. While the Polish
army conquered or seized pieces of territory on its eastern frontier, the Paris Peace
Conference had awarded it with territories at the expense of Germany to form its western
frontier. Through various special commissions and plebiscites, contested territories such
as Upper Silesia and Eastern Galicia for the most part were handed to Poland. After much
dispute between Poland and Germany, the port city of Danzig (Gdańsk) became a free
city in which Poland received exclusive rights such as vital access to the Baltic.
Ethnically the state was composed of about 70 percent Poles but also an enormous 30
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percent mixture of various minorities such as Germans, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and
Jews among the larger groups.3
World War I’s effects were extremely devastating to the Polish countryside and in
turn, set the postwar economy back when compared to Western Europe. An incredible 90
percent of land hosted the battles of the Eastern Front, 25 percent of which was
continuously fought on. 4 Like most of the region, Poland had never completely
industrialized during the 19th century. The war did not fare well on what little industries
the country did possess, as the retreating German and Russian armies had looted or razed
the majority of them. Plants were stripped of machinery and raw materials, all of which
was taken back to their respective countries. 5 Historically known to be agriculturally
dominant, Polish farms and livestock also suffered from the war. Fields were depleted
from continuous warfare, the retreating armies had taken livestock, and class differences
showed that the aristocracy was still unwilling to cede land to the large peasant
population of Poland.6
Politically, the new Republic was designed on the parliamentarian democracy
model, consisting of the Sejm as the lawmaker of the land. In its first four years it did not
have a president but instead was led by the Polish Legionnaires’ wartime leader Jozef
Piłsudski. Returning from his internment at Magdeburg in November 1918, he was
named and confirmed by the Sejm as de facto head of state. But Piłsudski did not wish to

3

Although outdated, Stephen Horak’s Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-39 (New York: Vantage
Press, 1961) still serves as a good, general survey describing the roles and history of minorities in Interwar
Poland.
4
About 30-40 percent of farms and or homes in some regions were completely destroyed as a result of
Polish territory hosting the Eastern Front of World War I. Czesław Brzoza and Andrzej Leon Sowa,
Historia Polski 1918-1945 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2006), 170.
5
This method of “total war” was used primarily by Germany to prevent the reemergence of a Polish state
who could threaten to rival it industrially. Brzoza i Sowa, 171.
6
The peasantry had been the dominant class in Polish society, constituting 53.5 percent of the population.
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become dictator of Poland but rather help secure its political stability and its place in
Europe. He worked with the Sejm to create a constitution and establish the presidency.
Unfortunately the contrasting ideologies of Piłsudski and the Rightist National
Democrats, who dominated the legislature, led the latter to tailor a constitution in 1921
that severely emasculated the presidency and greatly strengthened the legislative branch.7
Until 1926, Poland was ruled by what many referred to as “Sejmocracy”.
But inept domestic politics severely plagued the Republic and caused much
internal instability. Bitter rivalries and continuous cabinet changes (fourteen up until May
1926) had stagnated the attempted progression in social, economic, and most notably
political sectors of the country. Piłsudski had refused to run for the presidency in 1922,
citing that the constitution and the Sejm itself were largely built to oppose him or at the
least severely restrict his role in Polish politics. Rather, he chose to focus solely on the
military that he took great pride in and revered as his own appendage. Piłsudski would
retire in early 1923 as a result of the assassination of his close friend and first president of
Poland Gabriel Narutowicz. He had largely blamed the Right for the president’s death
and refused to serve or even have himself associated with them.8 A new election brought
in another long-time associate of Piłsudski’s during their days as socialists in the Russian
empire, Stanisław Wojciechowski. Unfortunately Wojciechowski’s tenure was marred by
the Sejm’s emasculation of the executive branch, with the President himself unwilling or
claiming to be too powerless to challenge the legislative.

7

The president was not able to be commander-in-chief during wartime, and any legislation he signed would
require a signature from the prime minister. He could not dissolve the Sejm, while the latter could only
dismiss the prime minister and his cabinet. The Sejm had secured and enjoyed complete protection under
the law it had molded itself. Antoni Czubinski, Przewrót Majowy 1926 roku (Warszawa: Młodzieżowa
Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989), 40.
8
Joseph Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup D’état (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 9.
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Poland’s financial woes were not only due to its postwar situation, but also due to
the continuous change in government. Hardcore hyperinflation hit Poland in 1923
practically as hard as the worldwide depression later on in 1929. It was only under the
cabinet and leadership of Władysław Grabski that Poland found some temporary stability,
with the creation of a the Polish złoty which replaced the value-plummeting Polish mark
in April 1924. Despite the longest tenure of all of Poland’s interwar cabinets, Grabski’s
fell after due to a clash of interests and the return of hyperinflation, in addition to a tariff
war waged by Germany in 1925. The cabinet of his successor, Count Aleksander
Skrzyński, did not fare any better. Although he also held the portfolio of foreign minister
and showed more interest in that than domestic affairs, Skrzyński desperately tried to
maintain his government. But it was doomed when the rivalry between the Left and Right
reached such extreme levels to the point where the former’s ministers resigned in protest
over the Right’s continuous political abuses. The succeeding cabinet of Wincenty Witos
on May 6, 1926 was thus made up of mostly members of the Center and Right parties. It
would however last only about a week as it triggered one of the most monumental
moments in Polish history.
Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s successful coup d’état that began on May 12, 1926 and
ended a few days later, had violently shaken the domestic scene in Poland. His return
from retirement had been in the making since late 1925.9 A mixture of verbal assaults
aimed at him, political abuses by the Sejm, and most notably the latter’s tampering with
the military had set off this radical change in the Republic. Since his retirement, the Right

9

Piłsudski had given countless interviews where he explained how Poland’s problems could be corrected.
But since late 1925, various pro-Piłsudski officers were being placed in key military positions. For an
overview of the organization of conspirational activity to bring the Marshal back to power, see Rothschild,
76-80.
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had continuously attacked him in the press, citing him as a has-been or as one political
opponent labeled him, “a political corpse”. 10 The deterioration of Poland’s social and
economic climates due to political antics worried the Marshal who felt that any morality
left in Poland was dying off. But attempts to subjugate the military under full political
control truly brought about the Marshal’s wrath, as since 1924 he had countlessly warned
Poland’s multiple governments about the dangers of civilian influence in military matters.
With the military command project never resolved since Piłsudski’s days as war minister
in 1923 and the Right solidifying control over Poland, the Marshal had been antagonized
enough and chose to execute his coup.
With the Marshal in full control it was time for many changes to be put into
motion. Thus until his death in 1935, the Sanacja regime increasingly solidified its rule
over the Republic. The regime’s focus was derived from the term’s meaning, where
Piłsudski’s entourage wished to bring about the state’s moral purification by eliminating
the abuse and corruption from the past. Disliking the idea of dictatorship, Piłsudski called
upon elections where the well renowned physicist Ignacy Mościcki was elected President
of the Republic.11 A trusted associate of the Marshal’s, Kazimierz Bartel, was given the
reins to the government as Prime Minister and compiled a cabinet made up of mainly
pro-Piłsudskiists. By 1928, Piłsudski had helped create a political bloc in the Sejm called
the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR). Its concept was to
not only unite parties who were interested in promoting the interests and welfare of the
Republic, but to rip power away from the Center and Right parties that Piłsudski had

10

Rothschild, 53.
Józef Piłsudski, Pisma Zbiorowe: Tom IX (Warszawa: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1937) 22. The
Marshal’s only request was that he retain the portfolio of War Minister, that his original military command
project would be passed, and that he become Inspector General of Armies.
11
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blamed for Poland’s problems of the past seven years. Sanacja’s tightening grip on the
legislature was not only for domestic policies to cater towards its political agenda, but to
also bring about a balance in power. The 1921 constitution was slightly revised in order
to strengthen the presidency and avoid showdowns with the opposition. Sanacja had for
the most part, enjoyed widespread and popular support among the Polish nation. The
economy was balanced, with foreign loans (most notably the Stabilization Loan from
American and European bankers) being invested in various state projects and
unemployment being at it’s lowest in the entire interwar period. 12 And despite the
hardships of the worldwide depression, it prevented hyperinflation from occurring for a
third time and maintained the state’s budget.
As time progressed the Sanacja regime displayed more authoritarian tendencies.
The 1928 “Czechowicz affair” shed light on the mismanaging of state funds by the
overspending of 563 million złoty the previous fiscal year. When the Świtalski
government attempted to create a conference to settle the affair, the Center and Left
parties (the Centrolew coalition) chose to prosecute the finance minister Gabriel
Czechowicz instead. 13 Originally supportive of Piłsudski’s return to power and the
Sanacja regime, the Centrolew had begun to distance itself from both, most notably when
their candidate Ignacy Daszyński defeated Sanacja’s for the position of Marshal of the
Sejm. Sanacja began to replace many of the Centrolew candidates with its own, to
prevent the coalition from becoming a challenger to its control over domestic policy.14

12

By 1928, only 80,000 individuals were unemployed, yet wages remained realistic, consumption
increased, and the standard of living increased. Sowa, 201.
13
It also attempted to oust the Świtalski government who had backed their finance minister. Antony
Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1972), 290-291.
14
It was seen as a challenger to the Sejm-dominated BBWR.
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When the Sejm was to reconvene for a budgetary session on October 31, 1929 after a
long recess, the first clash of interests between the Centrolew and the Sanacja regime
occurred when Daszyński refused to open a Sejm surrounded by armed officers.15
But it was the “Brześć affair” that put an end to the Centrolew’s growing
defiance. The latter had hosted a congress in Kraków on June 29, 1930, where they drew
up a manifesto demanding an end to a Piłsudski-influenced government, and the
formation of a constitutional one that would work together with parliament to solve the
country’s economic problems.16 In front of a large crowd, the congress declared an end to
the Piłsudski dictatorship where even the president had been “subject to the dictator’s
will.”17 Another rally held on September 14 finally broke the Sanacja’s tolerance and
resulted in the arrest of nineteen deputies and senators. They were detained in the fortress
of Brześć and subjected to harsh conditions and unheard of abuses. Subsequent trials
observed that “their ‘revolutionary’ activity was alleged to have consisted of inciting
hatred towards the Government among the masses, calling on them to overthrow the
regime by force, ‘organizing, schooling, and arming revolutionary cadres, and forming a
central revolutionary organization under the name of the [Centrolew]’.”18 The majority of
the accused were convicted and given lengthy sentences, with some choosing to emigrate.
The affair may have silenced the opposition but it drew large criticism from some
sections of society. New elections were called in November 1930, with Sanacja
overwhelmingly winning seats in the Sejm and Senate. Its consolidation of control over

15

Piłsudski and his officers’ presence had been widely regarded as an attempt to pressure the Sejm to
retroactively appropriate funds to balance the 1927-28 budget that the Czechowicz affair had affected. The
affair itself was resolved in late 1930 with the necessary adjustments made. For an account of the
showdown between Piłsudski and Daszyński, see Piłsudski, IX, 194-196.
16
Rothschild, 349. Polonsky, 309.
17
Polonsky, 310.
18
Polonsky, 341.
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Poland’s domestic issues had been completed, but at the price of leaving lasting
emotional and psychological scars. In the last five years the regime would successfully
continue to pass legislation in its favor, highlighted by a new constitution in April 1935.
At best the Sanacja regime was of a semi-authoritarian character where although
Piłsudski largely influenced important decision-making, he still respected the Republic’s
constitution and executive branch. His fear of parliamentarian abuse certainly triggered
his coup and brought about the birth of Sanacja, whose aim was to restore morality in a
country continuously seeking domestic stability. As time went on, the regime
increasingly monopolized its hold over not just the executive but also the legislative
branch in an effort to promote the interests of the state. When met with opposition, it
resorted to strong-arm tactics after attempts at negotiation proved futile due to political or
even ideological differences. But when comparing Sanacja to the first seven years of the
Republic’s existence, its merits outweighed its abuses. Piłsudski had put an end to
parliamentarianism, which had flirted with potential disaster and provided no clear plan
for the Republic’s future. Sanacja had corrected various legislation and state functions
that had been previously used by political parties as weapons against opponents and tools
for self-enrichment. The nine-year period from May 1926 to 1935 saw the reborn Second
Polish Republic enjoy the most domestic stability in the whole twenty-year period.
Reborn Poland within a Reconstructed Europe
While Piłsudski and the new Polish government in Warsaw formally enacted and
enforced domestic and foreign policies, it was the Polish delegation at the Paris Peace
Conference that continued to seek favorable political, territorial, and economic rewards
for the new state. The Conference’s Supreme Council reserved the right to make
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decisions regarding territorial settlements in East Central Europe. “The Allies stressed
their belief that they had to determine all postwar problems, whatever they were and
wherever they arose.”19 The Polish delegation’s task was to present Poland’s territorial
demands based on arguments of historic, ethnic, and even economical significance.
Before the state could create an official foreign policy, it needed to secure its place in
Europe through diplomacy and combat.
After the conclusion of the First World War, territory in East Central Europe was
up for grabs at the expense of the dissolved empires. But this frenzy became a potential
prospect for another war breaking out. The first known conflict involving Polish
territorial questions involved the struggle over Teschen with Czechoslovakia. Both sides
had created local governments there in October 1918, and both laid claims to it at the
Peace Conference. Polish arguments based along ethnic lines resonated slightly stronger
than that of the Czech economic ones, as the city had an enormous ethnic Polish
population.20 Yet before the Allies could decide the region’s fate, the Czechs forced a fait
accompli through partial military occupation of the region in late January 1919. Despite a
provisional treaty signed by both sides to partition the region temporarily, the Czechs
attacked the Polish half a month later. Their reasoning for aggression was the state’s
desire to recover its historic frontier, which it successfully accomplished in the summer
of 1920 at Spa. The Allies awarded the large majority of Teschen to Czechoslovakia at
the expense of Poland, whose diplomatic maneuvering had been severely limited by its

19

Roman Dębicki, Foreign Policy of Poland 1919-1939 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 24.
Czechoslovakian political thought felt that historical, economic, and strategic considerations would
triumph over ethnographic ones when it came to territorial acquisition. Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, “PolishCzechoslovak Relations, 1918-1922,” The Slavonic and East European Review 35, (1956), 177-178.

20
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reliance on Allied support in its struggle against the Soviet Union’s advancing Red Army
in the Polish-Soviet War.
After Germany had officially surrendered in the war, so began the withdrawal of
its troops from Poland. Unfortunately the Eastern Front army proved to be a headache in
its stubbornness to relinquish the Oberkommando-Ostfront (Ober-Ost) borderland. Yet
towards the end of its evacuation a greater problem had emerged for Poland. A power
vacuum had formed as it vied with a new Russia, the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics – USSR), over the territory and the race to create their own favorable
borders. For Piłsudski’s Poland, the aim was to create a federalist system of states with
the Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia forming a bloc against the USSR.
The idea was based on the romantic idea of resurrecting the Jagiellonian concept, a Polish
state that chaired over other national minorities. Yet Piłsudski had no plans to recreate
exactly the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before its partitions in the late 18th
century. Under the Federalist system, the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian national
minorities would have their own autonomous states under Polish tutelage. The PolishSoviet War proved to be more than a conflict over open terrain. It was a clash of
opposing political and even religious ideologies, with parliamentarian democracy facing
off against socialist communism and Christianity versus atheism. 21 Whereas Poland’s
independence was at stake, the Soviet Union aimed at maintaining the Russian empire but
under the Marxist model of a working class state. On a grander scale, Poland was seen by

21

Although outdated, Norman Davies’ White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London:
MacDonald, 1972) still serves as a highly detailed monograph on the event, filled with perspectives from
both sides and lively commentary from the author. For Polish-Soviet relations, including the war itself,
consult Piotr S. Wandycz, Polish-Soviet Relations 1917-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1969).
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the Soviet Union as the obstacle to exporting the proletarian revolution to the rest of
Europe, particularly a defeated German state.22
In the beginning stages of the war, the Polish army had pushed the Soviets out of
the Ober-Ost up to Kiev. But the tide turned when the latter answered with a devastating
counterattack, breaking Polish lines and advancing to within the gates of Warsaw in
August 1920. The “Miracle on the Vistula” saw Polish forces repel the Red Army, break
its divisions, and throw it into complete disarray on its retreat back to the Soviet Union. A
peace treaty was signed months later in March 1921 at Riga, where multiple
compensations were agreed upon such as an official border that favored Poland.23 Along
with domestic political opponents who favored the Piast model for a Polish state, the
Jagiellonian concept was not realized with the conclusion of the war. 24 States not
awarded with statehood by the Paris Peace Conference such as Belarus and Ukraine, were
divided up by Poland and the Soviet Union. 25 But the Polish-Soviet War had many
repercussions for both sides. For the Poles, it became a great sense of national pride for
the reborn state and lifted Piłsudski’s cult image to such levels that would clearly emerge
years later during his staged coup d’état. Yet the incorporation of Ukrainian and
Belarusian lands gave Poland one of the largest population of national minorities of any
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state in Europe, which would have profound consequences down the road.26 But for the
Soviet Union the war brought about a reality check and spelled the end of the premature
desire of spreading world revolution. It solidified Moscow’s isolation from the rest of
Europe, but also brought about a newer focus to win the civil war it had been embroiled
in against counterrevolutionary forces since late 1917. The ultimate end result was that
the Polish-Soviet War added another chapter in historic Polish-Russian relations, where
coexistence between the two was grudgingly accepted and abnormal for the next couple
of years.
Poland’s eastern frontier had been solidified. Yet the year 1921 saw further
developments in the final shaping of the Polish state and its borders. Although Lithuania
did not engage directly in the Polish-Soviet War, it was caught in the crossfire as the city
of Vilna continuously traded occupants throughout the two-year struggle. Historically, it
had been the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s capital until the state’s union with Poland in
1569. Until Poland’s partitions, the city was seen as a key cultural center for the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth among cities like Lvov, Warsaw, and Kraków. When both
states reemerged independently after the Great War, Lithuania was granted the city and
the Poles launched their objections. 27 Born in the city, Piłsudski held a particular
fondness towards it and saw it as a perfect addition to his federalist concept. Even Polish
opposition circles favored Vilna’s annexation.
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In the beginning stages of the Polish-Soviet War with the Red Army edging
closer, the Lithuanians appealed to the Poles for aid but only on the condition that the
latter agreed to recognize the former’s independence with Vilna as its capital. But when
the Poles captured the city, they chose to use it as bait, dangling it in front of the
Lithuanians in exchange for recognition of Lithuanian independence. 28 To instill proPolish support in the predominantly ethnic Polish city, there was a failed coup attempt led
by government officials from Warsaw in August 1919.29 Vilna was no longer a territorial
dispute, it now became a political even military one that worsened already raw relations
between both states. Poland further refused to recognize the Lithuanian state until the
Polish minority’s rights were protected. During the last stages of the war, Polish forces
clashed with Lithuanian troops in a struggle between both sides to mark their territories
from the fleeing Red Army. But it was the Lithuanians who recaptured Vilna.
The war had ended and peace seemed certain in Eastern Europe. But Polish
ambitions to enlarge their reborn state were not over, as Piłsudski had devised a scheme
to bring Vilna under Polish control. In October 1921, General Lucjan Żeligowski and his
troops “rebelled” against Polish orders and took the city and surrounding territories.
Żeligowski then declared himself de facto head of state of what was now known as
Central Lithuania. 30 Negotiations between both governments were futile, with neither
side giving into to each other’s demands. “It was only demonstrated that the crux of the
problem lay in the Lithuanians’ firm decision not to admit any constitutional link of
28
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closer cooperation with Poland.”31 Granting Vilna autonomy was also out of the question.
The case was referred to the League of Nations who rather than create a plebiscite, chose
to hold the elections to a Constituent Assembly that would vote on the fate of the city. In
January 1922 the Assembly was formed and overwhelmingly voted for reincorporation
with Poland. The Vilna dispute was formally settled in March 1923 at the same time
when the Allied powers recognized Poland’s eastern frontier. The end result was the
severe straining of relations between Poland and Lithuania, with the latter cutting off all
diplomatic contact as a sign of protest and contempt for the debacle.
With its borders practically completed, Poland replaced bayonets with diplomacy
to carry out her foreign affairs. The primary objective of Polish foreign policy was to
“create a political system that would permit Poland to develop her national life in peace
and security.” 32 Again, the state had found itself wedged in between two aggressive
neighbors, Germany and Russia, with its existence dependent on deterring not just any
threat from either side but to also prevent both sides from working together towards
wiping Poland off the continent again. There were two ways to accomplish this: to take
advantage of the Versailles Treaty’s enforcer, the League of Nations, and to seek
alliances with other states that shared the same interest in security.
The greatest accomplishment of Polish foreign policy came in February 1921 with
the creation of the Franco-Polish alliance, in order to “achieve complete security against
its principal enemies.”33 France had lost its key prewar ally in Russia to communism, and
now it aimed at promoting its security interests by keeping Germany in check and as
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weak as possible. The new Polish state seemed to have fit perfectly within the framework
of post-WWI French foreign policy. Poland, who had successfully staved off a Soviet
invasion, would serve as a cordon sanitaire, a barrier to keep German revisionism and
Bolshevism from spreading.34 Its interest in France was that it would have a chief ally to
monitor Germany from the West and support Poland in case of future conflict with the
Soviet Union. There also existed an enormous French support in promoting Poland’s
economic, territorial, and political interests at the Peace Conference, particularly in Upper
Silesia and the eastern borderlands. 35
Thus a formal agreement was concluded between both sides that brought the birth
of the alliance. A political treaty was founded on cooperation, mutual aid, joint defense,
economic collaboration, and consultation on foreign matters. Two days later, both sides
signed an important secret military convention.36 Its nature was defined by creating an
actual security system through French supplies for Poland in the case of unprovoked
German aggression, and if the Soviet Union attacked during a Polish-German conflict.
Although there were no promises of French troops being deployed, both sides were
satisfied despite overwhelming French dictation of the terms. Three years later the
convention was renewed, bringing material benefits for Poland and reaffirming both
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sides’ commitments to maintaining the alliance in the wake of the West’s rapprochement
with Germany.37
A month later another success in Polish foreign policy came about with the
signing of a similar agreement to that of the Franco-Polish alliance. Poland was able to
conclude an alliance with Romania with the Convention on Defensive Alliance.38 Like
Poland, Romania was interested in creating a cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union. It
was not only threatened by communism from the east, but it also saw developments in
Hungary under the short-lived Béla Kun regime. The other principal Romanian aim was
the annexation of Bessarabia, to create more of a barrier from the Soviet Union who had
already plans to take it.39 Poland saw Romania as a state where war material could be
transported through in the event of war with Germany without the kind of interruptions it
had suffered during the Polish-Soviet War.40 When coupled with Poland’s aspirations in
the east, Polish-Romanian cooperation would be founded on the use of a common frontier
as a defensive barrier against the USSR. Undoubtedly, it not only possessed an antiSoviet stance, but it was also seen as something that could have an overpowering effect
on South Central Europe.41 The treaty that was signed between the two had been in the
making for practically two years and highlighted that in the event of an unprovoked
attack on either state’s eastern border, the other would come to its aid. A secret military
37
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convention had also been concluded, coinciding with the political treaty and listing
stipulations such as steps towards mobilization in the defense of the afflicted partner.42 In
a matter of two months, Poland had concluded two treaties and set up a system of
alliances with one partner to the West and another in the East. Its security system against
Germany and the USSR was in place and now its foreign policy’s aim would be to
maintain it at all costs.
Relations with Germany were to be troublesome right from the start, as Poland
was the recipient of most postwar territorial acquisitions at the expense of her western
neighbor. Although plebiscites had been held for the contested areas of Upper Silesia and
East Prussia, the former’s Polish inhabitants successfully wrestled away its industrial
section through a fait accompli by way of three armed uprisings. Although East Prussia’s
plebiscite went Germany’s way, other territories such as Poznania and Pomerania were
awarded to Poland thanks to the Peace Conference. The city of Danzig proved to be a
mightier problem for both states. Polish claims to the predominantly ethnic German city
were of economic importance, while Germany refused to have itself and East Prussia
separated by a “Corridor”.43 The fate of Danzig was decided by the League of Nations,
becoming a free and independent city whose economy would be linked to Poland’s.44 Yet
hostility between the city and Poland would be a prominent and regular occurrence and
expressed in German propaganda throughout the interwar period, in an effort to prove the
incompatibility of the two and that Germany would be a better suitor for the city.
42
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Germany refused to acknowledge its border with Poland despite the League of Nations’
recognition. The end result was not only German feelings of contempt, but also a sizable
German minority left within the borders of the new Polish state. German foreign policy
aimed at the return of lost territory, and “once these claims were satisfied no obstacle
stood in the way, as far as Germany was concerned, to good German-Polish relations.”45
Major obstacles to the normalization of German-Polish relations were often linked
together. Germany’s territorial revisionist campaign was channeled in many different
ways, one of which was through its accusations that the German minority was being
persecuted and abused. Poland had given the minority the chance to opt for Polish or
German citizenship, with the option of returning to Germany.46 The goal was to weaken
German nationalism, which was seen as a threat to Poland’s independence. And so
Poland chose to forcefully evict the German minority when they chose German
citizenship but remained in Poland.47 The minority question was a hot topic before the
League of Nations, with Warsaw often defending itself against Berlin’s accusations. In
spite of each other, the two states became embroiled in a tariff war in June 1925 that
would last for many years. Germany halted Polish coal exports from Upper Silesia, while
Poland halted the former’s own exports. The German aim was to wreck Poland
economically and force it to concede to demands such as ones of a territorial nature in
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order to lift the financial siege.48 The tariff war did not hurt Poland, instead it made it
more dependent on domestic production of goods and opened it up to other foreign
markets. Yet the major result was the continuation of strained relations between both
states.
But the underlying reason for hostility in German-Polish relations was that the
former could not stomach the thought of a strong and independent Polish state. Many
political and military leaders viewed Poland’s existence as temporary (Saisonstaat) and
undeserving.49 Reichswehr General Hans von Seeckt’s continuously quoted position on
Poland captures these popular resentments over Poland, “Poland is the crux of the Eastern
Problem. The existence of Poland is unbearable and incompatible with the vital interests
of Germany. She must vanish, and vanish she will through her own internal weakness and
through Russia – with our assistance.”50 Poland’s alliance with France, which had clearly
showed anti-German aims, potentially may have deepened German hostility towards its
eastern neighbor. As long as Poland’s independence came at the expense of Germany’s
unfavorable postwar conditions, relations between the two states could never reach a
peaceful level.
The Polish-Soviet War had left relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in
an awkward state. Poland emerged victorious, while the Soviet Union’s idea for world
revolution had been shattered. It now had to change its approach to foreign policy by
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acknowledging a coexistence, if temporary, with the West. Revolution was not to be
completely abandoned, only supported if it arose anywhere in the world. Relations with
other countries were to be opened in order to gain economic aid and “breathing space” to
help survive the civil war. But the grand strategy was to play a double game: build
relations with other states and play upon their rivalries in order to divide them.51 This
way the Soviet Union could actually benefit off of its isolation and prevent any Western
designs of coalitions to destroy it, a paranoia present throughout the interwar period.
Soviet foreign policy affected Poland quite negatively. By opening up relations
with Lithuania and concluding a treaty, the Soviet Union had created a wedge between
Poland and her northern neighbor. This was prevalent in Polish suspicion of Lithuanian
collusion with the Soviets during the Polish-Soviet War. The consequences were not only
terrible relations between both states, but the spoiling of designs for a defensive bloc of
Baltic states in 1922 due to Lithuania’s refusal to engage in diplomatic talks with
Poland. 52 Polish fears over any collaboration between Germany and Russia flared up
when both countries concluded the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. It called for peace between
both states and secretly initiated German rearmament on Soviet territory that benefited
both states’ military. But it had also created a partnership between both European
outcasts, which according to Soviet opinion, spoiled any chance of a “united capitalist
front against Soviet Russia”. 53 This partnership was detrimental to Poland’s interests,
weakening any chance at an improvement in German-Polish relations. The idea of
collaboration between two states that showed contempt for Poland and could undo its
51
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postwar settlement, courted the minds of Berlin and Moscow.54 Yet still keeping the idea
of a German revolution in mind, the Soviet Union played a double game and proposed to
Poland territorial acquisitions if one successfully took over Germany. The Poles outright
rejected this but did engage in talks of a nonaggression pact which never materialized.
Negotiations for a nonaggression pact took place a number of times, but the Soviets
backed out each time as a result of Polish attempts to attach the Baltic states to it.55
Overall, the Poles exhibited neutrality towards their relations with the Soviets, while the
latter attempted to frustrate Polish initiatives in Europe.
The Teschen question became a bitter pill for the Poles to swallow and had
profound consequences in affecting Polish-Czech relations throughout the Interwar
period. It became the foundation for Polish animosity towards the Czechoslovakians,
serving as an obstacle to cooperation between the two states. Yet it seems that the true
underlying factor in poor relations between both states were their diverging interests in
pursuing and maintaining their independence. 56 Differences in ideology bore the
antipathy of both sides towards each other. Before the Great War and notably after its
conclusion when both states had gained their independence, Polish and Czech designs on
existence in East Central Europe were based on the state of their enemies. Whereas the
Poles saw Russia as a never ending danger to independence, Czech feelings of panSlavism favored a region under the guidance of Russia, tsarist or communist. They also
saw no ill will towards or from Germany. Czechoslovakian President Tomáš Masaryk
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insisted that the small people of Eastern Europe “need a strong Russia lest they be at the
mercy of the Germans and Austrians,” while the Poles favored a federation between both
states to counter the German threat.57 These differing views undoubtedly impacted the
territorial aspirations of both states and prevented any cooperation between the two
throughout the interwar period.
Czechoslovakia could not come to accept Poland’s quest to dominate the Eastern
Borderlands. It not only saw this as hostility towards Russia, but also towards Ukrainian
nationalism. The key factor linking both reasons was that the Czechoslovakians desired a
common frontier with Russia that would realize their pan-Slavic dreams, and where
reconciliation between Poland and Russia would promote Eastern Europe’s stability.58
They saw Polish gluttony for territory as the source of problems in the region, one that
would only benefit Germany in the end. Teschen was not the last territorial rift between
both states, as Javorina was contested for nearly two years after the conclusion of the
former’s fate. One prominent Pole suggested that it was “a question of sentiment, and, at
the same time, a test of the good will of the Czechs”. 59 Along with accusations of
minority mistreatment, it seems Polish-Czech relations were too focused and embroiled
with petty issues such as territorial disputes. These took away any chance at not only
good relations, but also cooperation in the event of conflict.
It is not to say that both sides never attempted to come to an understanding and
improve relations with each other. A political-economic treaty was all but signed between
both sides in 1921. Its failure was linked with Czechoslovakian fears of risking and
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endangering their state’s interests by becoming entangled in diverging Polish interests,
while the Poles disliked Czech dictation.60 When France concluded alliances with both
states, it attempted to open dialogue between them to create a united military front
against Germany. Both Polish and Czechoslovakian military circles agreed, only for the
latter’s political circles to reject such coordination until “political difficulties were
resolved”.61 Ultimately, relations were extremely complicated due to the power struggle
between both sides portrayed through territorial and ideological disagreements that led
Polish and Czech political thought away from cooperation.
In 1924 Polish foreign policy began to go on the defensive when its key ally
France and Great Britain began to open dialogue with Germany for better relations.
France had experienced a change in government when the socialist Cartel des Gauches
took over, who like Great Britain, favored Germany’s reintegration into leading European
politics. France had long sought to regain partnership with Great Britain who had been its
chief wartime ally, while the latter was always interested in the reemergence of German
economic growth. But both sides agreed that the Versailles Treaty had been too punishing
on Germany, and looked to bring about revisions to it such as the lowering of Germany’s
war reparation payments and its eventual entry to the League of Nations.62 Overall a
peaceful rapprochement with Germany would promote greater European cohesion and a
stronger structure for the League of Nations.
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A strong advocate of German revisionism, German Foreign Minister Gustav
Stresemann felt this was the perfect time to promote German interests in undoing the
effects of the postwar settlements. His philosophy was that if Germany “insist(ed) on
getting back everything at once, she would end up in getting nothing. Only by writing off
for the time being some of her losses – those impossible to recover in the existing
circumstances – might she regain the others.”63 The only way Germany was to recover
was through a process of seeking gradual concessions, and a Franco-British
rapprochement itself was the perfect opportunity. It was in September 1924 that
Stresemann began to court the British and later the French, about the return of Danzig
and the Allied-occupied Rhineland to Germany. His aim was not to renounce war as a
method to revising the German-Polish border, possibly the largest aim of German
revisionism, but to give the impression that a compromise could be reached in order for
everyone to gain absolute peace.64 In a letter to another German politician, Stresemann
stated that his aim was to “secure the Rhineland, split the Allies, and open new
possibilities in the east.”65 Months later in February 1925, he submitted a proposal to the
French about a security pact that guaranteed Germany’s western borders, renounced war,
and used arbitration as a method to resolve conflict.
Falling in early 1925, the Cartel was replaced by a government whose foreign
ministry was headed by a man who looked to continue this quest for French security
through direct dialogue with Germany, Aristide Briand. Briand was heavily invested in
the idea but was not quick to leave out France’s eastern allies in Czechoslovakia and
Poland. His idea was that Germany would not risk a war with France knowing it had
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Great Britain’s backing, thus France would no longer need a “provocative policy”, and
Germany would settle down and stabilize itself financially.66 Together with the British
Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain, Briand felt that gradual appeasement to German
demands would replace war as a method to maintaining peace and security in Europe.67
French goodwill towards the German proposal was exhibited with the commencing of
plans to evacuate the Ruhr, which had been occupied by French troops since 1923 as
punishment for German failure to repay reparations.
The quest for Western security came to a conclusion at the Locarno conference in
October 1925. France’s allies Czechoslovakia and Poland were invited to attend, but their
presence and actual participation were severely limited. The chief goal by Great Britain
and France was to achieve a favorable settlement with Germany, even if nothing could be
attained for the East. Locarno produced seven treaties that outlined security in Western
Europe, including the “Rhineland Pact” which ensured that France, Belgium, and
Germany would not attack each other. It was guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy who
would aid the victim of an attack by any of the other two countries listed. Notably, the
pact secured Germany’s western frontier yet made no mention of its eastern one, which
had been the deal breaker in order to get Germany to sign the agreements in the first
place. France made one attempt not to completely abandon the interests of its eastern
allies, and that was the creation of separate arbitration treaties between Germany and
countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Locarno was a huge success for Briand and Chamberlain, with the former
expressing the belief that the inclusion of Germany to European politics neutralized the
66
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threat of its collaboration with Russia. Germany had also highly benefited as it not only
left its border with Poland open to revision, it was to gain entry to the League of Nations
and the full evacuation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland was to commence. Yet it proved to
be a huge blow to Polish foreign policy. Germany had successfully driven a wedge into
the Franco-Polish alliance. According to the arbitration treaty between Germany and
Poland, if a conflict arose between the two states it would have to be handled by a third
party. But what truly weakened the alliance was that if Germany attacked Poland, France
would not be able to immediately assist its ally until the League of Nations ruled whether
Germany was an aggressor. Poland was now forced to take a defensive stance, and adapt
the results of Locarno to the alliance and its military convention. 68 It was helpless at
Locarno as not only had France failed to consult its ally, Polish acquiescence to the
scheme was to avoid the state being labeled as a liability to European peace. It was
apparent that France was no longer interested in using alliances to neutralize threats like
Germany. Although the alliance was not completely abandoned, it put forth grave doubt
among the Poles in the reliability of their French counterparts in case of conflict.
Skrzyński had publically praised Locarno, but privately he once admitted that the
Rhineland Pact was “a dagger thrust in the back of the alliance between our two
countries.”69
Locarno had also brought great unease to the Soviet Union. It had succeeded in
ripping Germany away from its sphere of influence, casting great uncertainty in the
German-Russian partnership established at Rapallo. But it mainly conflicted with Soviet
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foreign policy, as it derailed continuous efforts towards dividing the West. Yet Soviet
concerns were calmed when Germany reached out and directed the signing of the Treaty
of Berlin in April 1926. It reaffirmed cooperation between both sides, with Germany
giving assurances that Locarno and its entry into the League would not be detrimental to
the partnership nor Soviet interests.70 Relations strengthened between Germany and the
Soviet Union, while Polish anxieties grew larger.
Isolation and Uncertainty
Polish foreign policy’s main objective was to take the newly independent Polish
state and help it maintain its freedom by promoting its cultural and political growth. But
geopolitically, Poland found itself in a troublesome position. It reemerged on the map of
Europe stuck between two large neighbors yet again, and surrounded by other states with
which relations quickly soured. The roots of this interesting predicament stemmed from a
clash in ideology and interests, as designs for the recreation of the once glorious Polish
past did not fit within the framework of other states, with some trying to salvage what
was left of their shattered empires while others trying to create their existence from
scratch. The temptation of claiming territory and nostalgia for the past created a deadly
concoction that would inevitably lead to conflict. Although Polish ideas of federalism
failed and territorial struggles created detrimental divisions, the formation of alliances
seemed to have created this belief that Poland could peacefully exist on its terms despite
subpar relations with its neighbors.
Locarno had proven that postwar Polish success was only temporary. Changes
within the French political system ushered in governments that were seeking cooperation
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with Germany rather than alienating it. Although they acknowledged the need to maintain
France’s preexisting alliances, they saw them as disposable if the state’s security could
be guaranteed by coming to a direct agreement with Germany. This belief had played into
German desires for revisionism, which could only be put forth in motion if its western
flank was neutralized. Locarno was notorious for creating peace between Germany and
the West, but failing to secure the same for the East. Thus Poland was left to fend for
itself, failing to create a common bloc with Czechoslovakia at Locarno or drawing any
interest from Romania to fill the void.71 Its alienation of Lithuania and its failure to adopt
a more approaching manner towards the Soviet Union, rather than sternly maintaining a
cordon sanitaire against it, only isolated the state further.
Was Polish foreign policy completely to blame for its country’s downward spiral
in the European political scene, or had the West invested too heavily into German
overtures for security? When looking at Poland’s domestic politics, the continuous
cabinet changes and wide array of ministers certainly prevented a solid direction for
foreign policy to follow. One must consider whether there would have been stability had
Piłsudski remained active in politics, even with the failure of a federalist system
materializing in Eastern Europe. If the finger is pointed at domestic politics, then France
must certainly be placed in the same boat as Poland. A tug of war between the socialists
and conservatives influenced changes in foreign policy that led to partnering with
Germany as opposed to containing it. The main culprit was parliamentary democracy,
where the loss of confidence in one cabinet brought about its replacement with another
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that at times chose a radical change in domestic and foreign policy. Locarno highlighted
the European failure to stick to the postwar structures and laws set forth by Versailles,
abandoning them prematurely due to blind temptations of reconciliation, and putting in
motion events that would have dangerous consequences for the continent down the road.
By May 1926 the Second Polish Republic had found itself geopolitically isolated with its
future uncertain. The one question that remained was whether it could get itself out of
this predicament, and if so, whether it would be able to adapt to the rapidly changing
European scene.

34

II. FINDING POLAND’S PLACE IN EUROPE: 1926-1929
The Outline of Sanacja’s Foreign Policy
Marshal Piłsudski’s return to power in May 1926 had been primarily motivated by
Poland’s domestic crisis. Yet its geopolitical isolation certainly motivated the return of a
patriot who had fought for and defended its independence before his retirement from all
public offices. But in three years, his accomplishments and the state’s security were
unraveled and left exposed by an inconsistent foreign policy that failed to adapt to the
impulsive changes made to the postwar Versailles system. Although his primary
objective was to reestablish domestic order by eliminating the inefficiency of
“Sejmocracy,” the Marshal also possessed a more coherent view of how Poland should
conduct its relations with other European states in order to secure its place in Europe as a
strong and independent entity. He estimated that no major changes would occur in the
next five years that would require the state’s participation.72 While the Sanacja regime
consolidated domestic control, it would only resort to surveying the European political
scene before taking on any serious ventures. The main goal of Poland’s foreign policy in
promoting the growth of Polish national life in peace and security remained unchanged.
What ultimately would set Sanacja apart from its predecessors was its approach to
conducting relations with other states.
After a week had passed since his successful coup d’état, Piłsudski set the record
straight on his goals for foreign policy in an interview with Le Matin. He expressed a
desire for peace yet passive aggressively underlined that if Poland was infringed upon, it
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would know how to defend its interests.73 He had no desire to undo the errors of his
predecessors nor dismantle the post-Locarno system that he viewed with contempt, but
rather reaffirm Poland’s commitment to salvaging what little was left of the Versailles
Treaty’s provisions. While Piłsudski focused on rebuilding domestic policy for the time
being, he entrusted the day-to-day operations of the Foreign Ministry to a man who
shared similar views on Poland’s international position. An experienced diplomat, August
Zaleski was familiar with the international scene and well liked around Europe. Before
his official appointment as Foreign Minister, he had served the Polish delegation
alongside Skrzyński at the League of Nation’s General Assembly. Yet his ideas
continuously clashed with his superior’s, particularly on the topic of Locarno where he
argued against signing a pact that brought about an agreement of “differentiation between
the guarantees of security for the West and East.”74 Perhaps this is why he enjoyed the
Marshal’s good graces, as the latter was never short of being critical of Skrzyński’s
actions at Locarno, going as far as even labeling him the “bitch of Locarno”.75
In the summer of 1926, Piłsudski had arrived at the Foreign Ministry where he
established two principles that were to serve as the foundation of the Sanacja regime’s
foreign policy. The first one revolved around Poland’s place in between two neighbors it
historically had never truly gotten along with. It was to remain neutral with respect to
both Germany and Russia, and avoid garnering suspicion that it was colluding with one
over the other. The second point supplemented the first in that Poland should maintain its
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alliances with France and Romania, which had chiefly been designed to guarantee its
security if conflict arose with Germany or Russia. 76 Piłsudski asserted that these two
principles were to be maintained and never deviated from, as Poland’s existence
depended on them. Zaleski raised the question about a possible third point, namely
whether Poland should continue to remain close to the League of Nations. He had been a
supporter of the institution and its 1924 Geneva Protocol, confident that both could help
maintain the survival of the Polish state.77 Yet Piłsudski was not shy in expressing his
dislike for it, as he considered it a tool used by the Great Powers to force their own
policies upon smaller and weaker states. Zaleski stressed the need to seek collective
security through the Geneva Protocol, underlining that Poland could not even handle a
sole attack from Germany or Russia, let alone from both. Piłsudski understood this, but
he had predicted that neither side was capable of launching an offensive for another 10 to
15 years.78 Yet he did not restrict Zaleski from keeping Poland away from the League,
instead advising a cautious approach to it. “Follow it if you think it opportune, but do not
believe in it, if you don’t want to be made a fool of.”79
Although he did not wish to introduce radical changes to Poland’s foreign policy,
Piłsudski certainly wanted to distance it from the League’s supremacy. He had good
reason for this according to the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno agreements’ provisions.
Under the former, there was a blind tendency by all of its supporters to adhere to the
“Spirit of Geneva” doctrine, where all assembled delegates would settle their differences
by reaching an acceptable compromise. The problem with this was that there was a
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“tendency to overlook justice for the sake of compromise,” as stronger states would often
bully weaker ones into submitting to the League’s most favored option.80 In the case of
Locarno, it forced both Poland and her French ally to employ the League as a third party
arbitrator if conflict arose. French aid was conditional and could also only be dispersed to
Poland if the League agreed that the latter had been a victim of aggression. Therefore
Piłsudski’s skepticism of the League and subsequent choice to distance Poland from it
was not without reason, as he did not want to completely put Poland’s security or even its
existence in the hands of an institution that could potentially sacrifice it.
When Zaleski took over he immediately established communications with all
foreign representatives to clarify Poland’s direction after the May coup. His ultimate goal
was to “create the impression that Poland would continue her foreign policy in the same
pacific and conciliatory spirit as heretofore and that the return to power of Marshal
Piłsudski did not mean the return to the methods with the Poles had to use sometimes
during his tenure of the office of Chief of State.”81 It was to reassure international opinion
that Poland would not immediately resort to the bayonets of the Polish army if conflict
arose. Yet this did not mean that a military figure like the Marshal would also completely
refrain from using force if need be. Facing the Sejm’s Foreign Affairs Committee on July
21, 1926, Zaleski elaborated on the general orientation of his policy citing that above all
else, peace was needed to restore the equilibrium in Poland’s relations with other states.
He dismissed any rumors that designs for war were in the making, as they were not
consistent with the state’s political and national aspirations. “A peaceful policy nowadays
demands a wholehearted and a possibly most comprehensive collaboration, with other
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countries for the pursuit of aims common to all states.” 82 Zaleski was realistic in
acknowledging that although collaboration with other states had harmed Poland in the
past (i.e. Locarno), aside from armed conflict, it was the only option left that could
actually still be used in its favor. Thus the only way to bring Poland out of its geopolitical
isolation would be to continue collaborating with other states, but to ensure that it closely
adhered to Polish interests. But he did state that there was room for change in this policy
as changes in the international scene demanded “different tactics at different times.”83
Foreign Reactions to Piłsudski’s Coup and Sanacja’s Initial Approaches
Piłsudski’s coup had attracted great attention, particularly from the Soviet Union.
It was largely alarmed of what the Marshal’s intentions may be, fearing the resurrection
of his federalist ideas or a war against Russia for Piłsudski to divert attention away from
Poland’s internal crisis.84 But no such plot existed. To calm Soviet fears, the Poles made
a conciliatory gesture by inviting the Russian envoy Pyotr Voykov, to attend a personal
dinner with the Marshal. There, Piłsudski stated that the Soviet regime was most
favorable to Poland and that he personally possessed no territorial ambitions. He assured
Voykov that a new war between the two states was out of the question as, “…personally I
can only lose in the case of a war. Now I am a victor. In case of another war I would only
risk to lose this position.”85 To underline Polish goodwill, Stanisław Patek who enjoyed
popularity in the Soviet Union as a defense attorney of many revolutionaries in the days
of Tsarist Russia, was designated as envoy to Moscow.
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Yet Soviet foreign policy did not change much with regards to the new regime. It
continued to maintain close contact with Germany, focused on preventing coordination
among the Baltic states and Poland, and lastly, attempted some sort of détente with
Piłsudski’s Poland. 86 The last two objectives were notable with Soviet offers for
neutrality acts with every individual Baltic state, including Poland in August 1926. 87
Nothing ever materialized, as all states (particularly the latter) made their signatures
dependent on including all of the Soviet Union’s western neighbors. Soviet Prime
Minister Alexei Rykov once complained that the main obstacle in concluding a treaty
with Poland was the latter’s efforts to become the leader and negotiator for a chain of
states stretching from Finland to Romania.88
Germany did not exactly hold the same convictions as the Soviet Union. It
proceeded with caution but saw optimism in Piłsudski’s takeover, as popular opinion
theorized that the Marshal saw it “as the lesser of her [Poland’s] neighbouring evils”
when compared to the Soviet Union.89 It was right to a degree, as his distrust for anything
Russian did surpass any reservations he held for any other neighboring state. Polish
security depended on a subdued Germany, yet Locarno ruined that initiative. Sanacja
needed a new approach to counter the growing threat of Germany’s resurgence, which is
why Piłsudski felt it was better to create a rapprochement with that state. In June 1926 he
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sent Herman Diamand to conduct separate talks with Stresemann and the Foreign
Ministry’s Secretary Carl von Schubert, making it known that concessions could be made
if Germany supported Poland’s reelection to the League’s Council.90 The Germans made
no promises, marking the mission as a stepping-stone rather than a failure. 91 Another
attempt at dialogue was made at the League’s September session where Poland
successfully was reelected to the Council. It was there that Zaleski had met with von
Schubert, who informed him that relations would never improve without a revision to the
German-Polish border. Zaleski’s rebuttal was simply, “never.”92 He always underlined
that Polish policy was continuously seeking to establish a friendly coexistence between
both states, but remained steadfast in letting German revisionism influence or dominate
any sort of negotiations.
Aside from the topic of revisionism, Polish-German relations during this threeyear period aimed at settling other issues that divided both states. First, Germany held an
interest in coming to an agreement over the liquidation process initiated by the Versailles
Treaty. Under Article 297, a country had the right to liquidate the property of German
nationals. Poland had taken advantage of this privilege to continue its drive to weaken the
minority’s presence and influence in Germany’s revisionist aims.93 After much delay in
negotiations, both sides came to an agreement in October 1929 where they mutually
renounced all financial and property claims.
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The second issue regarded minorities, as the number of Poles living in Germany
practically equaled that of Germans living in Poland.94 Since the early 1920s, both sides
had lobbed complaints at each other over the treatment of minorities, with Germany
utilizing the League of Nations as a forum particularly after its entry in September 1926.
Due to the high concentration of Polish Germans in Poland’s western frontier, the goal of
Sanacja’s predecessors had been to disperse the minority and force its assimilation.
Despite a difference in policy, not much changed when Sanacja took over as it was more
interested in consolidating political control in Warsaw. 95 Thus Germany’s complaints
continued and the minority became a main propaganda tool in its revisionist campaign.
The minority issue was never truly solved and remained an obstacle in Polish-German
relations due to its deep roots in the political differences of both states.
In effect since 1925, the tariff war was the third issue obstructing the
normalization in relations between both states. The September 1926 encounter between
Zaleski and von Schubert also contained a dialogue between the two on a mutual desire
to end the economic conflict. For the next three years both sides would conduct
negotiations of various sorts to put an end to the tariff war. Headway was made on
commercial agreements for commodities such as timber and rye. The reason Germany
was willing to deal with Poland commercially despite a radical difference in political
aims, was because it was feeling the pinch from its embargo on Polish goods, drastically
needing to increase its exports in order to maintain financial obligations to the postwar
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reparation payments. Thus the economic channel provided a better shot at normalization
in relations than any other one.
The diverging interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia from 1919-1925
undoubtedly carried over into the Sanacja years. Czech perceptions of the May coup were
that Piłsudski would take an anti-Russian stance and bring Poland closer to Germany via
some kind of territorial agreement.96 Although some Polish officials attempted to dispel
Czech suspicions, the Marshal made it clear that he did not care much for Poland’s
southern neighbor. He still remembered the Czechs’ actions during the Polish-Soviet War
and personally held the opinion that their state’s independence would not last very long.97
Zaleski seemed to have been the only man the Czechs felt they could count on for normal
relations with Poland, due to his experiences working with Foreign Minister Edvard
Beneš in Geneva. But that partnership never truly materialized, as Beneš refused to
support Zaleski’s defense of Poland’s minority issues.
In fact, the minority question was actually an obstacle in the improvement of
Polish-Czech relations themselves. Poland had accused its neighbor of pushing its
political views onto the Polish minority that heavily occupied the border regions. The
Czechs often responded with complaints that the Czech minority in Poland was subjected
to hostility from their own localities. But other minority problems that should not have
directly affected relations between both states carried on from the pre-Sanacja years.
Polish suspicions that Prague was still supporting Ukrainian irredentism came up,
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particularly in 1927 when Beneš refused to support Zaleski’s attempt to dismiss
Ukrainian complaints against Poland at Geneva.
Perhaps foreign policy in relation to Germany was what divided both neighbors.
Whereas it was deemed a threat to Polish independence, the Czechs felt their position
was safer and thus refused to politically align with Poland, probably to prevent Germany
from concluding that an anti-German alliance existed between the two. 98 Hungarian
revisionism was another Czech concern in which Poland had no interest. Polish foreign
policy maintained very good relations with Hungary, and thus remained neutral on issues
such as revisionism. The Poles had always assured their counterparts that their country
held no serious political talks with Hungary, let alone any anti-Little Entente feelings.99
The other dividing factor was that unlike Poland’s neutrality on the issue, Czechoslovakia
feared an Anschluss between Germany and Austria because with Hungary, it would
create a complete encirclement of Czechoslovakia. In the end, political divisions
overshadowed any progress made between both states, such as the effective collaboration
between their General Staffs.
In early 1926 the Polish-Romanian alliance was renewed for another five years
without any significant changes.100 But the May coup produced considerable interest in
Romania, as Bucharest saw Piłsudski’s return to power as beneficial to the alliance.101
Yet the Marshal did not attach much importance to Romania. Although he never
specifically mentioned why, he was critical of their General Staff and felt it was too
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theoretical than practical in that it never showed any preparations if conflict arose. It
seems that Romania only offered one significant contribution to the alliance by forming a
joint barrier with Poland against the Soviet Union. This helped secure Poland’s eastern
border, but the “theoretical” train of thought may have created some doubt among the
Poles as to the reliability of Romania’s forces. The last reason for Piłsudski’s apathy may
have been that this alliance had no value in countering German aggression. Yet the Poles
continued to maintain the alliance probably because it did not cause as much difficulties
as the one with France.
The first three years were stagnant with the only development in the partnership
being the frequency in which their General Staffs met.102 There were instances where
both sides increased their development and trade of war material between each other,
something Piłsudski attached great importance to. He desired greater cooperation with the
Romanians, so that they could lean against Poland to become a strong ally. 103 The
Marshal’s concern was that they were too preoccupied with Hungarian revisionism as
opposed to any dangers from Russia or Germany. If there was one goal that Polish
foreign policy attached to this alliance, it was to change this Romanian mindset by
building Poland’s prestige in Bucharest.104 The greater the Polish influence, the greater
the alliance’s reliability may prove to be in the end.
The new regime drew mixed reactions in France, with most of the government’s
concern focused on what radical moves Marshal Piłsudski had in store for Poland. He
was not seen as a Francophile like his predecessors, and fears were conjured up that he
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might rip Poland away from its Western ally in favor of German influence.105 But on the
contrary, Piłsudski chose to uphold the alliance citing that it was one of the two
cornerstones of Polish foreign policy. Immediately upon his appointment, Zaleski
identified the alliance as an “instrument of security and peace,” a friendship that brought
both states together through “common interests.”106 But the main hurdle Poland faced
was how to bridge the gap that Locarno had created in the alliance’s effectiveness.
Piłsudski’s primary trepidation came from the question whether France was still a reliable
ally should Poland be attacked. Thus the initial focus for Polish foreign policy was to see
what had and had not changed within the alliance before adopting any new methods.
One thing that became evident early on was that Poland and France had different
interpretations of the alliance. A proponent of Locarno, Briand continued to direct French
foreign policy during this time in a different manner. Although he followed popular
opinion in France to maintain the alliance with Poland, there was a caveat in this where
France no longer had an interest nor need for a defensive alliance system to guarantee its
security. Security had been achieved through direct negotiations with the perceived
threat, Germany, at Locarno. There was a preference to adapt a self-defensive stance and
reduce the alliance with Poland to nothing more than an insurance policy that retained
some economic and political value.
Despite French assurances that Locarno did grant their country security, the
Sanacja regime refused to buy into that blind belief, rather choosing to adhere firmly to
the alliance’s original agreements. The focus was to attain a guarantee from their ally that
should Poland be the victim of German aggression, France would still aid it despite the
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legalities of Locarno. But if Poland began to engage Germany in negotiations to improve
relations between both states, why did it put so much effort into strictly maintaining the
Franco-Polish alliance? The reason may have been that it too served as an insurance
policy for the Poles. If German revisionism truly failed to cease until the western frontier
was rectified, French military backing was still vital.
France may have misinterpreted a German-Polish rapprochement for an actual
understanding between the two sides, thus triggering a process of blunting the sharpness
of the alliance. The diverging interests increasingly became apparent in that the French
were more absorbed in subordinating their ally to the status of “junior partner” while the
Poles desired that their counterparts “adapt their policies to the exigencies of Poland’s
security.” 107 This became obvious by French attempts to demand changes to the
alliance’s provisions, while the Poles countered those offers with more demands for
detailed guarantees of aid in time of conflict. The toxicity between the two also became
noticeable in Geneva, when the French rarely backed Polish initiatives or even scorned
their ally with regards to Germany’s constant minority complaints. It got to the point that
at times, France would ransom their support in return for Polish subservience to the
former’s agenda. But the underlying problem and trend within the alliance dating back
from Locarno was the failure of France to consult its Polish ally, reinforcing the latter’s
belief that the alliance one day might prove to be useless if not completely abandoned.
1927: War Scares and Cracks in the Alliance System
Relations with Lithuania had been nonexistent since 1923, when the Lithuanians
cut off all diplomatic contact with the Poles and declared that the two were at a “state of
war” with each other. It was a sign of protest against the Polish seizure of Vilna, as well
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as a demonstration against the League’s disinterest in taking any steps to rectify the
situation. Lithuania increasingly became closer with Germany and the Soviet Union, with
all three seeing this as an opportunity to neutralize or isolate Poland.108 But the military
coup d’état that occurred in Kaunas on the night of December 16-17, 1926, ushered in a
more nationalistic regime. Once in control, the regime asserted power in the style of a
semi-authoritarian state, with its parliament’s powers weakened to a large extent. Under
Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras, Lithuania’s primary objective was to do
everything possible to see that Vilna was returned, even if it meant war.109 These radical
developments intensified the state of war, setting off a war scare that swept across
European diplomatic circles.
Taking a step back, the absence of relations between Poland and Lithuania for
three years did not mean that no major controversies existed during that time. Lithuania
went a step further when it ended all diplomatic relations with Poland by effectively
closing the border between both sides. All links of communications were destroyed, with
thousands of miles worth of railroad tracks dismantled and telegraph lines torn down.110
There were countless border incidents with some that ended in one side or the other
sustaining casualties. Perhaps the main source of conflict was the numerous times one
side accused the other of mistreating its minority. In Poland, the Lithuanian minority
tended not to clash with the authorities due to its extremely small population. But in
Lithuania, the wealthy landowning Poles were regarded as alien to the population, while

108

Piotr Łossowski, “Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1921-1939,” in Przyjaźnie i Antagonizmy, ed.
Janusz Żarnowski (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, 1977), 139.
109
Alfred Erich Senn, “The Polish-Lithuanian War Scare, 1927,” Journal of Central European Affairs 21,
(1961), 271.
110
“Litwa i Polska pomiędzy dwoma wojnami światoweni. 1914-1939,” 1955, Box 4, Folder 4, Leon
Mitkiewicz Papers, HI, 165.

48
they themselves could not grasp the concept of an independent Lithuanian state
“unaffiliated with Poland”. 111 The population was not shy of harboring anti-Polish
feelings, with demonstrations and even physical confrontations occurring. Differences in
ethnicity, class, and historical interpretation tended to lead the relationship between the
two sides to a point where “conflict rather than accommodation prevailed”.112
When Piłsudski came to power, he held a desire to resolve the conflict over Vilna.
In the summer of 1926 there were Polish troop movements throughout the Vilna region
with secret military conferences held near the Lithuanian border. This raised alarms in the
Soviet Union who reported that Poland was going to attack Lithuania. Yet Zaleski
dismissed these rumors and stressed the need to reopen normal diplomatic relations in
order to liquidate the state of war. Polish troop movement may have been to pressure the
Lithuanians to open up relations, or at least to quell their increasingly hostile attitude
towards Poland. But tensions only increased as the Lithuanians concluded a
nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union on September 28, 1926. It reaffirmed the treaty
signed between both sides in 1920, with both states’ territory and sovereignty respected.
No aggression was to be undertaken against each other and the Soviet Union was to stand
by Lithuania on the Vilna question. Soviet willingness to take part in this pact was
because it complemented its foreign policy in creating divisions among other states. In
this case, there existed a strong desire that collaboration with Lithuania would prevent its
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alignment with Poland, thus further weakening the latter’s position in the Baltic region.113
The pact brought concern to Poland, as now the Soviet Union became indirectly involved
in the conflict. Polish protests were lodged against the Soviets primarily for violating the
Riga treaty by taking up a position on Vilna.114
Pressure between the two grew larger after the coup in Lithuania. Voldermaras
asserted that the return of Vilna was the price Poland would have to pay for the
reconvening of relations. Until then it would remain Lithuania’s principal enemy. 115
Piłsudski’s initial response was that he would do nothing. He acknowledged that before
the coup, no responsible government existed in Kaunas and that any dangerous situation
could have provoked a war between the two.116 Now Poland was dealing with a more
nationalistic regime and thus Piłsudski favored not to aggravate the already delicate
situation. But days later he did remark to the French ambassador that his patience was
ending and that he would find a solution. 117 Secret talks were conducted between
representatives from both sides during the summer of 1927, but proved futile.
While studying the conflict with Lithuania, other problems surfaced for Polish
foreign policy early on in 1927. The French had begun to inquire whether changes could
be made to the alliance. Their desire was not just to have it conform to the Locarno
agreements, but to complete France’s shift away from using alliances as their number one
113
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form of protection. The Poles had found this troublesome not only because it threatened
to diminish what strength was left of the alliance, but just a few months earlier in
December 1926, both sides had concluded a guarantee treaty that stated they were
obliged to come to each other’s aid even if the League Council could not come to a
unanimous decision in the event of aggression.118
Various proposals for modifications had been made involving the alliance’s
political or military convention. Ambassador Jules Laroche had suggested eliminating the
political convention and instead, subjecting the alliance to the League’s covenant. In
November, General Franchet d’Espèrey visited Warsaw to propose a revision to the
military convention, one that had been designed by the French General Staff as early as
March 1926. Among some minor alterations, its purpose was to eliminate Germany and
Russia as “aggressors” from the agreement. But all approaches proved unsuccessful.
Piłsudski absolutely refused to even consider discussing the changes, as he saw them as
openings for France to retreat from its commitments. If the Poles allowed one change to
the alliance, it would only further encourage France to continue pushing for more. The
only modifications Piłsudski would consider were increases in French deliveries of war
materials.
Another war scare stirred the already simmering worrisome feelings of many
European states. Great Britain cut off diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in May, and a
string of anti-Soviet incidents had popped up in Europe and Asia. To make matters
worse, on June 7 Voykov was the recipient of an assassin’s bullet while awaiting a train
at Warsaw’s train station. The perpetrator was Boris Koverda, the son of a Russian
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monarchist who opposed the Bolshevik regime. Soviet outrage filled the diplomatic
channels between both states, as they were convinced that Poland had been collaborating
with Great Britain against it.119 As a result, a genuine fear of war breaking out with the
West overwhelmed the Soviet Union, bringing about everything short of the Red Army’s
mobilization. While Poland apologized profusely, the Soviet Union accused it of
harboring anti-Soviet terrorists and condoning such acts of violence.120 Its official press,
Tass, accused the Poles of deliberately preventing Voykov from acquiring the necessary
medical attention and as a result, bleeding out to death.121 Patek had his work cut out for
him as he was able to calm Moscow to some extent. He informed the Soviet diplomat
Maxim Litvinov, that both sides could come to an understanding despite this “unfortunate
accident,” which had no connections to Poland at all. He assured him that Polish politics
were peaceful, having nothing in common with the “anti-Soviet intrigues on the wide,
international scene.”122
The Polish delegation attempted to attain a security guarantee for its state at the
League’s Assembly in September. It put forth a proposition to create a universal
nonaggression pact, later modifying it to conclude a “renunciation of war as a means of
settling international disputes and an obligation to settle such dispute by pacific
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means.”123 Its goal was to fill the gap that the 1924 Geneva Protocol had created, where a
state could still wage war if it was for legitimate purposes. Since German revisionism had
greatly intensified since Locarno, the Polish move here was to block threats like it from
taking advantage of the gap and targeting Poland. Unfortunately the proposal was denied
as it was strongly opposed by Stresemann. He argued for general peaceful methods to
counter what he saw as an “Eastern Locarno.” 124 If passed, it would indirectly force
Germany to recognize its border with Poland and renounce ever using force. The very
thought of Poland securing something of an Eastern Locarno sharply conflicted with
Germany’s revisionist agenda.125 But Stresemann successfully won the support of France
and Great Britain, as Briand took no interest in the matter and Chamberlain commented
that weaker states had no business putting forth proposals of such importance as the Poles
had.126 Although the pact failed, the League had adopted a resolution banning wars of
aggression. Yet this still did not fill the gap in the protocol. On top of that, Poland was
not considered a leading state, scorned for its initiative, and shunned by its French ally.
The Lithuanians were irked by Poland’s willingness to give asylum to political
refugees and use them to build support for control over Vilna.127 But the Poles had their
own gripes, stemming from newspaper articles reporting that Polish schoolteachers were
being interned at a prison in Lithuania. The Polish response was the closing of Lithuanian
educational institutions in Vilna, with Piłsudski even attending anti-Lithuanian
demonstrations on the seventh anniversary of Żeligowski’s seizure of the city. 128
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Voldemaras capitalized on these recent developments by writing a detailed complaint to
the League of Nations on October 15. He asserted that the report on the internment of
Polish schoolteachers was fabricated, and that Lithuania would not allow Polish reprisals
against the Lithuanian minority and its institutions go unpunished. Defending his country,
he concluded that “the Polish Government was putting into execution a general plan
directed against the existence itself of independent Lithuania.” 129 Voldemaras went
further by playing upon nationalist sentiments at home to consolidate his political agenda
against Poland.
The ongoing and escalating conflict between Poland and Lithuania had larger
implications for Europe. Many states such as Great Britain and France had continuously
tried to moderate the situation in order to maintain peace and prevent an armed
showdown from happening. France did not want this crisis to interrupt the recent PolishGerman rapprochement, which already contained considerable “strain.”130 Anxiety over a
war breaking out was high, especially since Germany and the Soviet Union had taken an
active role in it. According to Stresemann, his aim was to prevent the West from using
the crisis as a pretext for an Eastern Locarno, which would bring Poland security.131 The
Soviet Union was committed to supporting Lithuania according to their pact. They
underlined their position by sending a direct message to Warsaw, warning the Poles that
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Moscow would not stand by idly in the event of war.132 French Ambassador to the Soviet
Union Jean Herbette sent telegrams to Poland expressing his concern that a Polish-Soviet
war may break out due to the Lithuanian crisis.133 Patek pointed out in a report to Zaleski
that true Soviet desires were based on isolating Poland and preventing her from scoring
friendly ties with its neighbors.134 The League of Nations had found itself in a conundrum
over the situation and decided to convene in early December to find a solution to the
crisis.
The recent Lithuanian accusations lodged against Poland before the League
brought the situation to a breaking point. In the month of November Piłsudski weighed
his options. He held conferences with his military leaders and Lithuanian political
refugees to assess the situation. After reports were made that Lithuania was mobilizing,
the Marshal contemplated preparing the Polish military only to decide against it. He knew
Poland would be victorious but ultimately decided to let the situation be judged
accordingly at the League’s session next month.135
The Marshal personally embarked on a rare journey to Geneva where he arrived
on December 9. At the diplomatic luncheon he became personally acquainted with
Stresemann and cut straight to the chase. “For the last nine years Polish-German relations
have constantly been very bad. Moreover, the Germans have adopted an offensive policy.
The balance of all these years shows that Poland has not lost very much through it and
Germany not only has not gained anything but has done much harm to her interests in the
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international forum. Is it worth continuing?”136 Stresemann’s response was of open arms
and a “gesture of helplessness.” Yet Piłsudski did pepper the conversation with
compliments for Germany and emphasized that his state desired friendly relations with it.
The result of this encounter was a more direct attempt at rapprochement with Germany,
this time coming straight from the strong man of Poland.
It was the next day where Piłsudski shifted gears to address the issue that had
prompted him to come to Geneva. According to a witness, Voldemaras was giving a
speech when the irritated Marshal, “struck the table with his open hand so hard that the
water pitcher rattled, and screamed at the Lithuanian, ‘I have not made the long trip from
Warsaw to Geneva, M. Voldemaras, just to hear your long speech.’” 137 Drawing the
attention of every League representative, Piłsudski asked his counterpart whether he
wanted war or peace. 138 Shocked at the ultimatum, Voldemaras replied “peace.” The
Marshal had successfully exposed his counterpart’s month’s long bluff of an actual
showdown with Poland, and declared that the matter was over. The League ultimately
came to a resolution that a state of war no longer existed between both states and that
they could now open up negotiations to reinstate diplomatic relations.139 But both sides
had great difficulty choosing a location and setting up an agenda for when they would
convene. Eventually they held a conference in Königsberg in late March and early April
136
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1928, where they discussed communications, economics, and security. But nothing
materialized from it. Voldemaras had always been pessimistic about holding negotiations,
feeling that it was better for Lithuania not to come to an understanding with Poland.140
The Lithuanian delegation also felt relations would never become regulated, underling
the importance in the return of Vilna.141
The Transition from post-Locarno to Collective Security
The Piłsudski-Stresemann encounter carried on into the early months of 1928. It
was favorably looked upon by other states such as France, who felt that the differences
between both sides could finally be resolved. To start up fresher negotiations with
Germany, Piłsudski dispatched Prince Janusz Radziwiłł to Berlin in March 1928. He was
to secretly meet with Stresemann and like the Diamand mission, touch upon what was
obstructing Polish-German relations. When Radziwiłł made a reference to some sort of
minor territorial adjustments, Stresemann’s response was that the German people would
not allow him to come out of such negotiations empty-handed.142 What this meant was
that Germany was seeking a complete revision of the territorial status quo between both
sides before other issues could be addressed. Yet again, Polish overtures were considered
a failure as they were at the mercy of the territorial question.
The successes of Locarno had intrigued Stresemann enough to push for more
concessions for Germany. In September 1926 he met with Briand in the French village of
Thoiry to discuss greater German participation in European politics. There, it was
Briand’s mistake in hinting to Stresemann that Germany could gain more favorable
concessions. The latter knew that it was France who held “the solution of the principal
140
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questions of German policy, not only in the west but also in the east.”143 If he could
eliminate all French fears of German aggression, it would compel France to become more
pro-German. By the time 1928 came around, the Rhineland question had gained much
ground in diplomatic circles. Stresemann’s aim was to convince the West that Germany’s
good behavior deserved some kind of gesture of goodwill to signify the formation of
détente between both sides, such as the early withdrawal of Allied troops from the
Rhineland, who were to remain there until 1935. But the other goal attached to this one
was also some sort of compromise to ease the burden of reparations. If achieved,
Germany would be completely free to place all of its attention towards its revisionist
campaign against Poland.
An early evacuation of the Rhineland would be a blow to Polish foreign policy. In
reality, its occupation was the last piece of security guarantee Poland had against German
aggression. As long as Allied troops were stationed there and the war reparations were
not paid off, Germany could not afford in any way to mobilize against Poland and take
back the territories it laid claim to. And so on top of trying to find more guarantees for
security after Locarno, Polish foreign policy was now faced with another task that could
make the overall quest even more difficult. Although Zaleski supported a French-German
rapprochement and made it clear that Poland would not be an obstacle to it, there was
worry in Warsaw that the former might be realized at the expense of France’s allies. But
France did not see the Rhineland’s evacuation as a threat to Poland. Briand maintained
that an early evacuation could only occur if Germany followed disarmament provisions,
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and if so, Locarno did not prevent France from crossing back into the Rhineland if its
allies were victims of German aggression.144
Piłsudski had expressed an interest in attaining something similar to that of an
Eastern Locarno in order to offset the consequences of an early withdrawal.145 This was
witnessed via Polish initiatives at the League. Poland had considered invoking Article
429 of the Versailles Treaty, where the evacuation could be delayed in order to obtain the
required guarantees to fulfill the treaty’s provisions. Zaleski’s tactic was to use the threat
of legal force to push Germany into directly negotiating some sort of a nonaggression
pact with the Poles, which would be guaranteed by France and Great Britain. Yet France
refused to support this idea, as the Quai d’Orsay cited Poland as not being of the original
Allied contingency at Versailles, and Briand refused to extend Locarno-like guarantees to
Eastern Europe.146 If anything, the latter was more hopeful that the Piłsudski-Stresemann
encounter might produce some bilateral agreement or that some reparations may satisfy
Poland.
What became evident here was the growing estrangement between France and
Poland, due to increasingly divergent interests. The former progressively began to take a
defensive stance in terms of security arrangement. This came not only at the behest of the
state’s political arena looking for reconciliation with Germany, but the state’s financial
woes also influenced this turn in foreign policy. When coupled together, the military
budget shrunk and funds were transferred to a new project, the building of a defensive
barrier known as the Maginot Line. Although construction would not start for another
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couple of years, the French saw this as a precautionary measure after the imminent
evacuation of the Rhineland.
But yet again the French attempted to make changes to their commitments in the
alliance with Poland. A proposed revision submitted to Warsaw in January stated that
France would “possibly” engage Germany if it attacked Poland during a Polish-Soviet
conflict. Though it was outright rejected, Piłsudski did send a member of the Polish
General Staff, General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, to inquire what the French would actually do
in this scenario. His counterpart, General Eugene Debeney refused to divulge the new
mobilization plans under the proposed revisions.147 This clearly did not rebuild Polish
confidence in the reliability of its French ally. However in the summer of 1928, French
and Polish General Staffs came together to discuss technical adjustments to the military
convention, where France would possibly assist Poland in the buildup of its army, navy,
and general armament. But the true downside to this cooperation was that both General
Staffs were often subjugated to the wills of their political superiors. French military
leaders often clashed with politicians over budgets and foreign policy. On the Polish side,
Piłsudski directed the General Staff, with the only downfall being that he increasingly
weeded out French influence in the Polish military.
As time progressed, so did France’s attitude in treating Poland more like a junior
partner. It felt there was little need to maintain the razor sharp edge of an alliance that
was originally aimed at Germany, whom now was in the good graces of Paris.148 French
accusations that Warsaw leveled unfair treatment against French business firms in Poland
arose, with the most notable case being the Żyrardów textile mill. Allegedly, the Polish
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government had imposed harsh penalties on the business owners for widely profiting at
the expense of the country’s economy and the mill’s workers. But Warsaw defended its
actions arguing that it was trying to bridge the gap between Poland’s benefits from
French investments and the profits that the firms were reaping based off of the alliance’s
economic agreement’s preferred nation clause. But on a grander scale, France began to
attack Poland for constantly having accusations brought against it in front of the League,
considering them “petty and time-consuming.” 149 There were many instances where
France felt that Poland was always sabotaging all members’ attempts at reconciliation
with Germany. No matter what contested issue came between the two, Poland
continuously found itself emasculated and accepting the French point of view to prevent
a complete rupture in the alliance.
French efforts to gain security for France were seen with the concluding of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact on August 27, 1928.150 Designed and coordinated by Briand and the
United States’ Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, the pact was originally signed between
both statesmen’s countries as well as Germany. Other states such as Poland were forced
to wait and latch on their signatures at a later date.151 The pact went into effect about a
year later and its principal goal was for the signatories to renounce the threat and use of
war as a way to resolve disputes. Other provisions allowed signatories the right to selfdefense and to nullify their obligations under the League’s covenant should another
member violate the pact. Its design was to fit within not just the League’s framework, but
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also within that of Locarno’s. For France, the pact was seen as a chance to erase any
chance of Germany using force against it or its allies. It was also perceived as a way to
ensure the Rhineland’s imminent transition from occupied to free. If Germany violated
any of the provisions through an unprovoked act of aggression, than France would be
justified to take action against it.152 But this pact was not necessarily a victory for Poland,
as Zaleski had signed it to prevent the deterioration of Poland’s position as a supporting
ally and transition to being labeled a burden. The Poles held reservations about this pact
because they had not been consulted and the very fact that it had practically the same
nature as the Polish proposal in September 1927.153 It may have outlawed the use of war,
but this did not guarantee Poland’s security. Even if Germany violated the pact, there was
no promise of French aid because League members could decline to uphold their
obligations. Since France could not get Poland to accept revisions to the alliance, the pact
may have given it a blind impression that aid was no longer necessary and thus void due
to the ban on war.
The Soviet Union had always looked at the League with suspicion, seeing it as a
Western instrument aimed against it. When news broke of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
Chicherin reacted with contempt. “The omission of the Soviet Government from those
taking part in the negotiations brings us in the first place to the though that the real aims
of initiators of the pact obviously included and include the desire to make of it a means of
isolating the USSR and of fighting against it.”154 There was also a feeling of unease in
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Moscow, in that the pact did not go far enough in renouncing all methods of aggression.
The Soviets even accused the Germans of straying away from the spirit of Rapallo and
Berlin, sacrificing its ties with them for better relations with the West. “At that time
(Rapallo) Germany was tenaciously fighting for a place in the international arena and
needed the support of Russia; by 1929 she was recognized as an equal by the big
powers.”155 A real crisis struck Moscow as not only had Germany been drawn closer to
France and Great Britain, but the war scare of 1927 was still in the minds of many. A
feeling of insecurity arose to high levels by late 1928 in the Soviet Union, motivated by
foreign and domestic difficulties. Its own search for security now became paramount to
its existence.
In early December, Litvinov expressed his desires to Patek for the “regulating of
good mutual neighborly relations” between both their states.156 For years, neither side
could finalize an agreement over a nonaggression pact, but that changed on December 29,
when the Soviets proposed the Litvinov Protocol.157 It was to apply the provisions of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact to the relations between both states, without waiting for the former’s
ratification. The Soviets had also extended it to Lithuania, but not to the Baltic states. In
January, the Poles expressed a desire to conclude this agreement but on the persistent
condition that the Baltic states and Romania be included. Although they initially refused,
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the Soviets gave in and on February 9, the protocol was signed in Moscow.158 Although
hostilities between both states reemerged within months after the signing, both sides saw
the agreement as a diplomatic success even if only for the time being. Russia’s fear of
isolation had eased, and Poland had gained some assurance of security on its eastern
front, particularly in the wake of Germany’s growing strength in Western politics and
France’s unpredictable foreign policy.
The League had decided to settle the Rhineland issue and Germany’s remaining
war reparations in August 1929 at the Hague Conference. With its evacuation imminent,
the Poles scrambled to gain some kind of assurance of security before the decision was
made to pull out all Allied troops. According to Zaleski, Polish aims were to accept the
evacuation and instead, focus on collecting reparations and a guarantee of security.159 A
report from May 30, 1929 cited that potential compensation for an early evacuation
would involve attaining a “concrete political declaration from the Entente powers” for
security, in addition to the strengthening of Poland’s military.160 Another report created
two main points that the Poles should stress at the Hague: apprehend some kind of
guarantee of security from France, and, create a favorable political result from the
conference.161 The first point was to be based on proposing the “model D” project. The
second concluded that the evacuation should not be accepted behind Poland’s back.
The Hague Conference was split into two sessions, the first one taking place from
August 6 to 21, 1929, and the second one from January 3 to 20, 1930. At the first session,
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the conference’s participants accepted the reduction of Germany’s war reparations, and
initiated the process to withdraw all remaining Allied troops from the Rhineland.162 The
Polish delegation heavily courted their French counterparts during the conference. They
proposed the model D project as a final attempt to at an Eastern Locarno. It was supposed
to be a tripartite agreement between Poland, France, and Germany, with its structure
similar to that of Locarno’s. All three sides were to renounce war, use arbitration to settle
their differences, and lend assistance to one another after a League ruling on whether an
act of aggression had occurred. In fact, the project stated that one side could actually lend
immediate assistance to the victim since an attack on one League member equaled that of
an attack on all members. Yet it failed to define what constituted flagrant aggression and
how to secure obligatory aid. The Poles ransomed their consent to the Rhineland’s
evacuation in return for French aid that would cover this specific classification. They saw
model D important for the “consolidation of European peace.”163
But the French refused to accept the whole project for a number of reasons.
According to the Quai d’Orsay’s political director René Massigli, he expressed doubt
whether the Germans would accept such an offer. 164 They would not consent to
something that strengthened the Franco-Polish alliance (which in their eyes was always
aimed against Germany) and guaranteed Poland’s borders. Despite this project making
better guarantees of nonaggression than the Kellogg-Briand pact, the absence of a
demilitarized Rhineland made the term “flagrant aggression” difficult to define. Massigli
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embodied French concerns over its definition and whether it interfered with Article 2 of
the Rhineland pact.165 Under that article the French could only respond if: the Germans
entered the Rhineland before its evacuation, the League had made its decision on who the
aggressor was, and if this was not a legal war under Article 15 of the League’s covenant.
The definition of flagrant aggression was worthless without the Rhineland. When the
Poles asked the Quai d’Orsay’s Secretary General Philippe Berthelot what would happen
in case of German aggression, he responded, “You have your military convention, which
in time will find its application.” 166 Without the clause on flagrant aggression that
guaranteed immediate aid, the Poles could not push for the signing of the model D
proposal.167
The Poles were willing to come to a compromise by editing model D and
strengthening the alliance’s military convention through it. Rather than push for
immediate French aid, the Polish General Staff suggested strengthening the convention’s
terms on material aid. This too however did not stick well with the French, who
countered that they could not guarantee an increase in material aid for financial and legal
reasons.168 Whether this was the actual reason or that France was now pressured to accept
the evacuation by other members present at the Hague, it still represented another failure
for both sides to find an agreement that guaranteed Polish security. Zaleski made one last
attempt after the Hague conference to add “flagrant aggression” to the alliance, only for
the French to bring remind them of legalistic interpretations and reassure that France
would be ready to mobilize in the event of conflict immediately after a League ruling. An
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armament loan was discussed between Zaleski and Briand, after the former had asked the
latter what could guarantee Poland’s security now that the Rhineland’s early evacuation
was accepted. Briand responded that he was willing to commit a French loan of 2-3
million francs to help facilitate the Polish army. Although Zaleski accepted the offer,
Piłsudski refused it on the grounds that Poland would be greatly indebted to France and
that Polish war industries would be able to equip the army by the time conflict arose.169
The last Polish attempt at attaining some sort of guarantee for Poland’s security
had failed. “Poland was no closer to her East-Locarno goal and her security position had
considerably deteriorated.” 170 Their French counterparts were too invested in the
legalities and refused to back their allies because they were not interested in reverting to a
pre-Locarno-like position, where all initiatives were aimed against Germany. But in
reality, it seems the French were more interested in preventing anything from spoiling
their own rapprochement with Germany, something the Poles became increasingly
apprehensive about.171 What became apparent with the Rhineland’s early evacuation was
that the Franco-Polish alliance had lost practically all of its power, leaving the Poles to
wonder whether their French counterparts would still be reliable when conflict arose.
With the year 1929 coming to a close, Polish foreign policy had lost more than it
had gained. It was able to reassess Poland’s relations with its neighbors and allies through
bilateral talks in an effort to improve them. A slow thaw in Poland’s geopolitical isolation
had begun, with some diplomatic successes achieved. Unfortunately the failure to gain
any direct guarantees of security for Poland is what stood out the most in Sanacja’s first
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three years at the reigns of foreign policy. Unable to successfully prevent the premature
evacuation of the Rhineland, Poland was now more exposed and vulnerable to the
threatening dangers of German revisionism. Its foreign policy had to continue on,
searching for security by itself as France proved unwilling to assist it. The question
remained not just how, but what were the new challenges awaiting now that Germany
had been released from its shackles.
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III. UNCERTAINTY: 1930-1932
A New Direction in Foreign Policy
The year 1930 ushered in a new era in Europe. Barely any remnants of the
Versailles system remained truly intact. Stresemann was dead, but his work from the past
six years had come full circle since Locarno. Germany had been successfully reintegrated into the new European concert of Great Powers, due to keystone events like
the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Rhineland’s early evacuation. But the significance in its
emancipation from the shackles of Versailles lay in the circumstance that its revisionist
agenda faced just a few more obstacles. War may have been renounced with a caveat or
two, but the German courtship of the West proved to be the definitive factor in
Germany’s drive to retake what it had been stripped of. With security purchased on its
western front, it would amplify its revisionist aims against the East, hoping that Europe
would once again concede to its demands.
Poland had not necessarily found itself geopolitically isolated yet again, but rather
caught in the crossroads of European stability. The Sanacja regime had failed to attain
any direct guarantees of security for its state, but it did reopen dialogue with states it had
been estranged with due to longstanding differences. Some progress had been made to
neutralize the Soviet Union and its fears of a Western-led Polish conspiracy against it, but
negotiations with Germany continued to stall anytime the territorial question was brought
up. The bigger problem may have been that the alliance system with France had
deteriorated rather than strengthened in the face of Germany’s regeneration. No changes
were exactly made to the conventions, but it became inherently obvious that France was
no longer interested in maintaining the military stipulations that it felt were outdated and
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had to be replaced by conventional diplomacy. Facing the reality that its ally may be
unreliable if conflict arises, and troubled by what an unrestrained Germany might now be
capable of, Sanacja needed to rethink its approach to foreign policy as its soft diplomatic
aims now proved to be outdated for the challenges on the horizon.
The appointment of Colonel Józef Beck as Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in
1930 came at the behest of Marshal Piłsudski. The latter had held Beck in high regard
and possibly trusted no other man in Poland more than him, in the next few years
claiming that he had “found a particularly able and intelligent assistant in the person of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.” 172 He was Piłsudski’s right-hand man, an exLegionnaire who had fought alongside him during World War I. In the early 1920s he
briefly served as a military attaché in Paris, later working in the War Ministry shortly
after the May coup. But in the last three years, Piłsudski had planned for Beck to switch
careers and enter the Foreign Ministry.173 His quick ascendency to second-in-command
after Zaleski was a clear example that the Marshal was slowly turning Polish foreign
policy to a different direction. Judging from both Piłsudski and Beck’s backgrounds, and
their long relationship serving with each other, it is not far off to assume that the Ministry
was going to adapt a more militaristic-strategic approach to relations with Poland’s
neighbors.
Initial Responses to Revisionism
Polish-German relations had somewhat stabilized in the past three years. But after
the evacuation of the Rhineland, aggressive displays of revisionist feelings began to spoil
that progress. Stresemann’s successor, Julius Curtius, was in favor of continuing his
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predecessor’s goals and like most Germans, keeping up with a revisionist campaign
against Poland. Yet the state’s economic woes as a result of the worldwide depression
had made the Foreign Minister favor a more realistic approach. He found it more
practical to carry out a policy of normalization with Poland, as opposed to intensifying
Germany’s revisionist aims that could lead to a war in which the latter would be too weak
to engage in.174 It was in late 1929 that Germany had chosen to conclude a liquidation
and trade treaty with Poland after years of slow negotiations. By March 1930, both states
had signed a most-favored nation commercial treaty. But Curtius’ realistic approach was
met with domestic hostility, not only from most political parties but also from public
opinion.
As a result of revisionist feelings prevailing over conciliatory aims, relations
between both states began to deteriorate. The liquidation and trade agreements fell
through as the German Reichstag refused to ratify them, and instead, chose to increase
customs tariffs on Polish goods (which effectively eliminated any benefits from the mostfavored nation agreement).175 There were numerous occurrences of border incidents and
media outlets promoting anti-German or anti-Polish propaganda. Warsaw’s view of
Germany were dampened when the latter’s secret active role in supporting Ukrainian
nationalism by way of training and supplying terrorist cells like the OUN, came to light
in 1931. 176 Some prominent German politicians went so far not only to mention
revisionism in their speeches, but also assert that the lost territories in the East would be
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returned to Germany.177 The topic of the Polish Corridor began to reemerge whenever the
territorial question was brought up, as it remained the primary obstacle to linking
Germany with East Prussia. Overall, the danger in all of these cases was that it further
fueled the German public’s support for the revisionist campaign against Poland.
Despite being afflicted by the economic repercussions of the depression, Poland
was able to counter Germany’s reigniting of the tariff war. With the help of foreign loans,
it was able to hasten the construction of a commercial port in the Baltic city of Gdynia.
The benefit here was not just purely economical but also political. It relieved the burden
of the state relying on trade through the free city of Danzig, which had recently ramped
up its own hostility against Poland due to the growing influences of nationalist parties
like the Nationalist Socialist (Nazi) party. “Disorganization and disequilibrium within
and between both nations were rampant, nationalism was inflamed and ‘economic trading
considerations were subordinated to political objectives.’”178
Tensions were arguably at an all time high between both states, but war remained
unfeasible for either side to carry out against the other.179 Factors such as the open terrain
shared by both states and a general atmosphere of mistrust, was what particularly gave
way to this paranoia that precipitated in Berlin and Warsaw that war may break out. On
the Polish side, Zaleski had always lodged complaints following any signs of hostility in
German propaganda or actual incidents between both sides. However, he was always
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open to and pursued negotiations with his counterparts to liquidate any open conflicts.
But it was Piłsudski who embodied a tougher approach to relations with Germany, even
if it meant Poland taking up arms to protect its interests. In one instance, he underlined to
American President Herbert Hoover via the Polish Embassy in Washington, that Poland
will “never accept any discussion over the revision of its borders.” In the same
communiqué, the Marshal emphasized that in case of an attack from Germany, Poland
would launch all military might against it rather than lodge a complaint to someone.
“This type of war would be the ruin of Germany.”180 But under German Chancellor at the
time, Heinrich Brüning, Germany did not intend to concentrate all of its strength against
Poland. Instead, Brüning had also followed a policy similar to that of Curtius’, where he
was more focused on stabilizing and repairing his state’s domestic problems than
inflaming relations with Poland.181
German revisionism and domestic instability had surprisingly created anxiety in
France as well. Not only had Germany’s appetite for concessions grown, but also the
tensions growing on its eastern frontier had worried the West that a war may actually
break out and drag into it all of Europe despite the recent success in avoiding it.
Therefore the French began to reproach their Polish allies in 1930 in an effort to find a
solution to curbing the escalating uncertainty brewing in the state the partnership was
designed to keep at bay. The French General Staff reevaluated the military convention
and conducted studies on the Polish Corridor. It had concluded that the latter was largely
Polish and a key part to its ally’s economic sustainability, while the convention was not
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outdated and still valuable to the alliance. To show their Polish counterparts that their
state was vital to France’s interests, the French went ahead and transferred the final
installment of a loan that had been originally finalized in 1925. On February 18, 1931 an
agreement was concluded where Poland would receive the delivery of 113 million francs
worth of war material for its military.
Yet there were rough spots to these attempts at rebuilding relations, as the Poles
often demanded more from their ally. In particularly, they requested more loans to fund
other state projects such as an updated railroad system. But it was Piłsudski who held
general reservations about these recent developments in Franco-Polish relations. His
primary concern was that Poland was exhibiting too many signs of dependence on
France.182 The latter itself did not exhibit a concrete stance on the situation in Germany,
and whether its foreign policy would continue to cater towards greater cooperation with
it. While the political Left continued to support what the Briand years had produced, the
Right was apprehensive towards the rise in German nationalism and refused to tolerate its
growing revisionism. But the reality was that those in power blindly chose conciliation,
finding that the spirit of Locarno still existed and would continue to safeguard both states
from falling into conflict with each other. This thought served to neutralize any fears that
France would be dragged into a German-Polish conflict.
The highlight of the Franco-Polish alliance’s bankruptcy came at the
Disarmament Conference in February 1932. It was there that the assembled European
powers (even the Soviet Union, a non-League member) debated whether to completely
disarm or create limitations to their stockpiles of weaponry, in an effort to extend the
provisions of collective security from the late 1920s. Stresemann may have been dead,
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but his successors continued to push for Germany’s reemergence as a Great Power by
attaining an “equality of rights” status for their state, so it could have equal power in
European decision-making. With regards to the conference, the German delegation would
either attempt to convince all participants to uniformly disarm, or bring about limitations
equal to that of Germany’s. All of this had raised alarms in both Polish and French
military circles. But the political views of both allies had failed to align yet again in the
face of a possible German threat. Whereas Warsaw was interested in raising its military
strength, Paris only showed interest in a “retention of forces capable of defending the
country.” 183 Despite the latter’s ambiguity towards the domestic changes occurring in
Germany, Paris felt it was more important to continue promoting European solidarity
through Germany’s reintegration.
Prime Minister André Tardieu, who had personally submitted a proposal at the
conference, led the French delegation. The Tardieu Plan called for every League member
to contribute troops and heavy artillery in order to create a security force that would help
maintain international security. While the Poles held no objections to it, the Germans had
created an awkward and tense atmosphere by threatening to leave the conference if they
were not given the desired equality of rights for their state.184 Since the French plan was
met with objections, Zaleski decided that Poland should put forth its own plan, the
“Polish minimum scheme.” “The caliber of artillery guns and the types of armoured
vehicles be limited, and a convention adopted prohibiting air bombing of open cities and
non-military objectives, and also all particularly barbarous methods of warfare such as
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poison gas, bacteriological warfare, etc.” 185 But the plan found no support and was
outright rejected.
The conference yielded no great results for its participants except for Germany,
who on December 11 was granted equality of rights with the support of Italy, Great
Britain, and the United States. Germany’s victory bore many repercussions, namely that
the state could actually return its weapon stockpiles to the levels of its neighbors. But the
Sanacja regime saw this as another deep blow to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty,
which had kept Germany disarmed. In Warsaw’s eyes, the results of the conference only
increased the uncertainty it saw in its western neighbor. While Beck had told Laroche,
“To allow [Germany] to have arms means a lost game,” on a separate occasion he had
stated that the German victory, which had been decided by a small group of powers,
spelled danger for the League of Nations’ existence. 186 But France’s idleness also
disturbed the Poles who throughout 1932, increasingly became self-reliant and less
collaborative with their ally. Piłsudski had grown tired of Paris’ tendency to change its
policies, of saying one thing today and changing its mind tomorrow. The increase in
episodes of French officials commenting on the unavoidability of territorial revisions on
the German-Polish frontier, only reinforced Sanacja’s suspicion of its allies
dependability. By October 1932, Piłsudski clearly exhibited violent reservations about the
alliance, commenting to French military attaché Colonel Charles d’Arbonneau, “France
will abandon us, France will betray us! This is what I think, and this is what I should tell
you.”187 The Marshal’s beliefs may have been proven two months later when Germany
attained the equality of rights status. A notable discourse was occurring in the alliance, as
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France increasingly took up fortifying a defensive position while Poland continued to
invest in the 1921 offensive mindset. It was perhaps the failure or stubbornness of both
sides to find common ground, that directed the growing division.
A Turn to the East: The Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1932
The Soviet Union’s domestic difficulties had carried into the early 1930s, with its
Five Year Plan’s collectivization efforts meeting resistance in addition to falling short of
their aims. The goal had been to industrialize the state that could produce a “powerful,
modern military machine.”188 But this plan required foreign capital in order to lift off the
ground, thus compelling Soviet foreign policy to take on a more active and friendlier
approach to the West. But the state found itself plagued with worry when it also came to
external events. In 1931 Japan had launched a successful invasion of Manchuria, and
while its next target was China, its fortification in the Soviet Union’s backyard raised
alarms in Moscow. All of these events had prompted the Soviets to take up a position to
further their pursuit of peace and secure the state’s western frontier. 189 The Litvinov
Protocol had extended the Kellogg-Briand Pact to Eastern Europe, but this did not stop
the continuation of incidents between Poland and the Soviet Union. In fact, there had
been this wave of suspicion that occupied Moscow in the late 1920s and early 1930s
about Polish espionage taking place on Soviet territory, thus never allowing the war scare
from 1927 to recede into the pages of history. 190 To make matters worse, the recent

188

J.A. Large, “The Origins of Soviet Collective Security Policy, 1930-32,” Soviet Studies 30, (1978), 215216.
189
Bohdan B. Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations 1932-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), 8-9.
190
The Poles had waged a propaganda war to weaken the Soviet Union by targeting its southern enterprise,
the Soviet Ukraine. Although there were no designs to launch a war to rip it away from the influence of
Moscow, the Poles had created various espionage agencies that were attached to propaganda organs to
incite resistance in Ukraine. While it is difficult to measure the success of such ventures, it clearly became
a threat to the Soviet Union particularly when its collectivization campaigns of the early 30s began to face

77
developments in Germany had left relations between both states hanging by a thread.
With its revisionist aims free to take affect, Berlin no longer saw the Russian card as
valuable in isolating Poland. However it retained an active role in maintaining relations
with Moscow to prevent the latter from ever concluding an agreement with Warsaw that
recognized the Polish-Soviet border, or at least one that prevented the Soviet Union from
aiding Germany if it was attacked by Poland.191
As early as October 1930, Soviet circles began to publically express a desire to
improve relations with Poland. Both states began to gravitate towards each other
particularly after the Franco-Soviet talks in May 1931. Like Poland, France had also been
seeking a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union since 1926, and looked to keep
Moscow and Berlin apart.192 But since it could not force the Poles to make changes to the
alliance, its aim may have been to ease France’s responsibility in coming to Poland’s aid
in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union or a Soviet-Romanian conflict.193 Although
Paris did not include Warsaw in the negotiations with Moscow, it maintained contact
with it at all times and successfully coaxed it into pursuing its own agreement with the
Soviets. Days after the Franco-Soviet pact was initialed, Patek submitted a draft of the
original 1926 Soviet offer, in which the Poles yet again desired the inclusion of the Baltic
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states and Poland’s southern ally Romania. Although the Soviets scoffed at the proposal,
their domestic and foreign concerns forced them to reconsider and accept it.
The Marshal’s feelings of distrust and dislike for the Soviet Union had not
changed. Yet he was practical in the sense that with the uncertainty over the
developments in Germany, an opportunity arose to focus on securing Poland’s eastern
frontier with its other threatening neighbor. Thus Piłsudski felt it was necessary to take
advantage of this pretty favorable situation and come away with some kind of agreement
with the Soviets. In general, Polish foreign policy saw it as an opportunity to end Soviet
propaganda and speculations that Poland still had designs to invade Russia. 194 He
entrusted Colonel Beck to oversee this project, with Patek and the Ministry’s Eastern
Department’s Director Colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel, spearheading the negotiations with
Moscow.195 The reason Beck was given command was so that Polish foreign policy could
begin to follow a new direction, namely a strategic one underlined by a “freedom of
action,” where Poland could stabilize its security without depending on France
anymore. 196 When looking at the new Polish approach to conducting negotiations
bilaterally and independently of French guidance, it had opened up a clearer picture.
Litvinov, who had now succeeded Chicherin, gave the Poles in October 1931 a
counteroffer in which the nonaggression pact would be based on the Franco-Soviet one.
But the Poles were not satisfied, arguing that the pact should be based on previous
arrangements between both sides, such as the Litvinov Protocol and the Riga Treaty.197
After much debate, both sides were able to come to an agreement on this point, basing the
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new pact on the original Soviet offer from 1926. Piłsudski expressed four points for the
Poles to attach to this pact: It should adhere to previous political agreements, the interests
of Russia’s other neighbors, and to avoid any unclear definition of aggression. The
underlining importance of the pact was in “demanding that the inviolability of territory
and frontiers be adopted as the basis for any definition of the aggressor.”198 Once the
important matters had been agreed upon, Beck had instructed the Foreign Ministry to cut
off further talks. This was seen to ensure completion of the dragged-out project, and
mainly to prevent the Soviets from attaching at the last moment any conditions that were
of no interest to the Poles.
But the true obstacle to Polish-Soviet talks was that of the inclusion of the Baltic
states and Romania. Like the French, the Poles were interested in promoting stability in
the region. They saw it not only in their interests, but in all the other states’ interests as
well.199 But when it came to their Romanian ally, its security was just as important in the
common front against the Soviet Union as was maintaining the alliance itself. The
alliance had been recently renewed in January 1931 for another five years.200 If we recall
Piłsudski’s desires for the alliance in the previous chapter, involving Romania in a
nonaggression pact may have been an opportunity to strengthen the alliance and mold
Romanian foreign policy into a more Polish-accommodating one.
It was in early May 1931 that the Poles contacted Bucharest and inquired whether
it was interested in bilateral talks with Russia.201 Although talks wouldn’t take place until
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January 1932, the French and Poles had successfully coerced the Romanians into
approaching the Soviet Union, but at the sacrifice of the Baltic states’ direct inclusion.202
However Warsaw was able to salvage some leverage over Moscow by making their own
signature dependent on that of Bucharest, something the latter stingily accepted.203 Yet
the Romanians did not show as much enthusiasm as their allies. Relations with the Soviet
Union were practically nonexistent as the Romanians refused to discuss the mutually
contested territory of Bessarabia. They were also suspicious of whether a nonaggression
pact would cloak true Soviet intentions of driving a wedge in between the PolishRomanian alliance.204 If there was a chance in reaching a nonaggression pact, it was to do
so without touching upon the topic of Bessarabia or becoming detrimental to the alliance
with Poland. The true dilemma lay in two options: “preserve the unity of action with
Poland and France at the expense of some compromise over Bessarabia,” or “continue to
defend intransigently the principle of status quo inviolability even if that attitude should
lead to a loosening of alliances?”205
The French and the Poles were forced to take up the roles of arbitrators for the
Romanian-Soviet negotiations. Whereas the Poles relayed information to Moscow, the
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French maintained Bucharest’s composure and willingness to cooperate with the Soviets.
But trivial issues arose from the outset. Both sides debated on the location to carry out
discussions, with Romania suggesting Warsaw and the Soviet Union choosing Ankara in
Turkey. 206 A deep sense of ambiguity prevailed over the Romanian side, resulting in
evasive replies to the feasibility of reaching some sort of an agreement with the Soviets.
They never truly desired to negotiate with the Soviets and claimed that they were
pressured by Poland and France to open up dialogue.207 They felt that Warsaw’s refusal
to support Bucharest’s own draft of a nonaggression pact on the grounds that it differed
from its own, most likely aggravated not only the latter’s little enthusiasm but possibly
even relations between both states. Poland’s aim may have been to maintain the cordon
sanitaire against Russia through identical pacts, but Romania was more concerned in
defining particular conditions for security reasons, especially since it was still involved in
a territorial dispute. Since there had never been any legal recognition of the RomanianRussian border, Bucharest feared that any legal discussion regarding this issue would
open the door to discussions over the legality of their ownership of Bessarabia.208
A clash of personalities and interests also divided the Poles and the Romanians.
The latter’s Minister in London and former President of the League’s General Assembly,
Nicolae Titulescu, enjoyed widespread popularity in his home country and was
highlighted by being in the good graces of King Carol II. Titulescu’s opinions were held
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in high esteem due to his experience as a European diplomat and his honesty in
expressing his deep dislike for the Soviet Union. He felt that dealing with Moscow would
only be detrimental to Romania’s interests. It seems that he was predisposed to favoring
international treaties than bilateral ones, citing that there was no need to replace an
“eternal pact (Kellogg-Briand)” with “an isolated five-year pact…”209 Yet he did not cut
off negotiations with the Soviets, most likely to prevent a rupture in relations with Poland
and France. Instead he had stuck to firmly preventing the Bessarabian question from
being raised in the nonaggression pact.210 But he had a tendency to continuously push for
the pact to contain detailed wording. This came at the irritation of Beck who had avoided
this method to prevent the Soviets from ever gaining legal leverage against Poland.
Eventually Polish patience with Romania and France began to wear thin. While
the former balked at coming to a general agreement with Russia, France dismissed its
own pursuance of a nonaggression pact. The Franco-Soviet pact had been drawn up under
Briand and negotiations continued under his successor Pierre Laval. However France’s
domestic instability claimed another cabinet, replacing Laval with Tardieu who chose to
cease negotiations.211 Tardieu had never been in favor of negotiating with the Soviets,
and may have been influenced by political circles that opposed the pact. The Soviets
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somewhat displayed a mutual feeling, as they resented France’s economic reconstruction
in the Danube states and its support for Japan’s Manchurian venture.212 Yet the French
retained activity in Poland and Romania’s negotiations, largely guiding and influencing
the latter. But it soon became apparent that Zaleski’s diplomatic and calm approach to the
Romanians had no effect on speeding up the Romanian-Soviet pact. It was now time for
Polish foreign policy to apply pressure, clearly exhibited during Piłsudski’s state visit to
Bucharest in April.
While meeting with Romanian Prime Minister Dimitri Ghika on the 14th, the
Marshal claimed that the Poles were conducting a policy within the alliance’s framework
in establishing collective negotiations and agreements with the Soviets.213 It was here that
he put the Romanians on the spot and without directly saying it, inquired when they
would sign their pact? It was here the Marshal also espoused his contempt for persistent
French impotence, citing their habit of changing foreign policy and abandoning their own
plans for a pact.214 When the Romanians cited that they would not make any changes to
their own nonaggression pact, Piłsudski took this as his counterparts surveying whether
the Poles would adopt their policy to fit Romania’s interests. He burst out in anger
asserting that he was not like the French, and implied that if he shared a policy with at
least twenty individuals one day, he would not change it the next day like the French
do.215 The Marshal went on to insist the value of previous litigation like the KelloggBriand Pact and the Litvinov Protocol, and that simultaneous ratification of a
nonaggression pact would benefit both sides. A bitter taste was left in both sides’ mouth,
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with the Romanians certainly not taking kindly to Piłsudski’s less than conciliatory
approach.216
By June the Poles could no longer wait for their allies to conclude an agreement
with the Soviets. Szembek informed Bucharest that the Poles had decided to sign their
own nonaggression pact sometime between June 15 and 25 in order to maintain solidarity
with the Baltic states. 217 The Romanians retorted by asserting that they could not be
pressured to conclude their negotiations with a deadline, as it would weaken Romania’s
position in talks with the Soviets. By mid-June Beck had communicated to Bucharest that
Poland could no longer afford to put off its signature for fear of a Soviet withdrawal.
Thus in early July the Poles pressed the Romanians with a simple ultimatum on whether
they would simultaneously join Poland in concluding nonaggression pacts with the
Soviets.218 Romania’s response was “no,” but they held no more objections to Poland
proceeding to sign its agreement without them.219
The Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed on July 25, 1932 in Moscow.220
It reaffirmed the Riga Treaty, adhered to any previous legislation signed by either side,
and remained active for a period of three years. It also contained a clause for an
automatic two-year renewal, as well as an “escape” option where if one side displayed an
216
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act of aggression against a third party then the other side could void the pact.221 The Poles
had successfully included the coveted legislation on “the integrity and inviolability of
territory” into the pact’s first article. It was seen as a way to stabilize Poland’s eastern
territorial status quo, and allow Warsaw to focus more on countering German revisionism
in the west.222
Yet both sides did not attach great faith in the pact, only considering it a mere
diplomatic achievement. It lessened the chance of a Polish-Soviet clash but only gave
hope for peaceful coexistence between both states. Moscow was in need of establishing
peace with the West, only if temporary, while it consolidated its position of
industrializing its state. The Poles saw it as a “gesture of goodwill” and an opportunity to
build good relations with Russia.223 Although Piłsudski continued to remain suspicious
and distrusting of the Soviets, the pact was still considered a milestone and great success
in Polish foreign policy. Poland had engaged one of its threatening neighbors with little
to practically no French influence. 224 The result was an agreement that took Polish
interests into account, something that had always been absent in the West’s political
agenda. If there is one thing that the Poles had learned, it was that bilateral agreements
guaranteed more security than previous international collective ones.
A Romanian-Soviet pact never materialized to the great irritation of Warsaw.
While Moscow at one point had agreed to finally sign the pact, Bucharest had refused.225
It disagreed with the presence of the phrase “existing differences” which implied that the
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Bessarabian question was still open to future debates. It had also made a vain attempt to
involve France and Poland through a convention that would oversee extensions or
renewals of the nonaggression pact. 226 The nail in the coffin was the appointment of
Titulescu to the post of Foreign Minister in October 1932. He continued to clash with
Romania’s envoys in Warsaw and Moscow, with a tendency to continuously create new
arguments on why his state was being given unfavorable conditions in the proposed
pact. 227 Despite the efforts of Beck to mediate, Romanian stubbornness proved too
overwhelming. But what incensed Warsaw was French meddling in Romania’s
negotiations. While Tardieu had declared to Litvinov that France would not sign until
Russia dropped its quest for a “recognition of territorial dispute” with Romania, his
successor Édouard Herriot had rescinded his predecessor’s condition and instead tried to
implement a plan that contained the wording of “existing disputes.”228 Romania outright
rejected this and if anything, France only worsened Romania’s reservations of actually
concluding a pact with Russia. France’s continuous change in foreign policy had not only
been detrimental to its relations with Poland, but now threatened to do the same with the
latter’s relations with Romania. After months of negotiations, Bucharest officially ended
talks with Moscow on November 23, after Titulescu’s speech to the Romanian parliament
on rejecting the pact won popular approval. Romanian-Soviet relations would remain
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nonexistent until 1934, when both sides reestablished diplomatic negotiations and
exchanged notes that guaranteed full respect of each other’s sovereignty.229
Stick to Your Guns: The “Wicher” Incident
Sanacja had been preoccupied with concluding a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union in the first half of 1932. Yet by the late spring and early summer, it
nervously watched the deteriorating domestic scene in Germany. The Nazi party began to
wield considerable strength in German politics, while Brüning had resigned the
chancellorship in late May and was replaced by Franz von Papen. Together with the
Nazis, the parties of the Right were attempting to paint Poland as a state with “aggressive
designs against Danzig, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia,” in order to legitimatize
Germany’s claim to them. 230 Warsaw was less than thrilled by this change, as they
viewed Brüning’s policies towards Poland as more moderate than von Papen’s. Brüning
had been a block to the Nazis’ Adolf Hitler’s rise to the chancellorship.231 Whereas in
von Papen, they saw Germany’s direction shifting more towards the agenda of the
political Right, especially since his cabinet was made up of individuals who were
staunchly anti-Polish.
But the rapid changes in Germany were also exhibited in the free city of Danzig.
Up until 1930, Warsaw’s relations with the city were more normal than with Germany.
Under the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty, Poland was to allowed to use Danzig’s
harbor to accommodate its warships and for trading purposes. The former was reinforced
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by a port attaché agreement signed by both sides in October 1921. Despite the number of
complaints that the city lodged against Poland for years, a number of them were settled in
the late 1920s by both sides. But with the rise of the Nazis and their strong presence in
Danzig, the city began to exhibit vehement anti-Polish sentiments that led to a corrosion
of relations with Warsaw. As a result of Danzig’s choice to treat Polish enterprises
unfavorably, Poland answered back by transferring a great amount of its marine business
to the newly constructed port in Gdynia. According to one Polish government official,
Danzig was to blame itself for Poland’s preference in using Gdynia, “for it [Danzig] had
both been sabotaging Poland’s needs with regard to sea-borne trade and had been
demanding economic privileges which had to be paid for by the Polish national
economy.” 232 Both Beck and Piłsudski in December 1931 had acknowledged that the
Danzig situation needed proper attention. In the past, the Polish government had been
inclined to settle problems through bilateral negotiations. But the main obstacle to this
was that the Free City increasingly became subservient to Germany’s revisionist agenda,
which aimed at exploiting the tension abroad and showing that this Versailles settlement
could not last.233
Since January 1932 the port agreement had expired and a provisional one was put
into place while a new one was to be negotiated. Yet due to prevailing hostile attitudes
towards Poland, Danzig not only refused to create a new agreement but also forced the
Poles under the temporary one to seek special permission from the city before it sent its
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warships into the harbor. Warsaw refused to abide by the city whose actions benefited
Germany’s trade and political desires to reduce Poland’s claim to Danzig. Warsaw felt
that its rights to the harbor were still intact under the expired agreement until a new one
was put into effect. But Danzig decided to enforce its new regulations by requesting that
Great Britain send some of the Royal Navy’s warships to create a sign of foreign support.
Despite Polish protests, the British agreed and sent three ships that were to appear in the
harbor on June 15.
Piłsudski decided to make a move of his own in the form of a fait accompli, to
counter Danzig’s attempt to make the dispute over the port agreement an international
issue. Along with Beck, he dispatched the Wicher destroyer to join the Westerplatte in
Danzig’s harbor to greet the British warships, and exchange customary salutes in accord
with procedures for when foreign ships paid visits to a state. However the Marshal had
given special instructions to the Wicher’s captain to fire shots at the nearest public
building in Danzig should the city commit some insult to the Polish flag during the
British visit. 234 But in reality the ship’s guns were set on all of the city’s buildings.
Tension had filled the city, but no conflict ensued as the Wicher withdrew from the
harbor after greeting the Royal Navy. But an international outcry to the Polish move
followed, as British and French circles in Geneva practically accused the Poles of
attempting to provoke an incident with the Free City. At the time, Zaleski was
participating in a League session and was caught by surprise. No one in Warsaw had
notified him that this action was to take place or even took place, as the minister found
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out about it from Geneva’s newspapers.235 Seeing how the German warship, Glazenau,
was to visit Danzig after the Royal Navy’s departure, his job was to calm international
circles in Geneva and assure Poland was not going to repeat its actions. In a meeting with
the League’s General Secretary, Eric Drummond, Zaleski requested that the League try to
acquire some guarantee from Danzig that it reach a new port agreement with Warsaw. In
return, the Foreign Minister would try and persuade the Marshal to refrain from sending
the Wicher to meet the Glazenau, which both statesmen feared could provoke an
exchange of fire and ignite a conflict between Germany and Poland.236 The request was a
success, as Drummond and the British delegation were able to force Danzig to conclude a
new agreement with Poland, while Zaleski had acquired Piłsudski’s reserve in
dispatching the Wicher again.237
The Wicher incident stands out in Sanacja’s foreign policy, particularly as it fell
under not only Piłsudski’s supervision but also Beck’s. Thus it became one of the earliest
examples next to the concluding of the Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, to symbolize
the regime’s new direction in foreign policy. No longer was Piłsudski interested in
dealing with Danzig through the League’s international forum, but instead choosing to
use “new methods toward the League of Nations and the Gdańsk Senate,” and to mark
“the end of the former Polish policy of submission.”238 Since both states could not come
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to an agreement, with Danzig bringing the British into the matter, it seems Polish foreign
policy was no longer hesitant in using strong arm tactics to assert its interests.
But there was more symbolic meaning to the Wicher incident than to force Danzig
to concede to Polish demands in concluding a new and similar port agreement. Piłsudski
and Beck’s aim was to send a message to Berlin that in lieu of the growing revisionist
trends, Poland would not hesitate to use force to protect its interests in Danzig and its
overall territorial integrity. While the Danzig and German press chose not to put much
interest in interpreting the incident, it was of the opinion of Ambassador Laroche that
Poland’s actions were to finally bury the growing tensions between Warsaw and
Danzig.239 Other interpretations focused on Warsaw testing Paris’ reaction to its use of
force and whether France would finally stop its conciliatory approach to Germany’s
demand for further concessions. If anything, the event was to send a message that Poland
would not tolerate any further foreign meddling in its relations with Danzig.
A Transition Coming to Full Circle: Zaleski’s Resignation and Beck’s Appointment
The era of uncertainty from 1930 to 1932 was a period of transition for Sanacja’s
foreign policy. It was no longer based solely on executing goals through an international
forum, or even through its system of alliances. Rather Piłsudski had shifted foreign policy
towards a new direction, an independent one where Poland would solely dictate its
interests and not condition them on any foreign power or institution. Sanacja broke away
from the vicious cycle where European powers made decisions without taking Poland’s
voice or welfare into consideration. Instead it began to approach the hindrances to good
neighborly relations through direct negotiations with the respected state. Whereas it took
advantage of the opportunity to finally conclude some kind of peace agreement with the
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Soviet Union, the inflammation of preexisting tensions with Danzig and Germany itself
prompted Poland to meet the complications head on with strong-arm tactics. In both cases
the results were more favorable than risky, even if they were to only satisfy security
concerns temporarily and not permanently.
While the nonaggression pact with Russia was met with overall satisfaction, a
European community who for the past decade had chosen to neutralize conflict through
peaceful concessions and uniform litigation, largely frowned upon the Wicher incident’s
aggressive manner. Yet for Poland, more favorable results had been attained through such
independent actions as opposed to conforming to the decisions made by the Great Powerled League of Nations or the lopsided Franco-Polish alliance. Although Zaleski continued
to push for Polish presence in Geneva, and cooperation existed with Poland’s French and
Romanian allies during negotiations with Moscow, Sanacja no longer made its decisions
dependent on other institutions. Piłsudski and his right-hand man, Beck, were no longer
interested in maintaining solidarity with allies when opportunities had arisen to stabilize
Poland’s security.
The final piece to this transition from cooperating with Europe to becoming
independent and self-reliant came in late October 1932 when Zaleski submitted his
resignation. The Foreign Minister had always been an advocate of promoting Poland’s
position and security through Geneva and its alliances with France and Romania. But
during this period of uncertainty, his views increasingly contrasted with those of
Piłsudski who, in reality, was Polish foreign policy’s true architect. While the Marshal
chose to abandon the ineffective approaches from the late 1920s, Zaleski refused to adopt
the former’s more aggressive and independent tactics.
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On November 1, both men met at the Marshal’s Belweder residence to discuss the
resignation. “He [Zaleski] informed the Marshal [of the creation] of a particular system in
treating personal affairs and addressing ranking officers, who in the view of its director
[Zaleski], is not only unacceptable but in opposition to his nature.”240 Zaleski underlined
that a situation had emerged where mistrust existed within the Foreign Ministry’s ranks.
What all of this meant was that there were under-ranking officers within the Ministry
who were implementing their own decisions, a power reserved for the Foreign Minister
himself. Zaleski was particularly alluding to the actions of his Undersecretary, Beck.
When he tendered his resignation to President Mościcki a few days prior to the Belweder
meeting, the Marshal asked Zaleski who his replacement would be, in which the latter
awkwardly pointed at Beck and replied that his replacement was present.241 Thus the
Foreign Minister knew that Beck would eventually replace him, especially with the
latter’s growing role in executing major decisions in Polish foreign policy such as the
nonaggression pact with Russia and the Wicher incident. Since the latter event came as a
surprise and embarrassment to Zaleski, it is only correct to assume that it influenced his
resignation.242
In addition to his official resignation on November 2, Zaleski also refused to take
the Marshal’s offer in accepting the Ambassador to London’s portfolio, choosing to
disassociate himself with a government who tolerated a breakdown in discipline, where a
subordinate like Beck began to increasingly wield greater power than his superior. But a
mutual agreement was made between both parties, where the Sanacja regime would
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notify the press that they had chosen his dismissal. This may have been an effort to
uphold Poland’s international reputation by underlining that its recent actions were the
product of a new course in foreign policy, one distinguishing itself from Zaleski’s tactics.
But before relinquishing his post, the former Minister sent a communiqué to all the Polish
Embassies where he got the last word in on this transition within the Foreign Ministry.
“The significant cause of my decision is not illness, but personal affairs.”243
With this substantial shift in foreign policy, exhibited by actions and internal
changes within the Foreign Ministry, does one consider this period of uncertainty a
success or failure for the Second Polish Republic? Or is it more appropriate to deem this
period neither, but rather an experimentation in what Poland could do through its own
exit from the crumbling post-Versailles European order? The latter seems to be most
fitting since only major results came from the nonaggression pact signed with the Soviet
Union. In the same day that the Romanians had finally broken off talks for their own pact
with Moscow, the Poles signed a conciliation convention to the pact with the latter,
designating both parties to seek a peaceful settlement for any future disputes. 244 The
major milestone in Polish-Soviet relations came full circle four days later on November
27, when Poland ratified the pact and successfully found an answer to its eastern security
concerns.
Yet this period of uncertainty did not yield any concrete solution to security
concerns with the Republic’s western neighbor, Germany. By the late 1920s, relations
between both states had been on track towards normalization. But from 1930-1932 those
developments were put on hold if not completely scrapped. Although Berlin was
243
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preoccupied with the continuous domestic changes occurring throughout Germany, what
little foreign activity it practiced was largely anti-Polish and aimed at maintaining the
long-term goal of revisionism. Aside from the Wicher incident that affected Danzig more
than Berlin, nothing substantial occurred between Germany and Poland. If anything this
period of time was most likely used by Piłsudski and the Foreign Ministry to study the
radical changes occurring in Germany, in order to prepare Poland to adjust its foreign
policy in relation to its western neighbor once the latter had stabilized.
But was it wise for Poland to distance itself from its direct allies, France and
Romania? If not much had occurred, wouldn’t this have been an opportunity to reevaluate
and strengthen ties to repair the divisions from the previous years? The predominant
thought here lies within Marshal Piłsudski’s feelings towards the alliances. Whereas he
still wished to see Romania strengthen itself and increase its cooperation with Poland, he
had no patience for the French based on their track record of abandoning Poland and its
interests when more beneficial opportunities arose. In defense of Polish actions for not
working in solidarity with Paris and Bucharest during negotiations with Moscow, it
seems that the Poles turned the tables on the former and gave up on the latter when it
chose stagnancy over progress. When looking at Paris and Bucharest’s domestic
situations, the continuous change in governments and or foreign policy most likely
encouraged Warsaw that it was wiser to take the opportunity at hand, and conclude a
bilateral agreement with Moscow. Sanacja had learned from the past couple of years that
its foreign allies were not completely reliable. And while it was risky to conduct a new
foreign policy that required almost complete independence from outside influences, the
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venture proved successful as Poland found a greater guarantee for its security through
bilateral agreements.
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IV. RÓWNOWAGA: 1933-1935
A Turn to the West: Piłsudski’s “Preventive War” and the Four Power Pact
The growing power of the Nazis in the previous year had culminated in
Germany’s domestic paralysis by late 1932. Papen’s government had resigned and its
successor, Kurt von Schleicher’s government, did not fare much better as no coalitions
could be formed to prevent the Nazis from taking power. On January 30, 1933 Europe
saw the latter score their greatest feat to date when Hitler was appointed Chancellor of
Germany by President Paul von Hindenburg to resolve the crisis. Weimar Germany was
dead and replaced with Nazi Germany. If the previous two years had created a cloud of
worry over the continent, the ascendency of an aggressive nationalist and his radical party
now added thunder.
With its eastern front secured, Warsaw now turned to face its western neighbor
and the difficult task to create better relations with a new government that was much
more revisionist and anti-Polish. Piłsudski did not view Hitler in the same negative way
that the rest of Europe had.245 For one, the new Chancellor was of Austrian birth and did
not hail from the typical anti-Polish Prussian background as the majority of his
predecessors had.246 And secondly, the Marshal knew that Hitler and the German state
were in no way capable of launching any military venture to revise the German-Polish
border, as the Chancellor would be too preoccupied consolidating domestic control.247 He
did however acknowledge that down the road Hitler could be a serious threat. But for the
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time being he instructed his new foreign minister, Beck, to speak of Germany with
“definitions which would be steadfast but also calm and moderate and would not
anticipate the future as bearing exclusively negative possibilities.”248
Before Hitler’s appointment to the chancellorship, the Poles wanted to gauge
French opinion over the German situation. In mid-January the Marshal had sent Polish
envoy Jerzy Potocki to Paris with verbal instructions to test French reactions to
Germany’s elevation to equal rights in the Disarmament Conference. He was to make
direct contact with top French officials and avoid facilitating diplomatic channels.249 The
mission proved to have been a failure as the French showed no interest in discussing the
German rearmament question.250 When Hitler entered office, the French response was
split and showed no immediate hostility or alarm. There was more focus on France’s
financial difficulties, and the government was at odds with its military, as the latter
aggressively opposed the former’s attempt to impose larger budget cuts.251
The next month proved to be quite turbulent in German-Polish relations when
Hitler touched upon the territorial question in an interview with a London newspaper. He
stated that he had regarded the Polish Corridor as a “hideous injustice to Germany,” and
called for its German restoration.252 Although Sanacja did not concern itself too much
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with these comments, the actions of Danzig three days later on February 15 did raise
alarms in Warsaw. Influenced by extreme nationalism with the rise of Hitler, the Free
City decided to revoke its 1923 agreement with Poland that gave the latter the right to
station a detachment of harbor police responsible only to Warsaw. Danzig had notified
the Poles of this decision and stated it would replace the Polish detachment with one of
their own. Polish envoy to Berlin Alfred Wysocki had even remarked to a German
diplomat that both states were on the eve of a war breaking out.253 Faced yet again with
escalating tensions and another connection between Danzig and German foreign policy,
Piłsudski did not hesitate in responding to the city’s second act of defiance in less than a
year.
According to Beck, the Marshal had stated that the appropriate response would be
through a “new energetic act” to confront the Danzig Senate and send a warning to the
new government in Berlin.254 On secret orders, the Polish Naval Transport Wilja entered
Danzig’s harbor on March 6 and unloaded 120 soldiers on the Westerplatte basin to
reinforce the stationed Polish military garrison there. Soon after a Polish envoy informed
the Senate that the reason for this act was in response to rumors that German military
organizations were staging a coup to take the Free City.255 Warsaw’s fait accompli was
successful as the League yet again stepped in and pressured Danzig to restore Polish
rights to maintaining the port’s harbor police, on the promise that Poland would withdraw
the additional reinforcements. As a sign of good will and after the Danzig Senate’s new
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elections that ushered in greater Nazi presence, two of the city’s representatives arrived in
Warsaw and met with Piłsudski. The latter bluntly informed them, “I am very glad that
you sought the only sensible way for our mutual relations. I wish you would not come
here as foes, as it might end badly, much worse than you could imagine.”256
The results of Warsaw’s actions were both positive and negative. Positive in the
sense that not only had the Poles used force again to put an end to the Free City’s
rebellious actions, but the greater message it evoked was that Poland would still protect
its rights and interests even with a new, perhaps more anti-Polish regime in Berlin. But
the downside to this action was that it drew harsh reactions from European delegations at
the League of Nations. Although Danzig’s provocation was puzzling, the British and
French denounced Poland’s aggressive tactics and showed more interest in not taking a
stance just yet on Hitler and the Nazis.
One of the greatest questions regarding Polish foreign policy at the time is
whether Piłsudski attempted to initiate a “preventive war” against Germany in 1933.
After the German equality of rights fiasco, Hitler’s ascension, and his subsequent
declaration to undo the rest of the Versailles Treaty’s restrictions, there had been this
question whether the subsequent moves made by Sanacja were aimed at possibly
coercing Poland’s allies to join it in a venture to remove Hitler and restore order in
Germany. Often cited as one of Piłsudski’s possible motives for attempting a preventive
war was the invocation of the Treaty’s Article 213, which called for an Allied
investigation of whether Germany had illegally rearmed (Hitler’s paramilitary groups as

256

Ibid, 23.

101
possible evidence). If Hitler refused to allow the investigation, it would result in an Allied
invasion and occupation of key areas.257
The Potocki mission and the Westerplatte episode have been cited as precedents
for the preventive war in two ways. First, the Potocki mission was seen as a way to gauge
French interest in potentially putting an end to the growth of radicalism in Germany. A
similar mission took place at the end of 1932 when Szembek (now Undersecretary) was
dispatched to London and Paris to feel out the atmosphere in those two governments with
regards to Germany’s role in the Disarmament Conference. He had also stopped in Berlin
to question where Polish-German relations stood and declare that the relations between
both sides were in a dangerous position of uncertainty.258 When Szembek reported that
political circles in Paris and London displayed anxiety, Piłsudski may have formulated
further methods in stopping Germany’s resurgence. Days after the Westerplatte episode
Piłsudski had sent another mission to Paris, this time instructing Colonel Bolesław
Wieniawa-Długoszowski to confer with French military circles on their opinion of the
Hitler regime and Poland’s recent actions in Danzig. The goal was to see if there was
enough support from the military side to propose a joint mobilization against Germany.259
Długoszowski’s mission was futile as he failed to meet with any top military leaders.
The Westerplatte episode had two important ways of figuring into the preventive
war.260 Its main function was to exhibit Polish interest and initiative in taking up arms
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against Germany if met with positive response from primarily France. The second
function served to possibly provoke Germany into mobilizing against Poland and thus
allowing the latter to brand its neighbor as an aggressor who broke international
agreements such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Yet like the previously dispatched missions,
both methods failed to draw any provocation or interest. If anything, it certainly brought
unease to Hitler to the point that he issued orders to Nazi party organs to put a hold on
any further agitation towards the Polish state via Danzig.261 However, it has been noted
that all of these events and the topic of a preventive war did make their way into “very
serious political circles.”262
The Four Power Pact was seen as an opportunity to directly negotiate with Hitler,
rather than seek military force to soften Nazi Germany’s revisionist desires. The pact had
been designed by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, and first presented to the British in
late March. Its composition obviously pointed to the desire to restore a nineteenth century
type of Great Power directorate to possibly replace the League of Nations. Whereas
Mussolini intensely disliked the international institution, he strongly admired the Locarno
agreements and saw them as an “attempt to preserve the international order by a Great
Power directorate and claimed them as spiritual ancestors of the Four Power Pact.”263 His
aim was to create this concert in order to help fulfill his own foreign policy desires of
imperialism and revisionism. But in order to make this project appealing to other states
such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, he had to show that it could maintain peace
and security more efficiently than the decaying League. The pact would essentially
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promise Germany an easier way of achieving its revisionist aims because it would only
have to deal with the approval of the other three states. For Great Britain and France, the
pact was interpreted as a tool that could peacefully limit Germany’s excessive demands
and prevent them from potentially transforming into an armed conflict.
But the pact was not outright accepted by these three states. The German Foreign
Ministry held some reservations, fearing that it could be an attempt for the West to create
a front to subjugate Germany to its will and limit the latter’s freedom of action.264 The
French political spectrum was split, with the Left showing enthusiasm while the Right
vehemently opposed it. The country was torn between repairing its domestic problems
and preventing Germany from gaining any more concessions. Due to this political
malaise, Paris decided to follow whatever path the British chose to take, lest they become
labeled as obstructionists to peace.265 London was probably the most optimistic about the
pact, as they saw an opportunity to build cooperation with Berlin and circumvent its
revisionist aims.
But not all European states approved of the project, particularly France’s allies,
the Little Entente and Poland. The former had viewed Mussolini’s Italy with suspicion
almost as much as they had with Hungary, and viewed the pact as a threat to their states’
existence. Poland on the other hand was more critical of than endangered by the pact.
Piłsudski saw it as a “menace to the rights and interests of the smaller powers threatened
by the Great Powers’ cartel,” a view directly in line with the Little Entente’s.266 The chief
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problem with the pact was that it would allow these Great Powers to have jurisdiction
over issues that did not even pertain to them. According to Beck, the pact also mixed its
privileges with the League’s, thus making the latter useless as an international tribunal
whose decisions were binding to all states.267 Although the League would still remain in
existence, decisions would be based on the desires of the Great Powers. Polish foreign
policy’s main interest was to protect its state’s borders from revisionism, something that
this pact aimed at doing just as Locarno had.268 They also saw the pact as an opportunity
for Hitler to continue to bring Germany out of diplomatic isolation among the Great
Powers.269
Seeing the danger in potential German rearmament, Sanacja adopted a hardline in
response to the Four Power Pact.270 As a sign of protest, Piłsudski had instructed Potocki,
the new Polish ambassador to Rome, to resign. Beck went even further by threatening to
withdraw Poland from the League.271 After the Wicher incident, Piłsudski had asserted
that Poland would no longer let other institutions meddle in Polish affairs. With regards
to this new institution and rumors of sanctioning revisionism, Beck thunderously told
Ambassador Laroche, “If a state, alone or with others wants to take possession of a single
square meter of our territory, the cannon will speak! They know that in Berlin…I am
afraid that this is not well enough known in London and in Rome, or even in Paris…It
was foreign intervention that led to the disappearance of the old Poland.”272
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In April tensions between Hitler’s Germany and Poland began to heat up as
incidents increased between both sides. A monument to Germanism was unveiled that
alluded to the injustice of the German-Polish border.273 Propaganda intensified on both
sides as the German and Polish press accused each side of provoking war. Some of these
attacks were influenced by the increase in reports flowing into Berlin on the buildup of
Polish border patrol units on the frontier. According to a former aide-de-camp, on April
18 Piłsudski supposedly had drawn up an outline of a decree establishing a special
government in case war had broken out with Germany. When the aid had asked the
Marshal whether Hitler would attack Poland, the latter remarked, “Even if we attack him,
it will also be a defense.”274 Three days later the Marshal had arrived in Vilna to celebrate
the city’s fourteenth anniversary of liberation. The celebrations were highlighted by a
parade of 35,000 Polish soldiers adorned in full combat gear and in battler order, who had
just been transferred from the East Prussian border. This show of strength may have been
a sign of protest against France for considering the Four Power Pact, or to show it that
Poland was ready to move against Germany. Or it may have been dually aimed at
Germany to reinforce Poland’s position that it would not tolerate any further hostility.
This would include Berlin’s use of the Four Power Pact to accomplish its revisionist
aims. Thus the idea of a preventive war was not yet shelved, as it gave the French another
opportunity to see that Poland was willing to act against Germany before it struck first,
whether now or down the road.
Negotiations to finalize the Four Power Pact were beginning to conclude in May.
But a missed opportunity had occurred to prevent its completion when both Poland and
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the Little Entente had failed to oppose it in solidarity. Polish-Romanian relations had
cooled since the latter’s failure to conclude a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in
the previous year. It is not to say that the diplomatic channels between both states were
idle, but it seems that Warsaw no longer saw Bucharest as an ideal guarantor of Polish
security against Germany or the Soviet Union. The feeling may have been mutual as
Romanian foreign policy was still directed by Titulescu, who personally disliked Beck
and saw the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact as a betrayal by
Romania’s northern ally.275 The Poles held their own gripe about Titulescu’s new proSoviet policy beginning in 1933. In the face of German fascism, the Romanian felt that
collective security with France and Russia could guarantee his state’s security. 276
However, this drew the ire of Warsaw who feared the expansion of Soviet influence in
the region. As a result, Polish-Romanian relations fully froze until their thaw in 1936.
Polish-Czech relations had lacked normality due to territorial and political
differences. But most Czech political circles saw German revisionism in the Corridor as a
precedent to Hungarian revisionism in the Danube region. In the fall of 1932 Beneš had
allegedly suggested proposing a political agreement with Poland, which he approached
Beck with in February 1933. It entailed both states signing a friendship treaty that would
have both sides avoid any foreign issues that would hurt their relations with each other,
and it would promise Czech restraint in the event of a German-Polish conflict if Poland
pulled its border patrol away to assist its army. Despite Beck’s rejection of the
275
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proposition, there was a Polish attempt to conclude a secret military agreement with
Prague.277 But nothing ever materialized as the Czechs felt that Beck was inexperienced,
their own envoy to Warsaw was never treated accordingly, and that Poland’s foreign
policy strayed too much away from France’s. Beneš had also rejected any terms that
reopened the Teschen question.278 But personally, the Czech Foreign Minister did not see
any conflict between his state and Germany. Ultimately it seems that even Warsaw’s new
independent foreign policy could not accommodate Czech interests.
But the reason for this divide between Poland and the Little Entente could have
been that Paris presented the latter a better offer. French Foreign Minister Joseph PaulBoncour had sent a letter to all three states that downplayed the importance of the pact.
Investing their trust in France, the Little Entente proclaimed its support for the Four
Power Pact on May 30. To reassure their allies, the French had also promised assurances
to protect their states’ interests by underlining that any revisions could only be made
under Article 19 of the League’s Covenant with the complete unanimity of all parties.279
It seems that the Little Entente had given in to France’s sponsorship for the pact as a sign
of loyalty. Although Poland refused to buy into the Four Power Pact, it did give its
approval for a stipulation in the pact that required the Four Powers to examine the
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limitation of armaments, as this could have at least stemmed Germany’s future military
buildup. Beck had even remarked that had this stipulation not been put in, “Something
would have had to change in the relations between Poland and France.”280 But through
this compromise, Paris could not accuse Warsaw of trying to disrupt another European
design for peace and security, while the latter could still maintain its independent policy
and overall objection to the pact.
After a few months of negotiations and some revisions, the Four Power Pact was
signed on July 15, 1933 in Rome. “Refusing to wage a preventive war, and yet unwilling
to condone Hitler’s disturbance of the equilibrium, the Western statesmen had to face the
brutal choice, either to fight or to appease. The Four Power Pact could equally well have
served for both.” 281 Unfortunately the pact had quickly run into problems soon
afterwards, as it became nothing more than a reinforcement for the League of Nations.
This came to the dismay of Hitler and Mussolini who desired nothing more than to speed
up the League’s decay and bring about the vulnerability of its smaller member states.
Mussolini’s designs for the pact to allow an easier method for revisions were ineffective.
The bigger blow to the pact came on October 14 when Hitler withdrew Germany from
the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, stating it would not return “until
this real equality of rights is no longer withheld from our people.”282 Despite British and
French determination to keep the pact alive, it nonetheless became a dead letter and was
never ratified by any of the Four Powers.
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The emergence of the Four Power Pact may have ended Piłsudski’s designs for a
preventive war. But with Germany’s withdrawal, the opportunity reemerged to seek
support for the original plans due to the new uncertainty that Hitler had now presented
Europe with. A week later the Marshal met with Beck and Szembek to discuss the status
of German armaments. It seems the results were favorable as Piłsudski decided to test the
French response to recent events. Having a great relationship with both the Marshal and
French General Maxime Weygand, Ludwik Morstin was entrusted with this mission and
instructed to only approach the latter and avoid political circles. He was to present
Weygand with two questions: would France mobilize if Poland was attacked by Germany
on any part of its frontier, and if so, would France put all of its forces on their German
frontier?283 Weygand received both the envoy and his inquiry, but chose to present it to
his government superiors. The government’s response was negative and Weygand
informed Morstin that no general mobilization would take place and that Poland would
only receive material aid. In light of this, the Franco-Polish alliance had ceased to
function as an actual guarantee for security, becoming a mere document that became
“history.” 284 If Poland were to face Germany, it would have to do it alone. But after
weighing the pros and cons of a preventive war, Piłsudski chose to attempt a direct
understanding with Germany.285
The Policy of Equilibrium
With the Four Power Pact gaining more interest in European capitals than the idea
of a preventive war, the Sanacja regime needed to adopt another approach in facing the
rise of Hitler and the Nazis in Germany. This would take the form of directly approaching
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the Chancellor and sounding out his intentions with regards to Eastern Europe. The
preventive war would not be abandoned, but this new approach would assist Polish
foreign policy in its attempt to adapt a stronger line that could counter Berlin’s own
desires.
On February 9 President von Hindenburg held a gala for all foreign diplomats
where Hitler was present. It was here that Wysocki created the first unofficial Polish
démarche with regards to the new German government by exchanging a few words with
the Chancellor as the latter greeted all the diplomats. Wysocki stated that relations
between both states were based on the actions of certain individuals and the German
press, but that in reality they truly were not so poor. He finished by underlining that
Poland held no hostility towards Germany, particularly dismissing rumors of an attack on
Danzig and East Prussia.286 Hitler’s response was nothing more than a “thank you.” Yet
the importance in this exchange was that regardless of the new government in Berlin,
Warsaw was willing to continue seeking a normalization in relations.
Nothing really materialized between both states until May. The Poles had
attempted to request a meeting between Szembek and Hitler, or even Wysocki and Hitler
in April. But both plans were abandoned, as Hitler was too preoccupied with sensitive
domestic issues that could be aggravated by early German-Polish talks.287 But Hitler had
reportedly stated that he was interested in coming to an agreement with Poland, but that
Piłsudski was the only man he would do it with.288 By late April Piłsudski and Beck had
instructed Wysocki to request a meeting with Hitler, which the latter had granted.
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The Hitler-Wysocki talk took place on May 2 in the presence of German Foreign
Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Wysocki informed the Chancellor that differences
between both states had prevented the reaching of an understanding for normal
neighborly relations. Poland was quite worried by Nazi activity in Danzig, but Wysocki
maintained that it would defend its “rightful position in the Baltic.”289 Hitler stated that
his intention was not to violate any existing treaties, yet asserted that he would not
recognize any rights that exceeded the latter’s boundaries. With regards to Poland he
underlined that he did not support the numerous arguments in various German offices
that were aimed against the existence of a Polish state. In the end, he defended himself as
a pacifist who did not support war and ordered a communiqué issued declaring his
peaceful intentions towards Poland.290
This event was a milestone for Polish foreign policy as both sides presented their
views on relations between both states. Wysocki’s aim was to create a cordial atmosphere
as to not upset Hitler, but at the same time display Warsaw’s firm conviction that it could
not be intimidated into conceding to any German desires. The Poles were also able to
gain some clarification on Hitler’s foreign policy, but remained cautious in accepting it at
face value. The next step was to see if Poland could circumvent the impending Four
Power Pact by continuing negotiations with Germany. This way an opportunity could
possibly arise that would soften the repercussions of the pact through some direct
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understanding with Berlin. If anything, this rapprochement could have been aimed at
denting the chances of the pact’s signing.
Sanacja was compelled to continue talks with Hitler, particularly after hearing
about the latter’s remarks a day after the meeting with Wysocki. In a speech to the
Reichstag, Hitler stated that “Germany is ready to take part in any solemn pact of
nonaggression, for Germany has no thought of attack, but thinks solely of her
security.”291 Even though he did not mention anything about the Four Power Pact, he
displayed a willingness for bilateral agreements with any country. Poland may not have
been exclusively mentioned, but it must have given the impression that an agreement
could be reached with Germany, particularly in the interest of Poland’s security. Two
days after the meeting, Beck had sent a communiqué to all Polish posts in Europe stating
that due to the results of the Hitler-Wysocki meeting, “our latest démarche cancels the
plans for a preventive war.” 292 The preventive war idea still loomed in the fall after
Germany’s exit from the League, but Beck’s move may have been a strategic effort to
calm Berlin who had been aware of it. It was important for the Poles not to abandon their
plan, but to ease the pressure in order to avoid aggravating the newly constructed
approachment created with the Hitler government.
Two days before the Four Power Pact was signed, Wysocki was granted a second
meeting with Hitler. The topic of discussion was Danzig and the Polish Corridor in
general. Hitler accused the Versailles Treaty for creating the Corridor, an “enduring
abyss” between both states. In a gesture of goodwill, he told Wysocki that he had given
orders to his party officials in Danzig to end the city’s quarrels with Warsaw. He also
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touched upon the economic war between both states, claiming that it was in his and his
state’s interest to start buying foodstuffs from Poland.293 The results of this meeting could
be considered as another step towards a genuine German-Polish rapprochement.
There was not much activity between both sides in the next two months. Germany
had signed the Four Power Pact, while Poland continued its objection to the whole
project. It was in September that Marshal Piłsudski instructed Beck to conduct a survey
on the Hitler government before resuming talks with it, in order to measure its stability.
Beck yielded five key points from his study the first of which saw the National Socialist
movement embodying the character of a revolutionary movement. As a result, the second
postulate saw that some new agreement on an old subject could be attained as reformers
had a tendency to desire a brand new start in their state’s history. The third postulate
suggested that every reformer desired internal change, thus Hitler would want a period of
“calm” in external affairs. The fourth one was linked to Piłsudski’s earlier views of the
Chancellor, in that he was an Austrian and not the typical anti-Polish Prussian. The final
postulate stated that the goal of the Hitlerite movement was the last act of the German
people’s national unification. 294 Beck concluded that an “exceptional opportunity for
straightening our own position in the European balance of power” existed with regards to
Germany, and that the National Socialists were not as anti-Polish as the various
governments of Weimar. This study may have induced Piłsudski to continue GermanPolish talks.
Before any talks were continued with Hitler, Beck had met with the Chancellor’s
Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels and von Neurath during a League Assembly in
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Geneva on September 25. Goebbels explained to Beck that previous German policies had
been riddled with errors that had only hurt the German nation. He went on stating that
only direct understandings with other European states could produce more détente than
Geneva ever could.295 Beck decided to take the moment to underline that the Poles had
attempted such methods with Germany in the past, citing the Piłsudski-Stresemann
encounter six years ago. After Goebbels had compared the League to the Tower of Babel
and accused it of never providing any solutions to international problems, Beck replied
that Poland took its membership in the institution very seriously but assured that it would
not contradict an improvement in German-Polish relations.296
Goebbels’ opinion of the League may have been a forewarning that Germany
would abandon the institution. While its exit from the League sparked much alarm
around Europe, Warsaw did not jump to conclusions. Instead, there were two options for
Sanacja to counter this move with. As previously discussed, one was to approach the
French yet again with the Morstin mission as part of this idea of the preventive war. But
the second option was to continue direct talks with Germany. In September the Director
of the Foreign Ministry’s Western Department, Józef Lipski, replaced Wysocki as the
Polish envoy in Berlin. The German government in early October approved his
credentials, and while he was able to conduct talks with von Neurath in mid-October on
economic matters, he would have to wait for an audience with Hitler.297 But before that
crucial meeting with the Chancellor, Piłsudski held a conference on October 21 to discuss
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Germany’s armaments for military and diplomatic-political purposes. There he expressed
that it was important to work with France, but that any dealings with it must be
maintained in complete secrecy as to prevent Poland from being the state that rings the
“alarm bell.” 298 The results of this conference, particularly the Marshal’s interest in
working with France, may have been the reason to send the Morstin mission to Paris.
Since the French showed no interest in mobilizing in the event of a German-Polish
conflict, this strongly suggests why Warsaw gave Lipski the green-light to finally request
a meeting with Hitler.299
In early-November, Lipski had been recalled to Warsaw to confer with Piłsudski
and Beck. It was there that the Marshal gave him detailed instructions on how to conduct
the talks with Hitler. 300 On November 15 the Hitler-Lipski talk took place where the
Polish envoy began by repeating exactly what the Marshal had instructed him to. He
stated that Poland’s security was founded on two elements. The first one was that Poland
enjoyed conducting direct bilateral relations, and that second, it collaborated with other
States through the League of Nations as a security reinsurance.301 Germany’s exit had
deprived Poland of the second element, and so Lipski asked Hitler how he planned on
compensating Warsaw for this? Hitler’s response was that both states were obliged to live
side by side, and that he considered Poland an outpost against Asia. He concluded that he
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was anxious for good relations with Poland, and proposed the possibility of GermanPolish relations excluding war in the form of a treaty.302
The Hitler-Lipski meeting initiated the process of bilateral negotiations to create a
nonaggression pact between Germany and Poland. Most of the pact’s work was
conducted in December and although it was drawn up by Berlin, the Germans heavily
consulted Piłsudski on its nature. The ultimate aim was for the agreement to be in line
with the European order and not contradict any of Poland’s previous engagements.303 In
order to fulfill these assertions, Warsaw maintained the stipulations of the Franco-Polish
alliance by informing Paris of these negotiations. Beck had actually informed PaulBoncour of them, but did not give his counterpart any details on the project. Although the
French had no flat out objections, they did communicate a feeling of unease to their
Polish allies. In a December 7 meeting between Massigli and the Secretary to the Polish
Ambassador to France, Anatol Mühlstein, the latter informed his French counterpart that
Poland’s desire was to reach France’s level in terms of relations with Germany.304 He
emphasized that current German-Polish negotiations should not raise any concerns in
Paris, citing Poland’s need to remedy its practical exclusion from the Locarno
agreements. Massigli expressed concern over the repercussions of these negotiations,
mentioning that it would put France in a precarious position where it would almost be
forced to open up its own bilateral talks with Hitler, something the Frenchmen refused to
give a concrete answer on the possibility of it. Mühlstein reminded Massigli that it was
this kind of French tiptoeing around important issues that made relations awkward
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between France and Poland, with the latter unsure of what the former actually wanted. He
concluded by stating that Poland’s own politics could not be dependent on these tactical,
heat of the moment kind of actions exhibited by the French government.305
The disconnect in Franco-Polish relations did not intensify due to German-Polish
negotiations in late 1933. While the alliance had considerably weakened since the last
years of the 1920s, it was in early 1933 that a polarization in interests became quite
evident. European businessmen began to adopt a more favorable stance towards Germany
and the issue of territorial revisionism. When a similar incident to this nature occurred in
Paris, the French government was quite passive if not sympathetic. Some French
diplomats like the French Ambassador to Italy, Henri de Jouvenel, expressed support for
the revision of the Polish Corridor, the latter considering its creation a grave mistake.306
And while the French invested in a Great Power directorate to contain Germany, the
Poles were more willing to resort to force. Since Warsaw had no interest in the Four
Power Pact and France refused to become involved in plans for a preventive war, the
disconnect within the alliance not only became visibly clear, but had considerably
widened. Under these circumstances, it is of no surprise that Polish foreign policy
continued its independent track when it came to bilateral negotiations with Berlin that
resulted in the signing of the German-Polish Nonaggression Pact on January 26, 1934.307
Under the agreement, both sides agreed to renounce the use of war to settle
disputes, but purposely left out any stipulations that stated the use of a third party
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arbitrator to settle them.308 The pact was to adhere to previous agreements such as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and stated that both sides would use direct negotiations as a means
to maintaining peace between them. Finally, the pact was set to last for ten years and
continue to remain valid unless renounced six months prior to its expiration. Both sides
saw the agreement quite beneficial. For Hitler, he secured Germany’s eastern flank by
coming to a peaceful agreement with Poland. Due to Germany’s withdrawal from the
League and Disarmament Conference, this pact may have brought the state out from
geopolitical isolation and added to the weakening of the Franco-Polish alliance.309 But for
the Sanacja regime, the pact became almost as good as an Eastern Locarno. Although no
third party was involved in this bilateral agreement, Poland had secured its western
boundary not permanently, but at least for the time being. The other benefit from the pact
was that both sides would renounce the tariff war and sign a number of economic
agreements in the next two years.310 But the French were not equally as thrilled, as the
press and the government expressed suspicion. Paris feared that Poland was potentially
reversing its “attitude” towards its ally by now working directly with whom the alliance
was originally aimed against.311 But Piłsudski and Beck had made the effort to assure the
French that the pact did not change anything with regards to the alliance. The latter had
“emphasized that Poland retained full freedom of action and that, if France would initiate
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an active policy toward Germany, she could count on full cooperation from Poland.”312
Either way, Poland had taken a page out of France’s playbook from Locarno: come to an
agreement with Germany without its ally.
Marshal Piłsudski was not quick to celebrate the recent achievement in Polish
foreign policy. Hitler and the Nazis were never shy of voicing their extreme dislike and
contempt for communism and the Soviet Union. Bearing this in mind, Piłsudski felt that
it was extremely important to avoid arousing Soviet suspicion of the beginning of a
German-Polish collaboration against Russia. Since the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet
nonaggression pact, relations between Moscow and Warsaw had been quite good.
Sanacja’s policy towards Poland’s eastern neighbor was based on three postulates:
adhering to the nonaggression pact and demanding Moscow’s adherence as well,
promoting better relations, and holding a “careful attitude with regard to all Soviet
political schemes.” 313 There was a steady decline in the Soviet disbursement of antiPolish propaganda, as well as hostility towards the Soviet Union in the Polish press.
Improvements were continuously made even diplomatically. In July 1933, Poland was
among the many signatories that agreed on the Soviet Union’s Convention for the
Definition of Aggression. It not only reaffirmed the nonaggression pact Warsaw had with
Moscow, but it even pleased the former because it helped further facilitate the restored
negotiations the latter had with Bucharest.314 But the Poles were careful not to get swept
up in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. When Moscow proposed an agreement with
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Warsaw to guarantee the independence of the Baltic states in November 1933, the latter
refused.315
When the German-Polish nonaggression pact was announced, Moscow remained
calm but was certainly alarmed about the pact. Its press speculated that territorial deals
would be made, and private sources feared that Poland might now be under the German
sphere of influence.316 And so Piłsudski dispatched Beck to Moscow in mid-February not
only as a gesture of goodwill between both states, but to largely dismiss the wild rumors
that had immediately sprouted after the signing of the German-Polish pact.
The simultaneous timing of these two events [signing of the German-Polish pact and Beck’s visit to
Moscow] was to stress our position in Eastern Europe most clearly. It was necessary to make it known that
our direct contacts, negotiations and agreements with each of our big neighbours were to clear the situation,
aiming at positive results, i.e. the improvement of political relations in that European region, and that they
were by no means diplomatic plots, and could not be interpreted as a submission of Polish politics to
influences coming either from Berlin or from Moscow.317

The Foreign Minister’s visit went quite well to the extent that both sides agreed to
continue to work towards an improvement in relations and extend the nonaggression pact
of 1932 for another ten years, effectively aligned it with the German-Polish pact. 318
Moscow also refuted any claims of a German-Polish collaboration, and formally agreed
not to interfere on any territorial questions between Poland and Lithuania, such as the
Vilna dispute.319
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The conclusion of the German-Polish nonaggression pact signaled Sanacja’s
foreign policy coming to full circle through the creation of a sub-policy called
równowaga or “equilibrium.” Poland had been able to secure its frontiers through the
conclusion of nonaggression pacts with both of its large neighbors in a matter of two
years. The policy was to exhibit the success of Poland’s independent decision-making
through bilateral negotiations. But Piłsudski attached even greater importance towards
maintaining this balance between two large neighbors by stressing that Poland should
avoid aligning with either side. It was absolutely necessary to prevent Berlin or Moscow
from suspecting Warsaw of siding with one against the other, or else it would make
Poland “…a territory where foreign interests might clash.”320 Moving forward, Sanacja’s
foreign policy was to apply this sub-policy of equilibrium to all of its relations in order to
maintain Poland’s status quo.
A New Eastern Locarno: Containment and Collective Security
The attainment of two nonaggression pacts and the practice of the sub-policy of
equilibrium provided Poland with the best guarantee for its security. But Piłsudski knew
that this balancing act would not last forever. “Having those two pacts [with Germany
and Russia] we are sitting on two stools – that can’t last long. We must know…which
one we will fall off first and when.”321 Thus on April 12, 1934 the Inspector General of
Armies’ Conference was called to order with the Marshal presiding over an audience that
included Beck, Szembek, and an assortment of the Polish army’s most charismatic and
competent leaders. The topic was Poland’s position in between Germany and the Soviet
Union, with each attendant assigned the task of conducting a study to determine which
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one would be the first to threaten Poland’s security?322 The conference reconvened on
May 12 with the following results. Out of twenty participants, thirteen indicated that
Germany would be the first to attack Poland in the future, while only two pointed towards
Russia. The remaining four individuals indicated both sides, citing whereas one may be
more dangerous for Poland, it would be the other state that would attack first.323 It is
difficult to ascertain what conclusion was made at the conference, but it is clear that it
may have been unsettling for Piłsudski who had always regarded Russia as the greater
evil. While he considered the Red Army’s rebuilding in a backwards state, he did not
quite agree with the German threat because he considered Poland’s western neighbor still
isolated with no significant rearmament having taken place.324 The conference may have
been to direct Polish foreign policy as to where the majority of its attention should be
invested for the next couple of years. Unfortunately it failed to give an estimate when an
attack would actually occur.
It was in the summertime of 1933 that Moscow began to contemplate what
measures of its own it could take to counter the growing anti-Soviet hostility in Germany.
There were countless talks of reopening negotiations and concluding some kind of pact
with France. That opportunity arose when Germany exited the League and Disarmament
Conference, throwing Western states such as France into frenzy as their plans for
cooperation with Hitler’s government were in jeopardy. In late October Litvinov
approached Paul-Boncour and suggested resuming talks for a nonaggression pact that

322

Beck, 59, 60.
The detailed results of the study are reprinted in Jędruszczak and Nowak-Kiełbikowa, Dokumenty, II,
58-59.
324
Marian Leczyk, Polska i Sasiedzi: Stosunki Wojskowe 1921-1939 (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Filii
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1997), 305-306.
323

123
would grant mutual aid to both states. But the French did not immediately choose to
cooperate, choosing to hold off talks until early 1934.
When the Daladier government fell in February 1934, Louis Barthou took over
the Foreign Ministry and despite some initial skepticism, he decided to fully invest in this
project of a Franco-Soviet pact that would come to be known as the Eastern Pact. But
with French public opinion cynical of a bilateral agreement with Russia, the Frenchman
successfully petitioned Moscow to open up the project to all of the Baltic states. French
foreign policy under Barthou had a few reasons to take up the initial Soviet offer. Like
the Soviet Union, France was fearful of what Germany’s next steps may be after its
various exits from institutions and the failed Four Power Pact. But another common
interest both sides had was this suspicion of German-Polish collaboration after signing a
nonaggression pact without the latter consulting its allies before negotiations had
commenced. The French objective may have been to find a stronger ally in Eastern
Europe that was impenetrable of German influence and willing to directly align with
Paris’ desires. But working with Moscow did not necessarily mean Paris was willing to
drop Warsaw and the subsequent alliance the two had shared for more than a decade. By
turning this bilateral agreement into a multilateral one, France was hoping it could bring
Poland back into its sphere of influence and together with Russia, create an Eastern Bloc
against Germany.
Despite Beck’s visit and assurances that Polish foreign policy did not gravitate
towards Berlin or Moscow, the latter still held reservations over Warsaw’s nonaggression
pact with the former. To the Soviets, the Eastern Pact was to become a multilateral
nonaggression agreement that would shield not just Russia from Germany, but also the
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Baltic states from falling under the umbrella of Berlin’s influence. The pact became a
second opportunity for Moscow to realize its desire to guarantee the Baltic states, an
agreement that fell apart in late 1933. An even greater prospect to all of this was that
France was now willing to back the project and become an ally, if not a guarantor of
Soviet security.
Before any formal negotiations could begin, Barthou needed to examine where
the Franco-Polish alliance stood. It was important to first straighten relations between
both sides in order to discard the misunderstandings that had plagued the alliance in
recent years. 325 His visit would also embody a public relation’s move to improve the
alliance’s atmosphere, as it would mark the first official visit of a French foreign minister
to Poland. He set out for a three-day visit to Warsaw on April 22. The next day the
Foreign Minister met together with Piłsudski, Beck, and Szembek. While the visit was
cordial, it did show signs of strain between both sides. When Barthou asked what the
state of Franco-Polish relations was, the Marshal was quite frank with his response. He
stated that both of Poland’s allies (France and Romania) had brought it “much
embarrassment.”326 On the subject of German rearmament, a famous dialogue ensued that
highlighted why the Poles had begun to distance themselves from their ally in the last
couple of years:
“I have had enough of these concessions, the Germans must feel that we will not yield one more
step more,” declared Mr. Barthou.
“You will yield, gentlemen, you will yield,” answered the Marshal, “you would not be what you
are if you did not.”
“How can you suspect us, Marshal, of such a thing?”
“Maybe you yourself will not wish to yield but then you would withdraw from the Cabinet, or you
would be outvoted in parliament, and fall,” was the Marshal’s reply. “Do you remember when we visited
the battlefield of Verdun you staggered on ground furrowed with shells? Someone in your suite wanted to
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help you, but you said it was not necessary, as you were accustomed to falling, as a Minister who had done
so a score of times.”327

The Marshal’s comments embodied the feeling of déjà vu that the Poles
experienced anytime the French made a declaration first, then later granting concessions
to Germany. By this time the Poles refused to listen to any further assertions made by the
French. When Barthou brought up the possibility of making changes to the military
convention, the Marshal immediately dismissed the idea and grew annoyed when the
Foreign Minister suggested a new French military attaché.328 Piłsudski tried to convey a
serious tone with this issue in light of the growing German problem. But when Barthou
asked what the Poles wanted the French to do to mend the relations between both sides,
the Marshal directed him to discuss the matter with Beck.329 The meeting was concluded
with an exchange of kind and heartfelt words despite the dead end talks. Barthou was
assured that the nonaggression pact with Berlin did not change anything within the
alliance, but he left Warsaw worried. Although he did not mention the Eastern Pact
project, any time he touched upon the Soviet Union he was met with the Marshal’s
skepticism.330 If France was going to go through with this pact, it clearly was going to
encounter great difficulty from Poland.
On June 4 Barthou hosted Colonel Beck in Paris to propose the Eastern Pact and
gauge his counterpart’s response to it. He provided details and gave it the look of an
“Eastern Locarno,” by selling it as a collective security pact for Eastern Europe. But he
did mention that one condition applied, namely that it could only be realized upon the
Soviet Union’s entry into the League and with Germany’s inclusion in the scheme
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(despite Moscow’s tendency to argue against it).331 Barthou then asked Beck whether the
Poles would have any objections or conditions. The latter’s response highlighted the
argument that for the past eight years, Poland had worked for and achieved a balance of
power in Eastern Europe in which it must maintain. In order to keep this policy of
equilibrium, he agreed that Germany must be included in the pact. But he reminded
Barthou that it was Tardieu who had influenced Romania’s indecision to conclude a
nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union.332 Beck’s reasoning may have been to warn
Barthou of his predecessor’s hesitancy to conclude anything with Moscow, as well as
remind him that Tardieu’s actions irritated Poland’s own initiative in 1932. Yet he stated
that although Poland would not discourage France from going through with the project, it
would not allow the latter to dictate Polish interests as it had in the past with regards to
multilateral agreements. If Beck made one thing clear, it was that Poland was to be
treated “as partners and not as clients.”333
But the Poles never truly gave a definite answer as to whether they supported the
Eastern Pact. They only expressed doubt and uncertainty over whether it would truly
stabilize security in Eastern Europe. Beck had once remarked that he “was not keen on a
scheme that would include Germany and Russia.”334 Sanacja’s policy of equilibrium was
not only to keep Poland neutral between both neighbors, but to also prevent their
cooperation to an extent. When the project was extended to Lithuania and
Czechoslovakia, the Poles refused to take part in negotiations citing the absence of good
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relations with those neighboring states. If anything, the true Polish skepticism could
generally be seen in getting involved in a multilateral pact.335 According to a report made
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Polish foreign policy works to consolidate peace and
security through its initiatives of bilateral relations with other states, with priority given
to her neighbors.” 336 Hypothetically, this pact would void the bilateral agreements
Warsaw had scored in the last two years and upset the peaceful atmosphere that they had
purchased for the time being. The Ministry’s report concluded that the pact did not
present anything new or better than the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the FrancoPolish alliance.337 The belief also existed that this pact would bring the Baltic region
under Soviet hegemony and potentially dismantling Poland’s alliance with France. But
the provision on mutual assistance was of greater magnitude for Polish resentment, as it
would allow foreign troops to enter Poland while on their way to aid France or the Soviet
Union in case of conflict with Germany.
On September 18, 1934 the Soviet Union officially joined the League of Nations
and gained a permanent seat in the Council. This event had spurred mixed reactions in
Warsaw. For years, Piłsudski had expressed a dislike for the idea of admitting the Soviets
into the League. Although he was never completely against it, he saw it a potentially
detrimental to Poland’s interests within the institution. When Barthou had proposed the
idea during negotiations for the Eastern Pact, Beck also held no objections to the idea.
Polish passivity may have been to prevent Warsaw from being seen as an even greater
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obstacle to the Franco-Soviet alignment. But Beck undertook an initiative to underline
Poland’s position within the League before Soviet entry. To prevent the Soviets from
using the League as Germany had with regards to minority issues, he put forth a motion
to draft a resolution that generalized minority protection and bound every League
member to it. 338 The aim was to prevent the Soviets, who now wield considerable
influence due to their Council seat, from exploiting those issues in the borderlands at
Poland’s expense. Unfortunately the resolution found more objection than support, even
from states like Czechoslovakia and Romania who also had their share of minority
problems. Since Beck saw his effort as futile, he decided to revoke the 1921 Minority
Convention and declared that Poland would not abide by it until all League members
were forced to do so. His move was questionable but never denounced. It made in order
to prevent Soviet influence from challenging Polish interests, in this case domestic policy
with regards to minorities. Upon Soviet entry, the Poles sent a note to the former’s
delegation stating they would support this move only if preexisting agreements remained
intact.339 The Soviets agreed and the Poles supported the Soviet Union’s official entry.
Although Barthou was careful in ensuring that the pact was not anti-German, one
could hardly see it as anything else. France wanted to further fortify its defensive position
by procuring a multilateral guarantee for its own security, by using Eastern Europe as a
counterweight to the uncertainty that Germany continued to emit. Yet Poland proved to
have been the major obstacle, because Barthou failed to grasp that the years of French
superiority over Poland had left the latter with “intense bitterness” and with a new foreign

338

Dębicki, 84-85. The move by Beck may also have been an attempt to check the League’s competence in
equally enforcing all laws and restrictions upon its members. Karski, 201.
339
Dębicki, 85-86. Beck, 65.

129
policy that was of an independent substance.340 Like Warsaw, Berlin chose to stay away
from getting involved in multilateral agreements that could constrain it and weaken the
drive for future changes to the European order. Barthou had attempted to sway Polish and
German support by opening up the pact to Great Britain and Italy as its guarantors. Yet
he did not live to see any further developments in bringing the Eastern Pact to fruition as
he was assassinated on October 9, 1934.
A Busy Two-Year Period
The European community was quite proactive in the two-year period from 19331934, due to the formation of Nazi Germany through the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. This
advent did not set off mass panic in Europe but did increase tensions due to the
expansionist ideology and policies that Hitler planned to direct the German state with. At
first however, no uniform policy existed to serve as a defense against this. Despite being
a tool to sanction revisionism, Mussolini’s Four Power Pact was adopted by France and
Great Britain as a weapon to contain the growth of Nazi Germany by cooperation within
the framework of a Great Power directorate. But this idea became stillborn with
Germany’s exit from the League and Disarmament Conference. The next method to
counter the Germanic state was through a collective security system set up by a potential
Franco-Soviet alliance. The Eastern Pact or “Eastern Locarno” was an attempt to create a
Soviet-led and French-backed bloc of Eastern European and Baltic states. Although it
was defended as a security guarantee to the region, it clearly exhibited an anti-German
character. Only after problems surfaced that there lacked a uniform support for it, then
did it transition from being a pact against Nazi Germany into one that would contain it by
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tying it up within a security framework. But with little support and the assassination of its
chief architect, this solution to Hitler and the Nazi threat to European peace and security
failed as well.
Polish foreign policy maintained its independent character that it had developed
since the conclusion of the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in the previous
year. Faced with a new German regime that was staunchly revisionist and nationalist, the
Sanacja regime decided to examine the possibility of removing the threat before it
became deeply rooted. Yet Piłsudski’s preventive war idea found little to no support from
Poland’s chief ally France. Although the Marshal had been skeptical of the alliance’s
value, his desire was to test its reliability one more time to see if it would stand up and
prevent the Nazis form slowly dismantling the Versailles system. But did this preventive
war actually exist? Like the archival evidence, the historiography is limited on the subject
and quite divided. Whereas some historians such as Zygmunt Gasiorowski see it as no
more than a psychological war waged against Hitler in order to coax him into bilaterally
negotiating with the Poles, others like Wacław Jędrzejewicz have argued that there is
enough evidence to prove that there were genuine Polish overtures to the French despite
the lack of existence of any contingency plans.341 The discussions within the Potocki and
Wieniawa-Długoszowski missions are still unknown, but various diplomats in their
memoirs have recalled hearing about the preventive war. Two decades later, top French
officials like Paul-Boncour and General Weygand denied having knowledge of such an
initiative. Despite the existence of written testimony contradicting Paul-Boncour, it is still
difficult to ascertain the preventive war’s validity, as the historiography has cited that
Piłsudski trusted military circles more than political ones in discussing such sensitive
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matters. 342 Either way, Gasiorowski’s argument wields significant weight because the
idea did fall on German ears and perhaps motivated Hitler, a man who preferred bilateral
agreements, to reopen talks with Poland in May 1933.
But could Sanacja’s refusal to go along with the Four Power Pact and the Eastern
Pact be considered a hindrance to containing the Nazi threat in Europe? Piłsudski and
Beck may have had their gripes when it came to the League, but both still firmly adhered
to it and the overall Versailles system. To Sanacja, the Four Power Pact would severely
weaken both and allow four states to form a cartel and dictate the interests of smaller
states based on their own desires and plans. Polish objections existed in order to block the
possibility of the pact from becoming a tool for legally sanctioning revisionism. But the
Eastern Pact is a different story, stemming from sour relations between France and
Poland. It is without a doubt that the alliance between both states had severely weakened
over the years. Whereas Poland chose to find security through bilateral agreements,
France’s continuous change in foreign policy led Sanacja to steer clear of investing in any
French ventures such as the Eastern Pact. The latter itself was of an interesting nature, as
France abandoned its nine-year policy of negotiating with Germany in favor of reverting
to alliances. Since Poland was now seen with suspicion if not contempt for concluding a
nonaggression pact with Hitler, Paris chose to reopen the possibility of an alliance with
the Soviet Union, who was equally threatened by Nazi Germany. But the problem with
the Eastern Pact was that Sanacja did not want it to become a precedent for Soviet
hegemony over the region. Not only did the regime adamantly oppose any Soviet
influence from crossing the Soviet Union’s borders, it wanted to maintain this sub-policy
of equilibrium and maintain neutrality between Germany and Russia. The real hindrance
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to cooperation was that Polish and French foreign policy were extremely polar opposite
by 1934, with neither side willing to come to a compromise for the sake of general
European security.
The question that now begs to be asked is whether Poland had made the right
choice in concluding an agreement with Hitler. According to Anna M. Cienciała, the
majority of Western and Eastern historiography is quite critical of this event. 343 The
criticism lists various accusations, among these that Poland abandoned its French ally and
brought Germany out of geopolitical isolation. But given the decay of France’s eastern
alliances and its predisposition to negotiate directly with the given threat, could one
necessarily blame Poland for acting independent of its Western ally? For years Paris had
a tendency to leave Warsaw out of major diplomatic negotiations such as Locarno, and
secure its own protection at the cost of leaving out its other allies. Past Polish efforts to
create an Eastern Locarno with France and Germany were never accepted by Paris due to
technical and legal issues. It should be recalled that despite losing faith in France,
Piłsudski made sure that the nonaggression pact recognized the alliance and that Poland
was willing to cooperate with any French initiative towards Germany. It is also hardly
reasonable to blame Warsaw for unleashing the Nazi beast as well. Since Locarno,
French foreign policy had been strongly influenced by Great Britain to the point it copied
almost all of London’s moves. 344 The latter had always been against using force or
starting a war to maintain the Versailles system, choosing instead to grant concessions.
This is not to say that Great Britain’s passivity and France’s ignorance in following that
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model should be given complete blame. Since the West refused to take a stand against
Nazi Germany and its actions in late 1933, it was quite reasonable for Poland to pursue
its own security interests through a nonaggression pact.345 One must wonder if this also
applied to Polish relations vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and Romania, as Polish foreign
policy did not align with that of Prague or Bucharest’s. This may have further given
Warsaw a reason to negotiate bilaterally with Berlin, since there was a failure to align
with the Little Entente in the face of Nazi Germany. Perhaps the blame should be laid
upon all European states for failing to come to a compromise and stand in solidarity
against Hitler. After all, Nazi Germany would have still rearmed even in geopolitical
isolation.
As Marshal Piłsudski had noted, the completion of two nonaggression pacts with
Poland’s large neighbors was an extraordinary accomplishment for Polish foreign policy.
The German-Polish nonaggression pact was another example of Sanacja’s independent
policy that saw a guarantee for Poland’s security tied through bilateral agreements. Upon
its completion, the sub-policy of równowaga or “equilibrium” came full circle and
proved to have been a stronger security system for the Second Polish Republic than any
multilateral-collective agreement in the past fifteen years. But it did come at a price.
Although Polish foreign policy also added to the weakening of the Franco-Polish
alliance, perhaps the greater sacrifice was Poland’s cooperation in a 1934 Eastern
Locarno project. It makes one wonder whether France would have chosen Poland and not
the Soviet Union, to be its key partner in this design had the nonaggression pact not been
signed.
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V. END OF AN ERA
The Last Months of Sanacja’s Foreign Policy under Piłsudski
Polish foreign policy entered 1935 with the sub-policy of “equilibrium,” branding
it a success in balancing Poland’s two immediate dangers, Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union. But there was also considerable worry mounting in Warsaw, as Piłsudski’s history
of ailments began to catch up to him and his physical appearance had greatly
deteriorated. Nothing could be foreseen with regards to the Marshal’s health, and so no
changes to foreign policy were instituted by the Sanacja regime. Rather, it now had to see
what moves Poland’s two neighbors would make and whether its French ally would
continue to push for an Eastern Locarno.
With its chief architect now dead, it seemed as if the idea of an Eastern Locarno
would be buried with Barthou. But the Frenchman’s successor, Pierre Laval, revived the
project despite having greater reservations than his predecessor about tying France in to
an agreement with Moscow. His initial preference had been to attempt some sort of
reconciliation between France and Germany in order to counter Hitler’s sweeping
reforms and actions.346 But Laval decided to resume talks with his Soviet counterparts,
particularly when London increasingly became interested in the prospect. But Polish and
German refusal to take part in the pact caused the Soviet Union to declare that it would
prefer to conclude the pact without the two. France grew particularly impatient with its
Polish ally and the latter’s firm stance against joining the Eastern Pact. Laroche, who had
generally been a supporter of Warsaw’s policies, now became one of Sanacja’s vocal
critics. In a meeting with Szembek in late January, the French Ambassador stated that
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continuous German-Polish talks had evoked a feeling in France that Poland was
beginning to attach minimal importance to the Franco-Polish alliance.347 A few days later
on February 3, Szembek asked Laroche if France would sign the pact without Poland and
Germany. The Frenchman replied that it was quite possible and accused the Poles of
walking hand-in-hand with the Germans, causing a general belief in Paris that Warsaw’s
political moves were in line with Berlin’s.348 The Ambassador’s comments underlined
overall French opinion at the time, with its frustrations over this front that Warsaw had
unintentionally formed with Berlin in opposition to the Eastern Pact.
German-Polish relations had greatly improved with the concluding of a
nonaggression pact in early 1934. The tariff war was officially discontinued and
exchanges between both sides found more cordiality than tension. One notable exchange
occurred in early February when Nazi Minister President Prussia Hermann Göring joined
Lipski and Polish military officers on a hunting trip to Poland’s Białowieża Forest. He
met with Piłsudski after the endeavor to sound out the possibility of further improvement
of German-Polish ties. He had previously met with Beck in January where he declared
Hitler’s intent to continue building relations with Poland, and abandon any chance at
rapprochement with Russia, and assured Beck that Berlin would not sign the Eastern
Pact.349 When he met with the Marshal, Göring made similar statements starting with his
desire to see further advances in good neighborly relations between both states. But
despite being warned not to broach the topic, he began to express Berlin’s dislike for
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Russia.350 It was here that Piłsudski stopped the conversation from going any further by
informing the Minister President that Poland’s sole policy towards Moscow was “calm
and moderate,” stressing that Warsaw would not take up any new ventures that could
bring about renewed tensions on the Eastern frontier. “We cannot allow ourselves to
come to a state when we should have to sleep with a rifle in our bed.”351 The goal was to
stress the sub-policy of equilibrium, and prevent Göring from reporting to Berlin that
Poland could be seen as a supporter of its anti-Russian policies. But when the Göring
broached the topic of Czechoslovakia, Piłsudski did not stray from stating Poland’s
dislike for its southern neighbor. The conversation returned to a cordial and calm setting
when both men spoke of creating stronger ties between Danzig and Warsaw.
Germany’s rearmament became public in early March when Hitler announced the
existence of an air force and the reintroduction of military conscription. The
announcement was met with protest and hostility throughout Europe, as it was a clear
violation of the provisions for Germany’s disarmament under the Versailles Treaty. To
address this issue, various states convened at the Stresa Conference in April, where
French, British, and Italian representatives agreed to reaffirm their commitment to
maintaining the Locarno treaties and lodge an official protest against Germany for its
violation. Yet neither side was willing to take up arms against Germany, a clear sign of
idleness that was reaffirmed shortly afterwards with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
Poland itself did not denounce Germany’s violation, but rather expressed unease towards
it as a way to prevent the favorable relations between both states from breaking. If
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anything, Warsaw expressed deep resentment for being left out of the Stresa Conference.
The so-called “Stresa Front” did little to pressure Hitler in to ceasing the rearmament. If
anything, Hitler sought ways to falsely reassure the West of Germany’s peaceful
intentions. Though he refused to involve Germany in the Eastern Pact, he ordered the
Foreign Ministry to communicate a counterproposal to Laval where the clause on mutual
assistance would be replaced with one that reaffirmed the provisions of the KelloggBriand Pact.352 Paris and Moscow’s response to Berlin’s suggestion was negative and no
breakthrough in negotiations occurred.
Throughout the interwar period, Great Britain had always expressed interest in
reintroducing Germany to European politics and trade. Yet the island state had always
been aloof to getting involved in any continental problems. But the quick rise of the
Nazis and Germany’s announcement to rearm had forced London to take a more
proactive role in meeting the European problem head on. Secretary of Foreign Affairs
John Simon and Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden embarked on a tour of European capitals
including Berlin, to discuss German rearmament. Berlin assured the two diplomats that
rearmament was just to ensure that Germany could protect itself in the event of conflict.
Moscow however professed deep concerns over the issue, particularly when coupled with
the increasing anti-Russian rhetoric being professed by key German officials. It was there
that Eden had an exchange with Polish Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz, informing the
latter of the fear German rearmament was producing. He also broached the topic of the
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Eastern Pact and Soviet desires for a collective security system, only to be rebuffed by
the Ambassador who cited Moscow’s fears as being “unjustified.”353
Eden soon made his way to Warsaw to meet with Beck and Piłsudski on April 2.
In his meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister, the Lord Privy Seal recounted his
meeting with Hitler. He stated that Hitler’s dislike for the Eastern Pact was drawn from
his preference to conclude nonaggression pacts with Germany’s direct neighbors. The
Chancellor also had no desire to return his state to the League and defended German
rearmament by citing that Germany’s neighbors possessed far more troop divisions than
it did.354 Eden also repeated the conversations he had with Stalin and Litvinov during his
stay in Moscow, where tensions were quite high with regards to Germany’s recent
actions. Although there were no direct Polish-Soviet negotiations for the Eastern Pact,
Litvinov stated that the Soviet Union would give “uncompromised assistance” to Poland
if the latter acquiesced to the project.355 Yet he did underline the Soviet line that the pact
would be concluded with or without Poland and Germany. Quite receptive to Eden’s
report, Beck then took the opportunity to examine the above circumstances vis-à-vis the
grand scheme of Polish foreign policy. He reminded the Lord Privy that Poland’s security
was in a favorable position now, with its borders stabilized, the existence of good
relations with its two large neighbors, and its continuation of alliances with France and
Romania. Though Beck had his reservations about the reliability of the League, he
reaffirmed Poland’s commitment to factoring in that institution with its foreign policy.
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Eden then proceeded to inquire whether Warsaw would object to joining a pact that
included both Germany and Russia, in which Beck responded that the Poles did not
object to a multilateral pact as long as it guaranteed a dual stabilization of Poland’s
frontiers.356
According to Piłsudski, his meeting with Eden was an opportunity for the
“clearing of relations between Warsaw and London.” 357 It began with the Marshal
complimenting the British Intelligence Service but also delicately criticizing it for
investing too much confidence in the Denkin and Wrangel armies of the Russian Civil
War. 358 The two spoke about Eden’s trip to Moscow where the Englishman did not
refrain from expressing his dislike for the Soviets. Though not much else is known about
the Piłsudski-Eden meeting, it was regarded as a step towards a British-Polish
rapprochement. When taking into account Beck’s meeting with the Lord Privy, it seems
Eden’s trip to Warsaw was not necessarily to convince the Poles to join the Eastern Pact,
but rather to feel out whether there existed a German-Polish collaboration in opposition
to the pact. But more so, one should consider the visit as a British attempt to potentially
bridge the gap in the Franco-Polish alliance through a British-Polish rapprochement. If
France was so dependent on British foreign policy and if Great Britain could bring
Poland onboard to cooperate amongst the two, it might lead to the future formation of a
stronger block to counter the German threat. Eden left Warsaw satisfied but Beck and
Piłsudski felt that he had severely underestimated the strength of the Soviet Union. The
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Marshal had warned Eden that, “…one could not judge Russia without first coming to
know it deeply and substantially.”359
As time went on, the pact lost most of its appeal to Moscow as provisions for
mutual assistance vanished and were subsequently replaced by French demands for
promises of nonaggression and consultation to resolve disputes. The Soviets began to
slowly back away from negotiations due to these drastic makeovers, causing Paris to
reconsider the pact’s framework. To prevent Soviet abandonment and to find a
counterweight to Nazi Germany, Laval proposed two separate agreements to keep the
project alive. The new version would entail one agreement that created a provision for
mutual assistance between France and Russia, while the second one would allow for the
inclusion of Poland and Germany in the form of a multilateral pact. The Foreign
Minister’s aim was to “entangle the major powers and lesser allies in a network of
accords, pacts, and fronts constituting a complex security system that would prevent a
direct threat to France.” 360 Like his predecessors, Laval’s primary focus was France’s
security in light of the German threat. The Eastern Pact was unique because it entailed
tying up its participants in legalities, rather than creating an advanced defensive system
similar to the France’s with East Central Europe.
Despite the new formula, Poland and Germany continued to resist becoming
involved in this multilateral project. And so on May 2, 1935, the Franco-Soviet Mutual
Assistance Agreement was signed in Moscow, with the Czech-Soviet version following
on May 16. The Polish response was overwhelmingly negative and in order to calm it,
Laval headed to Warsaw on May 10 as a gesture of goodwill towards the Franco-Polish
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alliance. It was there he attempted to give one last attempt at swaying Warsaw to join the
second multilateral pact. However the Marshal’s health had drastically declined to the
extent that Beck was sent to meet with the French Foreign Minister. He reiterated the
same points he made to Barthou in June 1934 and avoided any agreement on the
matter.361
On the evening of May 10, Beck visited Piłsudski for the last time. In the short
conversation, the Marshal expressed his concern over the agreement that Paris had
concluded with Moscow, stating, “This cannot end well.” 362 He directed Beck to
disassociate Warsaw from that alliance, but to strengthen and maintain Poland’s own
with France. Marshal Piłsudski’s last advice to Beck was for Polish foreign policy to stay
idle for a certain time and to wait and see what the rest of Europe would do, presumably
in response to the Franco-Soviet pact and Germany’s continuing rearmament. 363 Two
days later Marshal Józef Piłsudski succumbed to liver cancer, exactly nine years after his
coup d’état. His death brought great mourning to the Second Polish Republic, from
admirers and critics alike. But it also concluded the nine-year period of time that Sanacja
directed Polish foreign policy, one that provided the Republic with stability and a steady
path to follow in order to maintain its independence in the continuously changing
European political scene.
A Fateful Epilogue: The Last Four Years of Independence
After Piłsudski’s death, the Sanacja regime came to be known as the regime of the
Colonels, based on its makeup of military men who were close confidants of the late
Marshal’s. Beck continued to solely dictate foreign policy himself, one that would follow
361

Dębicki, 95.
Beck, 88.
363
Ibid, 88.
362

142
“the lines established by the Marshal…but that tactical means should be adapted to the
standards attainable by ordinary men, lest the dangerous error should be committed of
imitating the means of action as well the activities of a personality of such greatness.”364
What this meant was that Beck would carry out Piłsudski’s last wishes but refrain from
using the latter’s fame or legacy as a means to achieve or execute them.
The new Constitution that was completed in April empowered the presidency to a
greater extent, strengthening Mościcki’s position in Polish politics. Before his death,
Piłsudski had issued a decree for the position of Inspector General of Armies to be
bestowed upon one of his long-time and loyal subordinates, General Edward RydzSmigły, which was granted by the President within days. It was the General and other
various military personnel that made up the Colonels’ regime, with the President and
Beck steering clear of associating themselves with the faction. Over time, the Colonels
began to exploit their positions in government and gradually seek greater ruling
autonomy within them. This eventually created a political rivalry between their camp and
the Presidency’s, which was supported by the government supraparty the BBWR.
Although the majority of Polish historiography has downplayed the rivalry, it is without a
doubt that it came at a poor time following the Marshal’s death. It failed to alleviate the
economic, social, military, and foreign issues that plagued the Republic in its final four
years of existence.365
The road to World War II lay in Nazi Germany’s foreign policy for the last four
years before war engulfed Europe. Hitler had played a double game in executing his
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designs to completely undo the Versailles system and conquer the continent. While he
continued to practice a policy of nonaggression and stress Germany’s intentions to
coexist peacefully with its neighbors, a façade lay behind this where he progressed
German rearmament and pushed for more concessions from the West. But the latter did
not come from the kind of diplomacy that individuals like Stresemann had used to rebuild
postwar Germany. Hitler would find situations vulnerable to a fait accompli in Berlin’s
favor, at the expense of the four-year period that was also known for the West’s infamous
policy of appeasement. The latter wanted to avoid war at all costs, and so step-by-step
Hitler increasingly took full advantage of that position.
On March 7, 1936 German troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland,
clearly violating the Versailles Treaty and the agreements made seven years prior to
prematurely evacuate the area. An immediate danger arose that in the case of a German
attack on France’s allies, Czechoslovakia or Poland, Paris would not be able to easily
march into the Rhineland and separate Germany from its industrial heartland.366 While
Hitler justified the action by citing the Franco-Soviet pact as a violation of the 1925
Locarno agreement, the irony in the Rhineland’s German remilitarization lay in that
Locarno’s guarantors Great Britain and Italy remained idle. Mussolini had for some time
flirted with the Nazis and chose neutrality, while London evaded the option of using
force as they saw it as a French matter to initiate mobilization. Reliant on British foreign
policy, Paris chose to sound out Warsaw’s response rather than mobilize. Beck may have
had reservations about the French, but in carrying out the late Marshal’s wishes, he
maintained the alliance with France by issuing a declaration that Poland would not
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hesitate to carry out its obligations to aid its ally if it was attacked by Germany. 367
However he made it known that the declaration only applied if German troops had
stepped on French soil as stated under the alliance’s military convention.368 This move
may have been to prevent any ripples from forming within German-Polish relations, but
also to reapproach Poland’s ally with caution, based on the previous years of maligned
cooperation.
Throughout the spring, the French General Staff approached its Polish counterpart
in an effort to procure a more concrete promise of Polish allegiance to the growing threat
of Nazi Germany. The growth of his political influence and power compelled General
Rydz-Smigły to take up the matter of bringing closer cooperation between both sides. It
was in late August that the General visited Paris and concluded the Rambouillet
Agreement where France agreed to transfer a credit of one billion francs in hard currency
to Poland for the modernization of its military forces.369 It became a milestone in the
Franco-Polish alliance as it began a genuine rapprochement between both sides after
years of estranged relations.370 Although there was an effort by France and Poland to
improve their military cooperation as a precaution, no concrete measure was taken by the
West or Poland in response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland.
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Having taken the Rhineland with very little opposition, Berlin now fixed its eyes
on Austria. For years, Hitler and the Nazi party had stressed the unity of the Germanspeaking people through an Anschluss where the German Reich would incorporate the
Austrian state. Since the assassination of the latter’s president, Engelbert Dolfuss, Vienna
had come under heavy Nazi influence. But Dolfuss’ successors refused to yield to
Hitler’s demands, leading to the entrance of German troops into Austria on March 12,
1938, where the public displayed very little opposition. While the West took no action,
Poland took advantage of a highly publicized border incident with Lithuania as part of
Warsaw’s desire to create some sort of defensive bloc of states between Germany and
Russia.371 Beck saw the reopening of diplomatic relations with Lithuania as the first step
towards this conception.
In the past ten years there were some efforts to conclude a Lithuanian-Polish
rapprochement, only for Piłsudski to dismiss them on the grounds that Kaunas continued
to send unaccredited diplomats to negotiate with Warsaw. In late 1934, Beck had met
with Prime Minister Stasys Lozoraitis at the latter’s request to begin the thaw in their
states’ relations. But the talks went nowhere as Beck felt that his counterpart did not offer
a clear solution to the improvement of relations.372 Thus border incidents continued as did
the mutual oppression of each side’s minorities, culminating in a highly publicized
incident on March 11 when a Polish border guard was shot and killed by some
Lithuanians. After a conference held in Warsaw’s royal castle on March 17, Beck issued
a forty-eight hour ultimatum to Kaunas to resume diplomatic relations in order to put an
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end to the exhausting disturbances, or face the consequences. While key military figures
in the Colonels regime favored a more severe response to the incident, Beck felt that an
immediate military move would only worsen Poland’s reputation in the eyes of the
West.373 Two days later, the Lithuanians officially accepted the ultimatum primarily due
to the failure of the West to restrain Poland and find a better solution. The whole affair in
itself was a Polish response to the Anschluss in two ways. Not only did Poland seek
solidarity with its northern neighbor in the wake of Nazi Germany’s territorial expansion;
its ultimatum was perhaps a warning directed at Berlin that Warsaw remained vigilant of
Germany’s increasing aggressive tendencies.
Hitler now turned his attention to Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, a strip of land
that bordered the Reich and contained a large German minority. In the wake of the
Anschluss, pro-Nazi propaganda and agitation rapidly increased in the region to the
extent that it gave Berlin a precedent to demand Prague’s secession of it. The latter
appealed to the West and its French ally for aid to combat Hitler’s ultimatum, which had
been backed by military preparations to invade the Czech state. But the Western policy of
appeasement infamously prevailed yet again in the hope that the Reich’s appetite for
territory could be satisfied through moderation as opposed to the barrel of a gun. Thus
British, French, Italian, and German representatives convened in Munch on September
29, 1938 to conclude the Munich Agreement, where the Sudetenland was peacefully
awarded to Nazi Germany.
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But just a few days prior to Munich, Prague faced another territorial crisis when it
received Warsaw’s announcement that it would no longer recognize the minority
agreement between both its governments signed in 1925. Attached to this statement was
also the demand for Prague’s secession of Teschen, something that Beck had formulated
a few weeks prior in order to align with Germany’s demand for the Sudetenland.374 AntiCzech propaganda was ramped up as were preparations for the mobilization of Polish
forces on the border, all aimed at pressuring Prague to accept the demand. Beck’s
argument was that Poland needed to take the valued area back before Berlin laid claim to
it, as the Sudetenland’s annexation would put the German-Polish boundary close to
Teschen.375 The Polish move caught the West by surprise and drew its scorn, particularly
from France who held alliances with both Eastern European states. Preoccupied with
moderating Hitler’s demands and preventing a German attack on Czechoslovakia, the
West did not respond to the Czech-Polish crisis. Beneš, who had succeeded President
Masaryk a year earlier, vainly attempted to moderate the situation by writing to Mościcki.
Finally on September 30, the Poles put forth a twelve-hour ultimatum for the secession to
be completed by noon of October 1 or Polish troops would march in and seize Teschen.
Powerless, Prague gave in and the Poles annexed the territory that the Czechs had
forcefully seized from them in 1919 during the Polish-Soviet war. The Munich crisis not
only became the highlight of Western appeasement, but also the affirmation that Poland
374
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would conduct its own aggressive policy to protect its interests and position in Europe in
the wake of new attempts to establish a Great Power directorate.
With Central Europe increasingly falling under Nazi control, Warsaw began to
examine Poland’s position in the region. Beginning in October 1938, Poland began to
search for allies within the region as it assumed that Germany would continue to drive
east with its expansionist agenda. In mid-October Beck paid a visit to Romania to
propose the idea of Warsaw becoming a broker for a Hungarian-Romanian détente and
territorial settlement. Beck was under the strong assumption that Germany would
continue to swallow up the Czech state and divide the Baltic region from the Danubian
basin.376 Under these circumstances, it would be wise to form a tripartite collaboration in
order to shield the region from German penetration. Beck’s idea was for Budapest to
annex sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, while Bucharest could extend its border up to the
Jablonica-Marmarosz Sziget region. The end result would be Poland having a border with
Hungary and Romania. Yet this plan did not materialize because Beck refused to
militarily aid Hungary’s annexation of Ruthenia.
But the bigger obstacle to the formation of the bloc was Poland’s Romanian ally.
Relations between both states were cold since the Romanian-Soviet debacle in late 1932.
As the years went on, Titulescu began to weaken the alliance by replacing Polish
influence with French and Russian ones.377 In his view, the latter’s collective security
schemes were of greater value and interest for Romania’s security. Since Beck refused to
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involve Warsaw in them, Titulescu began to view him as more of an enemy than an ally.
But in 1936 the Romanian threatened to resign from his post following a disagreement,
only to have the King refuse to give in to his demands this time. Titulescu was dismissed,
and according to some sources, it was thanks to Warsaw exploiting the King’s interest in
reaffirming the Polish-Romanian alliance.378 Despite the return to a pro-Polish policy,
Bucharest continued to forestall any genuine rapprochement politically and militarily.
Thus it was no surprise that Romania rejected the Polish overture of a détente with
Hungary for fear of the annexation of Ruthenia triggering the latter’s territorial
aggrandizement.379
Poland began to feel the pinch of being geopolitically isolated yet again as
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated considerably since 1935. The relationship
suffered considerable strain due to the failure of the Eastern Pact. While Warsaw tried to
influence the West to reconsider entering an agreement with Moscow, the latter accused
the former of sabotaging the collective security scheme. But since Warsaw possessed
favorable relations with Berlin since the conclusion of the their nonaggression pact,
Moscow continuously accused the Poles of becoming partners with the Nazis. Although
tensions cooled to a degree when both sides concluded economic agreements in the first
half of 1939, any cooperation in the wake of the expanding Third Reich was out of the
question. Moscow resumed its distrust for Warsaw, while the latter had adopted a new
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conviction that siding with Russia would “provoke Berlin’s wrath and could conceivably
lead to an outbreak of hostilities.”380
Nazi Germany’s next victim was Poland when Hitler’s new Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop submitted a proposal to Lipski on October 24, 1938. It outlined
the return of Danzig to Germany, the building of a superhighway across Pomerania, and
asked for future cooperation starting with Poland joining the 1937 Anti-Comintern Pact
aimed against the Soviet Union.381 Without hesitation the Poles refused the offer, citing
that cooperation against Russia would end disastrously for Poland, and reminding Berlin
of Hitler’s statements a year ago that Danzig should remain in Poland’s sphere of
influence. By early spring, Warsaw decided to take steps to counter the increasing
German pressure. Since 1935, there was not much activity in the British-Polish
rapprochement. But with Nazi Germany’s continuous aggrandizement, both sides
reopened negotiations to form an alliance to oppose any further concessions to Hitler’s
demands. Thus in April 1939, Great Britain formally guaranteed Poland’s security should
the latter become the victim of German aggression. Seeing the change in British foreign
policy, the French soon reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance with Poland.382
Berlin viewed these recent events as defiant and a rejection to the German
proposal that Poland become a satellite state. Hitler made one last attempt at demanding
the return of Danzig only to have Beck outright refuse the ultimatum in a famous speech
given before the Sejm on May 5. Poland now became an obstacle to Nazi Germany’s
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foreign policy, thus prompting Berlin to cut a deal with its enemy, former ally, and above
all, Poland’s feared rival: the Soviet Union. The concluding of the Nazi-Soviet
Nonaggression Pact on August 23, 1939 reaffirmed both states’ renunciation to wage war
against each other or for one side to aid a third party against the other. But a top-secret
protocol was attached to the agreement that sealed the fate of the Second Polish Republic.
In the early morning hours of September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland to start
World War II. As a result, Great Britain and France declared war only to have their actual
mobilization to aid their ally delayed by several weeks. Help never came and Polish
forces were forced to protect their rear after Soviet forces invaded on September 17. The
policy of równowaga or “equilibrium” had failed and by October 6, the Second Polish
Republic ceased to exist on the map of Europe.

152

CONCLUSION
Sanacja’s foreign policy was based on the premise of removing Poland from its
geopolitical isolation and attainting a guarantee for its security. For the first six years
while Marshal Józef Piłsudski consolidated Sanacja’s control over Poland’s domestic
scene, August Zaleski directed foreign affairs where Polish security interests were
advanced in a more proactive way through the League of Nations and the establishment
of direct contact with neighbors and allies. But like his predecessors he too learned the
difficulty in doing this, as Great Power states such as Great Britain and France favored
cooperating with Germany, yesterday’s enemy but today’s partner. By the 1930s the
latter had made more progress in shedding the shackles of Versailles, as the attainment of
an early evacuation of Allied troops from the Rhineland could now be placed next to the
accomplishments made at Locarno by German foreign policy. Having secured its western
frontier, Berlin could now shift its attention to the east to undo further undo the injustice
that Versailles had caused Germany.
Seeing the likely possibility of a future negotiation for territorial revision, Marshal
Józef Piłsudski decided to direct Polish foreign policy towards a more independent
course, where full cooperation with Poland’s allies or the League would no longer be
stressed due to their willingness to sacrifice the Polish security interests. He appointed his
long-time and loyal subordinate, Colonel Józef Beck, to succeed Zaleski and direct the
new orientation that Polish foreign policy had taken. The latter was highlighted by
adoption of strong-arm tactics towards the Free City of Danzig, which continued to be a
hotbed for Polish-German relations. But the greatest feat that defined Sanacja’s reign
over foreign policy was the creation of its sub-policy of równowaga or “equilibrium.”
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Just two years after securing Poland’s eastern frontier via a nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union, Beck and Piłsudski had taken advantage of the thawing of Polish-German
relations to conclude a similar pact with Berlin that secured the western frontier. The
second pillar of Sanacja’s foreign policy had been raised, with Polish concerns over
security now satisfied through peace with its two aggressive neighbors and the
preservation of its alliances.
But was Polish foreign policy under Sanacja a success, and if so, did it come at a
price? There were plenty of setbacks and only a few triumphs, but the main conclusion to
draw from this nine-year period is whether it placed the Republic in a better position than
its predecessors, and to an extent, its successors as well. The small historiography that
actually examines the successes and failures of Polish foreign policy tends to study the
policy of equilibrium under Beck and Piłsudski, and not so much the first few years under
Zaleski. Yet it is worth reviewing before a critique and or appraisal of the nine-year
period is presented. Of course there are two schools of thought for Polish foreign policy:
those that are critical of it and goes as far as to blame it for contributing to the start of
World War II, and those that seek to exonerate it of the latter charge and argue that its
decisions were favorable in light of the dangerous changes being made to the postwarVersailles system.
The typical criticism of Polish foreign policy stems from the German-Polish
Nonaggression Pact of 1934, where historians accused it of breaking the Franco-Polish
alliance and bringing Nazi Germany out of geopolitical isolation. With this, the members
of Sanacja have often been labeled as pro-Nazi or “Nazi agents,” the latter being an
accusation Soviet historiography has particularly subjected Colonel Beck to. But Anna
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M. Cienciała’s 1975 article dismisses many of these stereotypes by looking at their
sources. The early works that reviewed Polish foreign policy tended to level harsh
criticisms against it, mainly because they examined it through the scope of British foreign
policy, one that held no interest in Polish affairs and favored Germany’s recovery,
whether economically or territorially.383 Most works that label Beck as a German agent or
collaborator tend to be Soviet sources, which attempt to justify the failure of the Second
Republic by grouping it in the same fascist camp as Nazi Germany. Cienciała
acknowledged that Beck may have overly expressed his dislike for his French and Czech
counterparts, but based on the shortcomings of the latter two and the European
community as a whole, one could hardly find substantive evidence that Beck tried
purposely weaken the alliance with France or collude with Hitler against Czechoslovakia
in 1938.384 According to Henry L. Roberts, Beck’s actions may have added to the further
weakening of the international order at the time, but unlike other European leaders he
took a courageous stand by defying Hitler and his territorial demands.385 Yet there are
still some Polish historians like Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz who completely blame Beck
for blindly playing into the hands of Germany. Others like Jan Karski have been softer in
their critiques, citing that Beck should bear all the responsibility for his policy’s
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successes and failures, since he molded the Foreign Ministry after his own image and
philosophy.386
Cienciała is part of the group of historians who attempt to exonerate Polish
foreign policy of the above accusations, by justifying its methods and decision-making
due to the difficult positions the European community was putting states like Poland in.
The most popular example is the deterioration of the Franco-Polish alliance, which this
camp tends to point the finger at the former for attempting to retreat from its obligations.
French foreign policy was similar to that of Great Britain’s, in that it chose to sacrifice
Eastern Europe’s interests in return for stabilizing its own border with Germany. When
attempts were made by Paris to revise the alliance’s military convention, the Poles out
right refused. For precautionary measures, they began to conduct an independent policy
from that of their ally’s, since the French continuously failed to support or even include
them in major negotiations and schemes. Defending the policy of equilibrium is not only
linked to citing the problems plaguing the Franco-Polish alliance, but also the
advantageous opportunity that Poland had found itself in, to conclude nonaggression
pacts with both of its two large neighbors. In 1932 and 1934, relations with the Soviet
Union and Germany were favorable enough where negotiations could take place to reach
some kind of an agreement. Warsaw primarily accomplished this because both of its
neighbors began to drift away from their own mutual cooperation, dampening the spirits
of Rapallo and Berlin. Yet Cienciała has cited that historians have misinterpreted the
policy, as Beck and Piłsudski did not aim for Poland to balance Germany and Russia
alone and forever. Rather, the goal was to strengthen “Poland’s position so as to
counterbalance France’s concentration on security in the West to the detriment of the
386
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East.” 387 What this probably meant was that Polish foreign policy still intended to
strengthen the alliance with France and maintain the sub-policy of equilibrium until
something better and stronger came along to replace it, preferably in cooperation with the
West.
Yet the two-sided historiography still tends to overlook other issues that give
strength to either interpretation of Polish foreign policy. Perhaps the number one problem
that the Republic faced was territorial disputes with its neighbors. Without a doubt this
issue caused tension if not an absolute severance in relations between Poland and states
like Germany, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. The Sanacja regime inherited the
burden of the Republic’s territorial acquisitions and losses from the immediate postwar
years. Yet it maintained its arrogance of entitlement to certain areas like Upper Silesia
and Vilna, and the stubbornness to let the Teschen question poison Polish-Czech
relations. With regards to the latter, the Republic was better off renouncing its claims to it
and resurrecting the failed Polish-Czech negotiations for better relations in the early
1920s. Although Teschen was heavily Polish in ethnic makeup, one can make the
argument that Poland got away with its ownership of the predominantly ethnic German
Pomerania. The Polish claims to Vilna are themselves questionable, whether its
ownership was truly worth the extinction of relations with Lithuania. A Polish Vilna was
part of Piłsudski’s postwar vision to rebuild the borders of pre-1772 Poland. But the
Marshal failed to realize that his concept did not fit in the early 20th century makeup of
postwar Europe, as there now existed an independent Lithuanian state whose claims to
Vilna long outdated Poland’s. In terms of security against the likes of Germany and
Russia, the Republic might have benefited more from stronger strategic relationship with
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its Czech and Lithuanian neighbors, rather than pieces of territory that made its borders
all the more awkward and difficult to defend.
Frustrations over the alliance with France were clearly present, but Piłsudski never
desired to abandon it despite his growing doubt over its reliability. Yet the Polish
decision to simply keep the exclusive partnership around does not excuse the Republic
from accepting an equal weight in blame for the alliance’s impotence. Yes, the foreign
policy of both states widely differed in how to achieve the greatest guarantee for security.
But this did not mean that Poland had to completely stray away from cooperation with
France. Though Warsaw had preferred to act independently of its ally, it made a great
error in not regularly informing France of negotiations with Nazi Germany in late 1933.
Piotr S. Wandycz has cited that the alliance and the nonaggression pact were “clashing”
with each other, probably because French and Polish policy towards Germany never once
aligned at the same time.388 The latter may have had its shortcomings throughout the
1920s in consulting its Polish ally on political decisions, but Poland would have been
better off not imitating French gestures of disrespect and violations of the alliance’s
political clause. Thus this Polish tit-for-tat attitude weakened the alliance by inadvertently
promoting further alienation and mutual distrust, rather than it strengthening Sanacja’s
self-dependent foreign policy.
Poland had mainly refused to join the Little Entente after the conclusion of World
War I, due to the Teschen dispute with Czechoslovakia. Thus it is fair to accuse the state
of creating a division in France’s Eastern European defensive system right from the start
of the Interwar period. Years later this would have repercussions for the Sanacja regime,
as individuals like Beck and Piłsudski continued to withhold their willingness to
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negotiate with Poland’s southern neighbor lest it rectify the territorial dispute. But could
Warsaw have been able to accept Prague’s pro-Russian philosophy? Possibly. It still
maintained the alliance with France despite the latter’s courting of Germany and later, the
Soviet Union. Romania regarded the latter as its number one threat to independence, yet
it still cooperated with Czechoslovakia within the framework of the Little Entente. If
anything, Warsaw could have negotiated its neutrality from supporting any CzechRussian schemes, and perhaps focus relations more towards a Polish-Czech military
cooperation.
Since touching upon Romania, it is only fair to critique that alliance with Poland
as well. Polish complaints over its southeastern ally stemmed from the weakness of
Bucharest’s military command and later, that the alliance did not benefit Polish concerns
over Germany. Perhaps diverting more attention towards cooperation between the Polish
and Romanian General Staff would have alleviated the first issue. With regards to the
second, the Poles should not have attempted to change the alliance to now accommodate
both, a Russian and or German attack. The Polish-Romanian alliance should have been
maintained and strengthened to keep the Russian threat in check. Whereas some may say
that the personality of Nicolae Titulescu was unbearable, others would defend the
Romanian by citing him as being cut from the same cloth as Beneš or Briand, and
adhering to the League and the Little Entente’s interests. Regardless, Sanacja may have
missed its opportunity to settle tensions with the Foreign Minister when he began to
realize that Romania could be threatened by Germany. When adding a stronger PolishRomanian relationship to an improved Polish-Little Entente one, maybe Piłsudski and
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later Beck’s vision of a East Central European bloc of states could have been realized to
maintain the peace of Europe and the security of its individual states.
The leadership of Marshal Piłsudski and the Sanacja regime also deserves some
criticism for any shortcomings or negligence during this nine-year period. One of the
great problems that Poland ran into during the September 1939 campaign was the
inefficiency of its military. Despite having one of the largest militaries during the
Interwar period, by the mid-1930s its technology, arsenal, and strategy was beginning to
become outdated. 389 The Republic was able to procure French loans to build its war
stockpile, but it never truly got around to it. Piłsudski may have been preoccupied with
domestic and foreign policy, but it comes as a shock that the Marshal would allow the
military’s capabilities to deteriorate dangerously, especially given his position as
Inspector General of Armies, War Minister, and his personal dedication for “his” army.
But by the time he realized that the army needed work and that the buildup of a navy was
necessary in 1934, it was too late.390 The great mind and talents of the Marshal’s began to
fade away and were replaced by a prolonged illness that would claim his life just a few
months later.
One must wonder whether the three primary leaders of Sanacja’s foreign policy
were cut out to direct it? Above all else, Piłsudski was a capable and intelligent military
leader who lacked the qualifications of a diplomat. He understood the dangers that faced
Poland, but he may have failed to realize how relations with other states truly worked,
389
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which at times allowed his impatience and frustration to get the better of him. At times
the end result was something as severe as alienating Poland’s neighbors and or allies, if
not logic in general. One may even see his obsession over a Russian threat as one that
negatively affected his decisions, particularly when the General Staff’s report in 1934
saw Germany as the greater threat to Poland in the future. Beck too, lacked the
diplomatic skills and like his mentor, approached foreign policy from a military strategic
standpoint. According to Roberts, the problem with Beck was that he rose through the
ranks of the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry too fast.391 His previous positions
were all military and intelligence related, thus he probably would have been more
valuable in that facet of Poland’s government. One must wonder whether he too,
obsessed over a Russian threat and perhaps made incorrect judgments on the Nazi regime
in his own study of it. Zaleski on the other hand, possessed all the qualifications and
skills of a diplomat. The only error to his methods was that he placed too much emphasis
in conducting Polish foreign policy vis-à-vis the League of Nations, which realistically
had always been dominated by the Western states who overlooked Polish interests. Thus
when it came to protecting the latter in light of events such as the premature evacuation
of the Rhineland, Zaleski found himself in the same position as his predecessor,
Aleksander Skrzyński, appeasing Western desires and accepting a risky promise that
Poland’s security was not in jeopardy.392 One hesitates to but finds it appropriate to label
the former foreign minister as hypocritical, as he failed to set himself and his methods
apart from his predecessor’s.
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Briefly looking at the last four years of the Republic’s existence, one must wonder
whether Sanacja’s foreign policy set up the Colonels regime for disaster. Even though
Beck continued Piłsudski’s policies and final wishes, he did have a tendency to maintain
better contact with Germany than with Russia. When it came to major events like the
Anschluss and the Sudetenland crisis, Beck arguably took a page out of Hitler’s playbook
by handing Lithuania an ultimatum and annexing Teschen when Czechoslovakia was
vulnerable. These kinds of actions drew disappointment from the West and could have
sent Hitler the wrong messages of hope that Polish aggression could be used in the Nazi
crusade against Russia.393 But when Poland refused such a venture and garnered British
guarantees for its independence instead, it may have provoked the Führer to now devise a
plan with the Soviet Union to bring about Poland’s fate. Though the alliance with France
was solidly reaffirmed in 1939, it was too late and earlier efforts had been wasted in the
wake of the Rhineland’s remilitarization. Thus not only was the sub-policy of equilibrium
not maintained in the last four years, too much time had been wasted in creating a new
security system to replace the former and the West’s outdated Locarno guarantee.
Yet when looking at the drastically changing political atmosphere in Europe
during this nine-year period, can one truly blame Sanacja for directing a self-dependent
foreign policy that created an equilibrium that solely favored Poland? World War I had
created this great stigma or rather fear throughout Europe, of another small conflict
dragging all states into another continental war. As a result, many states such as the
Western ones chose to avoid confrontation through arbitration and or concessions. Once
393

I find Cienciała’s following observation quite interesting that Beck’s foreign policy had been one of
“…tacking with the wind to avoid isolated confrontation with Germany as long as this was possible.”
Cienciała, “Polish Foreign Policy,” 52. If one takes this into consideration and the failed concept of a
united bloc of states from Scandinavia to the Danubian basin, Beck’s policies had backfired on him and
thus by late 1938, early 1939 Poland had found itself geopolitically isolated yet again.

162
Germany scored a victory at Locarno, it continued to push for greater reintegration into
European politics, and demand more concessions to reduce its Versailles punishments.
The critical error committed by the West was the failure to abandon their accommodating
stance and uphold the postwar settlements, even after Adolf Hitler had taken power and
removed Germany from the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference.
But another significant problem lay in the League’s decay. Its original purpose
was to preserve peace and promote security, acting as an arbitrator when conflict arose
between member states. Yet Piłsudski’s observation that the institution had become a tool
for the Great Powers to dictate theirs and the smaller states’ interests proved correct. But
a dangerous precedent arose within it, as the small powers began to follow and support
almost all decisions made by the Great ones. This opened the door for schemes such as
the Four Power Pact to come to fruition with little to no opposition, with the League
being reduced to a rubber stamp in approving the Great Powers’ desires and decisions.
Since the latter institution lacked practically any plurality, it thus became more of a social
club whose powers to enforce the postwar Versailles order became utterly ineffective and
reduced to nothing more than a platform for verbal shaming.
The Second Polish Republic’s independence and existence heavily relied on the
above. As the League decayed and Germany’s strength grew, Poland’s security
diminished and its fears amplified. With the deterioration of the alliance with France, the
Republic had two choices: follow the West’s lead to uncertainty or take a new, selfcontrolled direction. With the emergence of the Sanacja regime, the second choice was
arguably forced upon it. Although risky, it allowed Poland room for maneuverability in
making decisions that benefited the state and its security concerns. Thus when the
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opportunities arose to conclude mutual agreements with Germany and the USSR, they
were taken without hesitation and created a balance in the East to make up for the gaps
created by Locarno. Warsaw’s decisions did not always come with the rest of Europe’s
approval, but nor did the often accepted French or British ones either. If the West only
accommodated its own position, it thus set a precedent if not a model for the rest of
Europe to follow. Sanacja’s Poland saw this and adopted this method. And when it fell in
1939, so did the Western trendsetters.
In general, the absence of European unity and the domination by individual states’
selfish tendencies to seek out solely their own security at the cost of everyone else’s, may
have been the ultimate mistake in which Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union capitalized
on in 1939. But if there is one last thing to consider in defense of Polish foreign policy
during the Interwar period as a whole, it is that the geopolitical positions of states like
France or Great Britain’s were never truly endangered, as history was in their favor. The
same could never be said for the Second Polish Republic, as it was reborn and forced to
make any decisions to protect its position between not one, but two large and aggressive
neighbors.
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